No Florida High Speed Rail

[Green Maned Lion]

What debt? These are grants, not loans.

Then why was the Governor of FL worried about having to pay it back?

Anybody who places political ideology over the benefit of the people who voted him into office is inherently a very special person. So special they ride short busses to special classes.

Expecting them to act in a logical and reasonable fashion that can be explained rationally is an abject example of insanity.

LOOK MR BRIGHT GUY WHO GOES BY DAXOMNI: You are great at name calling are you?? I have noticed that....my statement was not mine but THE GOV"s>>>>>I have no "dog" in this fight (discussion)...please stop with the name calling......of course I am not a genius, and don't pretend to be.....but because I had some difficulties with figuring how Rail Passes work, I guess all rookies should stay away from you.

Don't let Dax get to you. Failing to understand a rail pass would be an improvement on his part.

 

[pennyk]

As a Floridian, I am extremely disappointed. I do not think that our governor has the best interests of the citizens of Florida in mind. (I want to say a whole lot more, but I think it might be irrelevant to the topic, and I do not want to get into a spitting contest with anyone).

 

[Devil's Advocate]

As a Florida citizen, I am very disappointed. The traffic between Tampa and Orlando is horrendous. Florida is perfect for High Speed rail; flat surface, lots of tourists. It is very political just like when Jeb Bush facilitated a repeal of the high speed rail referendum that Florida voters had approved. I am looking forward to riding California's high speed rail line.

Keep in mind that the same nonsensical partisan attacks that have now killed Florida's HSR can also kill California's prospects as they continue to build momentum in the GOP. There is still no guarantee that America will ever see true HSR anywhere in the country.

I'll give you the benefit of doubt, on this one; but I thought it in poor taste. I viewed it as a shot, too. Very demeaning and singled out the poster. Not at all funny, either.

Meanwhile telling Obama to shove his passenger rail funding "where the sun don't shine" was both funny and tasteful apparently.

 

[Anderson]

I'll repeat what I've said elsewhere: The Orlampa line was a mess at best: Too short to actually "go" anywhere, it would have been, in essence, an Acela in an area with about 1/5 the population. Yes, you would have gotten a good deal of traffic off of I-4, but I think you would have been facing a decade-long buildup while the project bled money (and let's not even get into the probably inevitable cost overruns).

Honestly, Florida's best bet is probably a four-line system (Miami-Orlando-Tampa, Miami-Jacksonville, Jacksonville-Orlando-Tampa, and Miami-Orlando-Jacksonville...the redundant coast line is only important because of the high population concentration along the coast) with 2-4 trains per day on each route (I'm assuming 7-8 hours from JAX-MIA on the low end)...and looking at the per-mile cost...$5 billion for a line less than 100 miles long translates into a project cost of $50 million plus per mile to build. Simply routing everything through Orlando and ignoring the East Coast Line, if the per-mile basis were to carry over, you'd be looking at over $20 billion for a statewide JAX-ORL-MIA project.

Look, Florida is an excellent candidate for improved rail service: It has a densely-packed corridor population along the east coast, and there's a second not-quite-a-corridor between Tampa, Orlando, and the east coast. But you don't go from minimal service to all-out HSR without inviting a disaster. The Acela was built on the Metroliner service and on the highly-traveled NEC...it was built on a region with 8-12 million riders on Amtrak alone, not to mention the NJ Transit trains, Metro North services, and MARC runs available on segments of the line (and the VRE off the south end). Compare that with Orlampa and tell me how many people take a train from one to the other...and I will bet you dollars to doughnuts that number is less than 100,000, seeing as annual transits to/from Tampa are only in the 130,000 range, and I am prepared to bet that the vast majority of that comes from somewhere else to Tampa (and that the vast majority of the Orlando traffic is from up north as well). Heck, out in California, you've got a decent existing network that's being built on.

So...I'm not too sorry to see this project go because while it was well-intentioned, I think that it was doomed to failure because it wasn't built on anything. I mean...an Orlando-Tampa line is basically a commuter line, but the best I can find for intercity travel there is a Greyhound. There's not even a bus service this is tapping into, and while I will agree that a train will attract plenty of folks a bus won't, to go from one train per day to a high-speed line over the extent of a planned system (as opposed to part of a system) does not compute if you're making it a public venture, because you're likely to find an embarrassing funding hole as a result.

Just by the way, was there even any talk on how many trains were supposed to run on this line and how much operational expenses (in real terms) would run?

 

[BobWeaver]

Just learned that Governor Rick Scott is refusing the high speed rail $ for Florida.

http://www.kgmi.com/...ntentId=7674012

When I read Sh!# like that, it just makes me wanna go postal.
What if all the Governors told Dwight D. the same thing 50 years ago? We'd still be driving coast-to-coast on two lane roads I guess.

The U.S.A. is destined to staying a 3rd-world country when it comes to HSR I guess. It just blows my mind.

We are afraid to "do" big projects anymore, like the Interstate System, or the Apollo project. Content to sit on the sidelines, and watch our world-side competitive advantages just disappear, and watch China and others pass us by. So sad.

In my mind, the recent state of the high speed rail push in the US has been grossly misdirected. The media and many Amtrak/rail supporters like the ones that post on here (don't take that the wrong way folks) liken the current HSR push to "building the next generation of the Interstate Highway System," when it is simply not the case. The current state of HSR in the United States (here) is really nothing more than a small number of largely localized high speed rail (a term that is up to interpretation anyway) designated corridors that, with the exception of SEHSR, don't link up to a greater network and require at least some form of state support. Do not confuse this with the original plan of the IHS, which was a Federal effort and was very deliberately designed as an interconnecting nationwide network. For proof, look at page 5 of the original General Location of National System of Interstate Highways publication from 1955, which can be found here. The two simply cannot be compared. I find it greatly disappointing and short-sighted that our current plan for a high speed rail network remains so fragmented, and that this country, as well as many of its states, lacks a comprehensive master plan for the future of its transportation, distribution, and logistics systems.

