State Subsidies to Amtrak

[TWA904]

I have read that while several state pay subsidies to Amtrak for state trains, New York

only pays sibsidies on only one route. Yet most service from Amtrak is provided in the state

of New York. Pennsylvania, according to the article, pays subsidies on every route in the state. Why does New York get a free ride.

 

[ALC Rail Writer]

Better lawyers?

 

[Tumbleweed]

Ridership?

 

[jis]

I have read that while several state pay subsidies to Amtrak for state trains, New York

only pays sibsidies on only one route. Yet most service from Amtrak is provided in the state

of New York. Pennsylvania, according to the article, pays subsidies on every route in the state. Why does New York get a free ride.

The Empire Corridor was part of the original Amtrak system and as a result was included in the national system when Amtrak was created. That is the historical reason why it is funded out of Amtrak. This is going to change in the next couple of years. Similarly the Pennsylvanian which came from the original system (Duquesne) is not subsidized by Pennsylvania.

Also Pennsylvania does not subsidize any operation on the NEC running through it, except the Keystones. It only subsidized the Keystone Service. Similarly, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Delaware and Maryland (in addition to Pennsylvania) do not subsidize any NEC operations.

OTOH, Rhode Island, Connecticut New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia are all clients of Amtrak paying use fees for running their own trains (MBTA, Shore Line East, LIRR, NJTransit, SEPTA, MARC and VRE respectively) on portions of the NEC. Additionally Amtrak is the client of MNRR/ConnDOT for using the portion of NEC between New Rochelle and New Haven.

The situation in Massachusetts is further complicated by the fact that the actual property is owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, but operated by Amtrak which manages the finances of the service. I am not quite sure how the use fees are actually handled.

 

[ALC Rail Writer]

Does Penn subsidize the Penny? That was part of the national system, in different form, wasn't it?

 

[jis]

Does Penn subsidize the Penny? That was part of the national system, in different form, wasn't it?

No it does not AFAICT. Pennsylvania did subsidize a different train one that run for a short while between Pittsburgh and Johnstown or some such. And there has been much talk about Pennsylvania subsidizing a second Philadelphia - Pittsburgh frequency, but nothing has come of it yet.

 

[Anderson]

JLS,

That was the Fort Pitt, between Pittsburgh and Altoona.

 

[AlanB]

Additionally Amtrak is the client of MNRR/ConnDOT for using the portion of NEC between New Rochelle and New Haven.

And also on MNRR between Spyten Duyvil and Poughkeepsie.

 

[jis]

JIS,

That was the Fort Pitt, between Pittsburgh and Altoona.

Right you are!

Additionally Amtrak is the client of MNRR/ConnDOT for using the portion of NEC between New Rochelle and New Haven.

And also on MNRR between Spuyten Duyvil and Poughkeepsie.

Indeed. Right you are too!

 

[Oldsmoboi]

I just rode the Pennsylvanian from NYP to Pittsburgh yesterday. For 95% of the ROW from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh, the ROW is still wide enough for 4 tracks even though it is now mostly two. In places where it is no longer wide enough for 4 tracks, either it's just a move of trackside equipment or there is enough for just a 3rd track. The notable exception being the last 5 or so miles from Swissvale PA to Pittsburgh where 50% of the old ROW has been turned into a busway.

Even at Galitzen, the unused portals could be enlarged and track re-layed.

If there ever was a "low hanging fruit" to restoring rail service at minimal (comparatively) cost, this would be it. With the exception of the eastern and western approaches to horseshoe curve, much of the route could also support higher speed service as well if the rail quality were up to snuff.

It's GOTTA be cheaper to install 1 more track along this line rated for 100mph travel that Amtrak gets priority on than most other high speed rail projects out there.

I'd like to see them raise PA turnpike tolls a half a cent per mile to subsidize this.

 

[jis]

If there ever was a "low hanging fruit" to restoring rail service at minimal (comparatively) cost, this would be it. With the exception of the eastern and western approaches to horseshoe curve, much of the route could also support higher speed service as well if the rail quality were up to snuff.

It's GOTTA be cheaper to install 1 more track along this line rated for 100mph travel that Amtrak gets priority on than most other high speed rail projects out there.

I'd like to see them raise PA turnpike tolls a half a cent per mile to subsidize this.

Let's not get ahead of ourselves here. In this thread we are talking about operating subsidies, and at present PA is unable or unwilling to come up with even operating subsidy for another train on that route. They had a plan to fund SEPTA out of a toll on I-80, a toll that was disallowed by the feds. So even if the toll is miraculously increased on the PA Turnpike, where do you suppose that extra money will go first?

 

[afigg]

Also Pennsylvania does not subsidize any operation on the NEC running through it, except the Keystones. It only subsidized the Keystone Service. Similarly, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Delaware and Maryland (in addition to Pennsylvania) do not subsidize any NEC operations.

OTOH, Rhode Island, Connecticut New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia are all clients of Amtrak paying use fees for running their own trains (MBTA, Shore Line East, LIRR, NJTransit, SEPTA, MARC and VRE respectively) on portions of the NEC. Additionally Amtrak is the client of MNRR/ConnDOT for using the portion of NEC between New Rochelle and New Haven.

The situation in Massachusetts is further complicated by the fact that the actual property is owned by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, but operated by Amtrak which manages the finances of the service. I am not quite sure how the use fees are actually handled.

The NEC is a rather complicated arrangement which is a reason not to make it more complicated by requiring the states to subsidize it directly beyond what they contribute via the many commuter services running on it. But the NEC states may not need to if the trend lines continue. The January 2011 Monthly report shows the NE Regionals on the NEC spine operating at a (very) slight profit for October-January with a +0.1 cent cost per passenger mile above expenses. The cumulative 5 month numbers slipped a little in the February report with a -1.1 cent loss per passenger mile, but this is still very close to breaking even. The February 2010 numbers were a operating loss of 8.8 cents per passenger mile in comparison. The Acela had a positive return of +23.6 cents per passenger mile.

If Amtrak can get WiFi deployed to the NE Regionals in the coming months, expand capacity with restored Amfleets, continue to make incremental improvements to the NEC and gas prices stay up (which in the long run is a very