From a rail supporter's perspective, it is unfortunate to watch HSR having such a hard time getting off the ground domestically. However, from someone who is realistic, very fiscally-aware, and future-oriented, I have to agree that it is not the right time for HSR in its current form. I have personally opposed any HSR project outside of California's effort and SEHSR, because I believe that these two areas have not only the greatest need, but also the greatest potential. I believe, and have for some time now, that the public isn't necessarily set on the prospect of true HSR for the future of rail transportation. Sure, the marketing aspect of HSR is sexy - a sleek, modern, electric train pulling into a shiny newly-constructed station whisking you away to your destination at 150+mph...I mean, who wouldn't want that, right? - but realistically, all that most Americans want in the present and near-future are consistent, reliable, drive-competitive trains. There is very much so pent-up demand for this type of service in our country. If this weren't the case, NCDOT would not have seen the need to institute 2 new midday round-trip departures (74/75) between Charlotte and Raleigh, in addition to its existing two round-trips per day (80/79 and 73/74). Could one drive the same distance in an hour less and at a lower fuel cost than the $26 one-way itinerary? Most likely, assuming no traffic. But for many people, there exists a certain willingness-to-pay in premium for not having to drive it. The implementation of this new midday service is proof of all the above. Additionally, NCDOT would not see a need to extend service from Salisbury to Asheville (a city whose airport passenger numbers have been skyrocketing recently), and from Raleigh to Wilmington if the demand didn't exist. Another perfect example is the large success of the Amtrak Regional extension to Lynchburg. As with trains 74/75, one could drive the distance in about an hour's less time, but for an increasingly small difference in fuel cost as compared to the $29 one-way fare, again assuming no traffic. Again, the service's unexpected (not so much to me; I figured it would break the ridership goal, but not to the extent that it did) success is a testament to what consumers are content with and want in our country. From 10/1/09, to 9/30/10, the Lynchburg train achieved an annual ridership of 126,072, exceeding its initial yearly target of 51,000 by 147.2 percent. The service also exceeded its initial annual revenue goal of $2,580,000 by generating $6,337,457.42 in revenue, 145.6 percent over the goal. The new Richmond extension introduced at around the same time is doing well also. Case in point.

In going with the idiom, "you have to walk before you can run," I deeply believe that our focus should be on implementing new service and/or extending existing service at current speeds, all the while improving the existing infrastructure, and expanding where necessary with the goal of continuous improvement at a relatively even spending level. Obviously, first updating and fixing our existing network's most serious problems and bottlenecks (read: Chicago congestion, the NEC, Amtrak equipment, etc.) would involve a potentially large initial outlaying of public funds, but its benefits would be clear and very, very noticeable. However, after the initial large-scale, large-effect updates and improvements have been completed, smaller continuous improvements of the system would take over, and would be far less likely to require large capital investments. But more importantly, these funds would go towards optimizing an existing integrated system, not an entirely new project. The truth is that HSR is simply too much to swallow at this time financially with the state of the economy. The Department of the Treasury reporting a deficit of $1.29 trillion for 2010 and our national debt being more than $14 trillion as of last month certainly doesn't help the HSR case either. Without a plan in place for a national, integrated network like we had with our Interstate Highway System, we are unable to prioritize route planning, and as a result, we get projects like the ~80-mile-long Orlando-Tampa corridor. That is, small, localized routes whose benefits to the nation as a whole are ambiguous at best. Are HSR projects that small really necessary? I think the answer to that is no, given the vast amount of funding that it would require. I instead would support, and I think the public would as well, a network of consistent, clean, frequent 79-90mph trains whose upfront costs would be significantly less, yet would still offer drivers an advantage over a frustrating, cluttered drive up Interstate 4. It also concerns me that such short routes would prevent us from realizing potential cost savings from a lack of scale as opposed to if the project was part of a larger integrated plan, in addition to the potential for differences in equipment, technical aspects, personnel, etc. between two given corridors.

Overall, I do feel that we are moving in the right direction in general with rail transportation, albeit slowly. We must remember that our government has much on its plate right now in terms of transportation funding, and passenger rail must compete with the need for an updated air traffic control system, highway rebuilding and expansion, and modernization and expansion of our ports, all of which we badly need, and arguably more than localized HSR corridors. The reality that many states are coming to is that "Yes, HSR would be nice, but we simply can't justify its upfront costs and the risks associated with it, especially at the current time. Instead, let's get a dialogue going with the guys over at the freight railroads and see what we can mutually agree on to perhaps get some existing speed passenger trains running on existing infrastructure," which is totally acceptable in my opinion. It's what North Carolina has been doing for the last decade, albeit with a unique agreement with NS, and it's what Virginia has started to do in the last few years. A perfect example is the new service that was approved late last year for new 79mph service to Norfolk from Petersburg/Richmond via the NS, which will provide a viable alternative to the congested I-95 and I-64 corridors, and will serve the Hampton Roads area as a whole, an area of 1+ million that hasn't seen passenger rail since 1977. The cost for this ~85 mile project? A cool $87 million, funded by a Rail Enhancement Fund grant. Quite a sizable contrast to the $2.4 billion price tag on the similarly sized Tampa-Orlando corridor, with probably only about 20-30 minutes' difference in travel time. Florida Governor Rick Scott was quoted as saying, "Government cannot spend more than it takes in. ... The truth is that this project would be far too costly to taxpayers and I believe the risk far outweighs the benefits." I'll side with Rick on this one. A continuous improvement strategy and culture is what keeps an increasingly large amount of companies competitive in today's business environment. Here's to hoping our nation's passenger rail system can do the same.

I'll be hopping on the new Lynchburg train to Newark in 2 weeks and then will be returning the following weekend on it from Washington. I am very much looking forward to supporting this service and becoming a part of its successful numbers.

CM

 

[volkris]

Please don't fall into the trap of confusing honest ideological disagreements with gamesmanship by greedy politicians looking to screw over their constituents.

People honestly disagree as to the value of rail and providing rail to citizens, and that's a rational, reasonable disagreement. After all, as GML recently pointed out, the value of something like HSR doesn't appear on any balance sheet. Similarly, the value of avoiding the risks that Florida was taking on with this project (and yes, there were risks to the state's budget even with the private contracts) doesn't appear on a balance sheet either.

So how do you decide between those apples and oranges? Republicans might tend to think one apple is wort two oranges while Democrats think it's one to three. Neither are bad people for their opinions there, and neither is trying to game the system. They simply disagree about how much they like apples.

The push for civility starts with assuming the other side has the best of intentions.

Edit: I just read the cahsrblog response to the Reason study. Ho-ly-geez, what an empty smearpiece that was! Even ignoring the wholly inappropriate tone of the post, it refuted a report about a report, not the report itself. It sounds like the poster never even read the original report, and so is in no position to actually critique its reasoning.

 

[Ryan]

Please don't fall into the trap of confusing honest ideological disagreements with gamesmanship by greedy politicians looking to screw over their constituents.

You're absolutely correct. This has absolutely nothing to do with the former and everything to do with the latter. It boils down to a simple calculus for this governor (and the others in WI and OH). Barack Obama supports it, so therefore I must be against it. Nothing more.

 

[The Davy Crockett]

Please don't fall into the trap of confusing honest ideological disagreements with gamesmanship by greedy politicians looking to screw over their constituents.

You're absolutely correct. This has absolutely nothing to do with the former and everything to do with the latter. It boils down to a simple calculus for this governor (and the others in WI and OH). Barack Obama supports it, so therefore I must be against it. Nothing more.

I agree. The self-serving, negative and short-on-fact partisan rhetoric that way too many of our politicians engage in will keep us muddling along in short-sighted mediocrity. Times like these are never America at her best.

 

[ALC Rail Writer]

What debt? These are grants, not loans.

Then why was the Governor of FL worried about having to pay it back?

By accepting the money, he commits the state to operate the train for 20 years. That commitment includes covering any operating losses. If he or any future Governor, or the legislature for that matter, fails to cover the operating costs and instead decides to shut the operation down within that 20 year period, then the State of Florida is obligated to repay the Fed for the grants.

Florida actually came very close to this situation with Tri-Rail, as they barely passed funding in time to keep Tri-Rail running ahead of massive cuts that would have triggered repayment of a Federal grant to double track the line.

All Federal grants come with similar strings attached. They want to make sure that the states don't just throw the money away or use it for other than the intended purpose.

And the Florida legislature has never been known for consistency.

Here's how politics works in this country:

Press. Obama lauds HSR in his SotU speech

Glenn Beck goes on the next day saying HSR is "socialism" and declare that it is a slap at our rights and freedoms to choose modes of transportation

Egypt happens, everybody is momentarily distracted

With the news cycle back to normal, Rick Scott (T-FL) appeases his conservative base

 

[jb64]

Just learned that Governor Rick Scott is refusing the high speed rail $ for Florida.

http://www.kgmi.com/...ntentId=7674012

When I read Sh!# like that, it just makes me wanna go postal.
What if all the Governors told Dwight D. the same thing 50 years ago? We'd still be driving coast-to-coast on two lane roads I guess.

The U.S.A. is destined to staying a 3rd-world country when it comes to HSR I guess. It just blows my mind.

We are afraid to "do" big projects anymore, like the Interstate System, or the Apollo project. Content to sit on the sidelines, and watch our world-side competitive advantages just disappear, and watch China and others pass us by. So sad.

In my mind, the recent state of the high speed rail push in the US has been grossly misdirected. The media and many Amtrak/rail supporters like the ones that post on here (don't take that the wrong way folks) liken the current HSR push to "building the next generation of the Interstate Highway System," when it is simply not the case. The current state of HSR in the United States (here) is really nothing more than a small number of largely localized high speed rail (a term that is up to interpretation anyway) designated corridors that, with the exception of SEHSR, don't link up to a greater network and require at least some form of state support. Do not confuse this with the original plan of the IHS, which was a Federal effort and was very deliberately designed as an interconnecting nationwide network. For proof, look at page 5 of the original General Location of National System of Interstate Highways publication from 1955, which can be found here. The two simply cannot be compared. I find it greatly disappointing and short-sighted that our current plan for a high speed rail network remains so fragmented, and that this country, as well as many of its states, lacks a comprehensive master plan for the future of its transportation, distribution, and logistics systems.

From a rail supporter's perspective, it is unfortunate to watch HSR having such a hard time getting off the ground domestically. However, from someone who is realistic, very fiscally-aware, and future-oriented, I have to agree that it is not the right time for HSR in its current form. I have personally opposed any HSR project outside of California's effort and SEHSR, because I believe that these two areas have not only the greatest need, but also the greatest potential. I believe, and have for some time now, that the public isn't necessarily set on the prospect of true HSR for the future of rail transportation. Sure, the marketing aspect of HSR is sexy - a sleek, modern, electric train pulling into a shiny newly-constructed station whisking you away to your destination at 150+mph...I mean, who wouldn't want that, right? - but realistically, all that most Americans want in the present and near-future are consistent, reliable, drive-competitive trains. There is very much so pent-up demand for this type of service in our country. If this weren't the case, NCDOT would not have seen the need to institute 2 new midday roundtrip departures (74/75) between Charlotte and Raleigh, in addition to its existing two roundtrips per day (80/79 and 73/74). Could one drive the same distance in an hour less and at a lower fuel cost than the $26 one-way itinerary? Most likely, assuming no traffic. But for many people, there exists a certain willingness-to-pay in premium for not having to drive it. The implementation of this new midday service is proof of all the above. Additionally, NCDOT would not see a need to extend service to Salisbury to Asheville, and from Raleigh to Wilmington if the demand didn't exist. Another perfect example is the large success of the Amtrak Regional extension to Lynchburg. As with trains 74/75, one could drive the distance in about an hour's less time, but for an increasingly small difference in fuel cost as compared to the $29 one-way fare, again assuming no traffic. Again, the service's unexpected (not so much to me; I figured it would break the ridership goal, but not to the extent that it did) success is a testament to what consumers are content with and want in our country. From 10/1/09, to 9/30/10, the Lynchburg train achieved an annual ridership of 126,072, exceeding its initial yearly target of 51,000 by 147.2 percent. The service also exceeded its initial annual revenue goal of $2,580,000 by generating $6,337,457.42 in revenue, 145.6 percent over the goal. The new Richmond extension introduced at around the same time is doing well also. Case in point.

In going with the idiom, "you have to walk before you can run," I deeply believe that our focus should be on implementing new service and/or extending existing service at current speeds, all the while improving the existing infrastructure, and expanding where necessary with the goal of continuous improvement at a relatively even spending level. Obviously, first updating and fixing our existing network's most serious problems and bottlenecks (read: Chicago congestion, the NEC, Amtrak equipment, etc.) would involve a potentially large initial outlaying of public funds, but its benefits would be clear and very, very noticeable. However, after the initial large-scale, large-effect updates and improvements have been completed, smaller continuous improvements of the system would take over, and would be far less likely to require large capital investments. But more importantly, these funds would go towards optimizing an existing integrated system, not an entirely new project. The truth is that HSR is simply too much to swallow at this time financially with the state of the economy. The Department of the Treasury reporting a deficit of $1.29 trillion for 2010 and our national debt being more than $14 trillion as of last month certainly doesn't help the HSR case either. Without a plan in place for a national, integrated network like we had with our Interstate Highway System, we are unable to prioritize route planning, and as a result, we get projects like the ~80-mile-long Orlando-Tampa corridor. That is, small, localized routes whose benefits to the nation as a whole are ambiguous at best. Are HSR projects that small really necessary? I think the answer to that is no, given the vast amount of funding that it would require. I instead would support, and I think the public would as well, a network of consistent, clean, frequent 79-90mph trains whose upfront costs would be significantly less, yet would still offer drivers an advantage over a frustrating, cluttered drive up Interstate 4. It also concerns me that such short routes would prevent us from realizing potential cost savings from a lack of scale as opposed to if the project was part of a larger integrated plan, in addition to the potential for differences in equipment, technical aspects, personnel, etc. between two given corridors.

Overall, I do feel that we are moving in the right direction in general with rail transportation, albeit slowly. We must remember that our government has much on its plate right now in terms of transportation funding, and passenger rail must compete with the need for an updated air traffic control system, highway rebuilding and expansion, and modernization and expansion of our ports, all of which we badly need, and arguably more than localized HSR corridors. The reality that many states are coming to is that "Yes, HSR would be nice, but we simply can't justify its upfront costs and the risks associated with it, especially at the current time. Instead, let's get a dialogue going with the guys over at the freight railroads and see what we can mutually agree on to perhaps get some existing speed passenger trains running on existing infrastructure," which is totally acceptable in my opinion. It's what North Carolina has been doing for the last decade, albeit with a unique agreement with NS, and it's what Virginia has started to do in the last few years. A perfect example is the new service that was approved late last year for new 79mph service to Norfolk from Petersburg/Richmond via the NS, which will provide a viable alternative to the congested I-95 and I-64 corridors, and will serve the Hampton Roads area as a whole, an area of 1+ million that hasn't seen passenger rail since 1977. The cost for this ~85 mile project? A cool $87 million, funded by a Rail Enhancement Fund grant. Quite a sizable contrast to the $2.4 billion price tag on the similarly sized Tampa-Orlando corridor, with probably only about 20-30 minutes' difference in travel time. Florida Governor Rick Scott was quoted as saying, "Government cannot spend more than it takes in. ... The truth is that this project would be far too costly to taxpayers and I believe the risk far outweighs the benefits." I'll side with Rick on this one. A continuous improvement strategy and culture is what keeps an increasingly large amount of companies competitive in today's business environment. Here's to hoping our nation's passenger rail system can do the same.

I'll be hopping on the new Lynchburg train to Newark in 2 weeks and then will be returning the following weekend on it from Washington. I am very much looking forward to supporting this service and becoming a part of its successful numbers.

CM

Great Post! Thanks for a rational contribution to the topic. I think infrastructure, and particularly rail infrastructure, is going to become even more important to our country and recovering economy. We need to take the steps needed to improve what we have and have the general public understand the value of that before we can ever think of getting to the sexy stuff. As you said, baby steps.

 

[Anderson]

You know, it just hit me while I was in the shower, but why isn't anybody talking about rolling some version of this into the SunRail project as a second line? You'd get the benefit of cross-platform transfers or, better yet, through trains at the Orlando station, you could ditch the bus at Orlando in favor of a timed local connection (not ideal, but arguably better), and if you wanted to hawk it to the tourists, you could run some more limited trains that skipped a bunch of the commuter stops and ran on an altered fare schedule. You could probably even get a few higher-speed segments in the middle of the Orlando-Tampa run where you're still crossing orange groves and the like if you wanted to plan for an eventual HSR line or if you wanted a peacock segment along the lines of the Acela's 150 MPH bit.

 

[Greg]

Ahhh, politics in Florida, this is getting real interesting, now a veto-proof majority of the Florida Senate is trying to bypass Governor Scott and get the HSR $ anyway!

http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/02/17/2072075/scott-rebuked-by-26-senators-over.html

 

[AlanB]

I'll repeat what I've said elsewhere: The Orlampa line was a mess at best: Too short to actually "go" anywhere, it would have been, in essence, an Acela in an area with about 1/5 the population. Yes, you would have gotten a good deal of traffic off of I-4, but I think you would have been facing a decade-long buildup while the project bled money (and let's not even get into the probably inevitable cost overruns).

It was a first step. You've got to start someplace. With this being the shortest planned segment, along with a ready made ROW, it made sense to start here.

As for those cost overruns, there is a 30% contingency built into the budget. Unless the states fails to properly excute contracts and watch things closely, there should be no cost overruns. And with some of the potential players in the game saying that they would consider covering some of any potential cost overruns, that would go further to preventing things from getting out of hand.

and looking at the per-mile cost...$5 billion for a line less than 100 miles long translates into a project cost of $50 million plus per mile to build.

The total currently package is $2.7 Billion, where are you getting $5 from?

 

[AlanB]

Edit: I just read the cahsrblog response to the Reason study. Ho-ly-geez, what an empty smearpiece that was! Even ignoring the wholly inappropriate tone of the post, it refuted a report about a report, not the report itself. It sounds like the poster never even read the original report, and so is in no position to actually critique its reasoning.

While perhaps that response could have been written better and handled differently, it still doesn't change the fact that the original report is at best horribly questionable and at worst totally false.

One doesn't have one's aide write a report that magically proves what you want, such that you can then have a basis for doing something. The report must be above reproach, which means that no one with direct ties to the Governor should have been involved. Adding Wendell Cox to the byline doesn't help matters.

 

[Devil's Advocate]

In my mind, the recent state of the high speed rail push in the US has been grossly misdirected. The media and many Amtrak/rail supporters like the ones that post on here liken the current HSR push to "building the next generation of the Interstate Highway System," when it is simply not the case.

I think the point being made was that today's hyper-partisan government would never have been able to create an IHS or fly us to the moon. Those were huge projects that required an understanding of what's best for the country more than what's best for a given politician or party. Nobody is claiming that today's tepid HSR proposals are anything like the creation of the IHS. In fact the only post calling for a passenger rail network at anything even approaching the scale of the IHS is your own, albeit at a LSR rate of 79-90MPH.

From a rail supporter's perspective, it is unfortunate to watch HSR having such a hard time getting off the ground domestically.

We already saw a major passenger rail effort get off the ground in Florida thanks to the voters. Then we saw a handful of politicians endeavor to repeal it. They succeeded. Eventually we saw yet another major passenger rail effort get off the ground again, immediately followed by yet another set of anti-rail politicians jumping at the chance to kill it. They also succeeded. The primary deterrent to improved passenger rail in America is the growing number of anti-rail politicians we keep electing. Where there is political will new service is coming. Where there is political opposition even 90% federal funding is still not enough to get the job done. Politics over practicality. It's really as simple as that.

In going with the idiom, "you have to walk before you can run," I deeply believe that our focus should be on implementing new service and/or extending existing service at current speeds, all the while improving the existing infrastructure, and expanding where necessary with the goal of continuous improvement at a relatively even spending level.

I've yet to see a single HSR proposal that has been seriously criticized for being far too fast, although I have seen several repeatedly condemned for being far too slow.

Overall, I do feel that we are moving in the right direction in general with rail transportation, albeit slowly.

That's a rather surprising thing to say after watching a half-dozen major passenger rail initiatives bite the dust in the last few months.

 

[Anderson]

I'll repeat what I've said elsewhere: The Orlampa line was a mess at best: Too short to actually "go" anywhere, it would have been, in essence, an Acela in an area with about 1/5 the population. Yes, you would have gotten a good deal of traffic off of I-4, but I think you would have been facing a decade-long buildup while the project bled money (and let's not even get into the probably inevitable cost overruns).

It was a first step. You've got to start someplace. With this being the shortest planned segment, along with a ready made ROW, it made sense to start here.

Yes and no. I would be more inclined to agree if you had a link to the current Orlando station that didn't require a crosstown bus...if that was the case, then you could (at least in theory) take SunRail from DeLand or Kissimmee to Orlando and then take the HSR line the rest of the way to Tampa. Instead, the line is almost totally non-integrated with any existing rail transport. I know that a lot of people won't bother with a cross-platform transfer, but a decent number of folks will, and excluding this connection is definitely leaving lots of traffic on the table. It severely limits the usefulness of the route.

More to the point, I'm willing to submit that a project with limited upgrades to the rest of the planned route so that you had, say, 90-110 MPH from Orlando to Miami that could be later upgraded to 135 MPH or better. Right now, though? It's great if you want to go to either Disney World or the airport, but without integration into a larger network, it reeks of turning into an expensive disaster.

As for those cost overruns, there is a 30% contingency built into the budget. Unless the states fails to properly excute contracts and watch things closely, there should be no cost overruns. And with some of the potential players in the game saying that they would consider covering some of any potential cost overruns, that would go further to preventing things from getting out of hand.

and looking at the per-mile cost...$5 billion for a line less than 100 miles long translates into a project cost of $50 million plus per mile to build.

The total currently package is $2.7 Billion, where are you getting $5 from?

The following post is what I was going off of. I am, as always, more than willing to stand corrected. Yes, this is bigger than the number I was expecting, but it's also not like we haven't seen projects quoted at one number that then have a few billion dollars turn up in unexpected costs in the past...the infamous "Big Dig" tops the list here, but it's not alone (I've stopped trying to keep track of quoted figures for the CA system, too).

Yes, Gov. Scott as much as told Obama to take the 2.4 billion and stick it where the sun don't shine. Reasons: Cost over-runs would cost state taxpayers and additional 3 billion dollars, the projected ridership estimates are grossly over stated, and if things didn't work out-----the state taxpayers would have to refund the 2.4 billion to the feds. Just looking out for taxpayers in Florida I guess.

 

[Gray]

Yes and no. I would be more inclined to agree if you had a link to the current Orlando station that didn't require a crosstown bus...if that was the case, then you could (at least in theory) take SunRail from DeLand or Kissimmee to Orlando and then take the HSR line the rest of the way to Tampa. Instead, the line is almost totally non-integrated with any existing rail transport. I know that a lot of people won't bother with a cross-platform transfer, but a decent number of folks will, and excluding this connection is definitely leaving lots of traffic on the table. It severely limits the usefulness of the route.
More to the point, I'm willing to submit that a project with limited upgrades to the rest of the planned route so that you had, say, 90-110 MPH from Orlando to Miami that could be later upgraded to 135 MPH or better. Right now, though? It's great if you want to go to either Disney World or the airport, but without integration into a larger network, it reeks of turning into an expensive disaster.

Here's what I don't understand. Why are people so eager to dump projects after lengthy planning and cost-benefit analyses because of gut feelings? You're certainly not the only one to do this, but why do you think your gut feeling should override the years of analysis up to this point?

The following post is what I was going off of. I am, as always, more than willing to stand corrected. Yes, this is bigger than the number I was expecting, but it's also not like we haven't seen projects quoted at one number that then have a few billion dollars turn up in unexpected costs in the past...the infamous "Big Dig" tops the list here, but it's not alone (I've stopped trying to keep track of quoted figures for the CA system, too).

As I mentioned previously, the Cox and Poole study is a joke. Its basic argument is that the ridership projections are too high because (a) some other projects in other countries using completely different models haven't met projections, and (b) comparing the projections to ridership on Acela (not including the many, many other trains in the NEC), these numbers just feel too high. Seriously. On the basis of this, they make up some new numbers, then claim that at the ridership they project, the project will lose billions.

 

[volkris]

As I mentioned previously, the Cox and Poole study is a joke. Its basic argument is that the ridership projections are too high because (a) some other projects in other countries using completely different models haven't met projections, and (b) comparing the projections to ridership on Acela (not including the many, many other trains in the NEC), these numbers just feel too high. Seriously. On the basis of this, they make up some new numbers, then claim that at the ridership they project, the project will lose billions.

Since a lot of people don't seem to have actually read the study they're so critical of, here's a link: http://reason.org/files/florida_high_speed_rail_analysis.pdf

As you can see, the argument is not as you frame it. It goes through many reasons to suspect the ridership numbers as being too high including but not limited to historical rampant gross overestimation of ridership numbers (two-thirds of projects are overestimated by more than two-thirds) and the comparison to Acela numbers which point out that the ridership estimate is 2/3 of Acela ridership but without nearly the population density.

But focusing on these two points completely and utterly ignores the bulk of that section of the report. Here's the conclusion from that:

Close examination shows that door-to-door travel times on the train are generally slower than by car and the costs are generally higher. As a result, the train is unlikely to be attractive for the local

and short intercity trips that it would serve

One thing I find kind of interesting is that this forum has something of a mantra of "rail never runs a profit". Well, the Florida project relied on the assumption that the service would run a profit or else it would fail and the state would be left holding the bag. Judging by the knowledge of this forum, then, the governor was right to cancel the project.

 

[Anderson]

Yes and no. I would be more inclined to agree if you had a link to the current Orlando station that didn't require a crosstown bus...if that was the case, then you could (at least in theory) take SunRail from DeLand or Kissimmee to Orlando and then take the HSR line the rest of the way to Tampa. Instead, the line is almost totally non-integrated with any existing rail transport. I know that a lot of people won't bother with a cross-platform transfer, but a decent number of folks will, and excluding this connection is definitely leaving lots of traffic on the table. It severely limits the usefulness of the route.
More to the point, I'm willing to submit that a project with limited upgrades to the rest of the planned route so that you had, say, 90-110 MPH from Orlando to Miami that could be later upgraded to 135 MPH or better. Right now, though? It's great if you want to go to either Disney World or the airport, but without integration into a larger network, it reeks of turning into an expensive disaster.

Here's what I don't understand. Why are people so eager to dump projects after lengthy planning and cost-benefit analyses because of gut feelings? You're certainly not the only one to do this, but why do you think your gut feeling should override the years of analysis up to this point?

I don't trust the studies because projections tend to have an extremely large margin of error. Look at what was "supposed" to happen with the Lynchburger versus what actually panned out. Yes, that was an error on the "good" side, but that's still a big error.

Moreover, I have to compare this with existing services in terms of ridership projections: 2 million people per year on the one line would make it the third or fourth most traveled rail route in the country, behind the NEC (or the NE Regional and the Acela) and the Pacific Surfliner. To compare, the Pacific Surfliner runs a route that has had continuous, multiple daily round trips for seventy years. The NEC has had large-scale passenger service for over a century, and the Acela in particular was built around the Metroliner service, which itself dated back to the 1960s.

So...why am I willing to toss the studies? Because I do not see what they are based on. I don't see the numbers materializing, and frankly I haven't heard a good justification for them. I just don't see it. You don't go from 0 to 2 million overnight, and if 2 million is the "eventually, when everything is said and done and the line has been operational for 4-5 years and we eventually get around to integrating this line with existing services" figure...well, that's not really being conveyed very well. What I'm seeing now is "We expect 2 million people to ride this short line which doesn't hardly link in with anything else, rail or otherwise". And that doesn't follow.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

I have never been a supporter of Florida's HSR program because its basic design was set up to fail. As people said, no connection to local transportation, limited distance reducing average speed, limited basis on the corridor, and so on. A grand high speed project between New York and Buffalo makes sense. So does one between Philadelphia and Harrisburg, with eventual extension to Pittsburgh. The Keystone and Empire Corridors are very successful.

California makes the most sense of all. Connecting transportation is excellent, rail awareness is excellent, population density is extreme. Florida doesn't even make sense for an intercity rail corridor at this point.

Florida has almost no functional public transportation outside of Miami. They have the kind of crappy bus-only system designed to serve the poor people who can't afford a car, where it exists at all. Intercity rail, on a corridor basis, requires connecting transportation on a grand level. Where does it work? Chicago- lots of Els, Subways, and insane buses criss crossing everything- successful corridors to Milwaukee (decent public transit), St. Louis (excellent public transit), and to some small extent, Detroit. Practically every major city on the Northeast corridor has commuter rail (Washington, Baltimore, Newark, Philadelphia, Newark, New York, New Haven, Providence, and Boston), rapid transit/light rail (Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newark, New York, Boston), and Buses (All of them).

Even though I am 40+ miles from the closest of these major cities, I can get to them with a combination of a mile walk and mass transit. I can live without a car. And that is the secret to why rail transit works around here.

Florida has none of this. NONE OF IT. The only rail transit in the state are a joke of a commuter system out of Miami, the Miami people mover, and the tourist attractions in Tampa and Disney World. Buses are limited service, even. Walk before they run? They have to start crawling, dude.

 

[Gray]

Since a lot of people don't seem to have actually read the study they're so critical of, here's a link: http://reason.org/fi...il_analysis.pdf
As you can see, the argument is not as you frame it. It goes through many reasons to suspect the ridership numbers as being too high including but not limited to historical rampant gross overestimation of ridership numbers (two-thirds of projects are overestimated by more than two-thirds) and the comparison to Acela numbers which point out that the ridership estimate is 2/3 of Acela ridership but without nearly the population density.

As others have also mentioned, the problem there is that Acela doesn't even carry half of the Amtrak passengers in the NEC. A quick googling gives me ridership numbers for October 2007, when NE Regional trains carried twice as many passengers as Acela trains. Not to mention the many commuter trains running the same route. So, right, comparing a new HSR line in its own corridor to one of several train options in a completely different corridor . . . well, that's a pretty naive comparison.

The did cite one book that evaluated projections made for projects in other countries. If they had demonstrated that the same sorts of models were being used here, that would be one thing. But they don't do that, and instead just use that to jump to the conclusion that all projects can be expected to significantly underperform projections.

And yes, there was another part to that other section of the report, as you point out: they did their own back-of-the-envelope calculations of travel times and claimed that these numbers were more useful than the feasibility studies done by people with actual knowledge and experience with actually modeling such projects.

But focusing on these two points completely and utterly ignores the bulk of that section of the report. Here's the conclusion from that:

Close examination shows that door-to-door travel times on the train are generally slower than by car and the costs are generally higher. As a result, the train is unlikely to be attractive for the local

and short intercity trips that it would serve

And finally:

One thing I find kind of interesting is that this forum has something of a mantra of "rail never runs a profit". Well, the Florida project relied on the assumption that the service would run a profit or else it would fail and the state would be left holding the bag. Judging by the knowledge of this forum, then, the governor was right to cancel the project.

A couple of things. First, it's not true that rail never runs a profit--though it does depend on which definition of profit you use. I'm not aware of many projects funded entirely with private funds and turning a profit on their own (though I'm sure someone here will come up with some), but there are plenty of well-run routes around the world that turn an operating profit once the lines are built. To use the example that Cox and Poole brought up but didn't actually understand, Acela turns an operating profit. But more generally, we have seen that all over the world, convenient, well-run high-speed rail turns an operating profit. Which is exactly what we could expect from the Florida HSR project if implemented correctly.

And of course that's ignoring the fact that, for multiple reasons, Florida wouldn't be left holding the bag. But we've already discussed those, even if you keep ignoring them.

 

[ALC Rail Writer]

Ahhh, politics in Florida, this is getting real interesting, now a veto-proof majority of the Florida Senate is trying to bypass Governor Scott and get the HSR $ anyway!

http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/02/17/2072075/scott-rebuked-by-26-senators-over.html

And that's why we have checks and balances.

 

[Anderson]

Double post

 

[Anderson]

Alright, I've flipped through the Cox and Poole study. On the one hand, I don't find all of the arguments to be convincing, but on the other hand I think there are good points raised that deserve some consideration, particularly with the ridership figures. I'll go ahead and say that I think the cost figures are probably going to come in below what is estimated in the report, but I also don't think it's unreasonable for FL to want something in place to split cost overruns.

I still think that a major factor that is overlooked is the lack of preexisting service. The Acela didn't get to 3.2 million riders out of nowhere: It replaced the Metroliners, which were already doing a lot of NYP-WAS business and were well-established. But the point of "How do we get 2/3 of Acela's ridership on 1/8 the population base" bears questioning. Yes, you can probably get some ridership on Orlando International to either Disney World or the Tampa cruise terminals, but I'd be shocked if you managed to displace that much traffic. Unless Disney is going to buy folks' tickets as part of a hotel package, there are going to be plenty of tourists who are going to blink at dropping $60 on a one-way train fare (for a family of four, at least), and if someone is staying at a Holiday Inn, it'll probably be cheaper to simply rent a car for a long weekend than to fork over the round trip fare.

So...I do not see this working as a tourist shuttle (particularly since it's only really effective in that capacity for Disney itself). I finally did figure out how the Sunrail line links into this, by the way: A third (bus) line links two of the stations. Really, that's getting to the point of absurdity: If I want to go from downtown Orlando to (presumably) downtown Tampa, I have to get on a train...then a bus...then another train, all presumably with separate fares? To quote Charlie Brown, "Good grief." One switch would be fine (I'm used to having to grab a train and a linking bus when I'm up in DC), but two on what will to all appearances be non-integrated systems just doesn't compute.

Edit: I'm going to self-correct and note that there does seem to be a three-train possibility: SunRail-North/South Light Rail-HSR via the convention center. Still a mess (I thought there was a connection in there somewhere), but not quite the mess that the bus link would be...but still not good. I'd like to point out that in Virginia, one of the big points being made about the Norfolk line is that it will allow downtown-to-downtown service from Norfolk to Richmond (and, of course, Washington and beyond). The Acela offers downtown-to-downtown service in the NE. This...doesn't. The airport link is nice, but seeing as a cab fare from the airport to International Drive is only a bit over $30 and takes you to your hotel (rather than having to switch to a cab or van at the station)...yeah, that dog ain't gonna hunt.

With that said, I think I've realized what else is gnawing at me about the service: The lack of downtown-to-downtown service. The Orange County Convention Center is miles from downtown, and that's supposed to be the linking station. Now, this isn't easy to say, but I think the answer is to build a good track system down the center of I-4...but use an improved version of a commuter system on it. Nothing horribly flashy, not capable of "tapping" 168 MPH, but I think if you put a solid system in there and make sure that the track is up to standards, there's no reason you couldn't operate an express line down the middle at around 100 MPH most or all of the way that links into the planned SunRail system. You could probably back down from Class 9 to Class 7 track (I'm not sure of the differences in track requirements, but for 168 MPH you've got to use class 9, while a less "shiny" 125 MPH on the Orlampa segment would basically mean less accelerating and decelerating on most runs and more time at top speeds) and not lose much time.

I say this because, as far as SunRail is planned to go off to the north (DeLand is somewhere around 1/3 of the way from Orlando to Jacksonville), you can look at substantial improvements in Jacksonville-Tampa times with the related Amtrak ownership of the railroad line, and I think you'd be able to get a good intrastate intercity network going. The current project really offers no prospect of that; the Miami phase has some promise, yes, but that's...how many hurdles away? And even that line doesn't seem set to integrate with the larger rail network anywhere outside of Miami, even in separated platforms at the same station.

 

[volkris]

The did cite one book that evaluated projections made for projects in other countries. If they had demonstrated that the same sorts of models were being used here, that would be one thing. But they don't do that, and instead just use that to jump to the conclusion that all projects can be expected to significantly underperform projections.

And yes, there was another part to that other section of the report, as you point out: they did their own back-of-the-envelope calculations of travel times and claimed that these numbers were more useful than the feasibility studies done by people with actual knowledge and experience with actually modeling such projects.

This sort of analysis is actually not so uncommon in the real world. It's a meta-analysis, and it's a legitimate tool. After all, you point out that studies "done by people with actual knowledge and experience" said something. Well, how much trust should Florida put in their conclusions? Should the state of Florida, which is already having budget problems, risk funding a project based largely on their say so? A reasonable answer is to look at other studies "done by people with actual knowledge and experience" to get a sense of how accurate such knowledgeable and experienced planners are historically. The answer, it turns out, is surprisingly disconcerting.

Does that mean the planners are definitely wrong or that they knowingly submitted a flawed report? No. But it does mean the project carries more risk than its backers may have assumed, and considering its budget Florida is right to be risk-adverse right now.

A couple of things. First, it's not true that rail never runs a profit--though it does depend on which definition of profit you use. I'm not aware of many projects funded entirely with private funds and turning a profit on their own (though I'm sure someone here will come up with some), but there are plenty of well-run routes around the world that turn an operating profit once the lines are built. To use the example that Cox and Poole brought up but didn't actually understand, Acela turns an operating profit. But more generally, we have seen that all over the world, convenient, well-run high-speed rail turns an operating profit. Which is exactly what we could expect from the Florida HSR project if implemented correctly.

And of course that's ignoring the fact that, for multiple reasons, Florida wouldn't be left holding the bag. But we've already discussed those, even if you keep ignoring them.

Glancing through, I don't see anything in the report that refers to Acela turning or not turning a profit. Can you point to it?

The profitability of this line relies on demand, and the report does cast doubt on the demand. Therefore, it casts doubts on the profitability. It also states various circumstances under which Florida would be left holding the bag, regardless of this group's insistence that it would be impossible. Those threats--ranging from the private guarantor shutting down to actions of federal government itself--are entirely real and undisputed here.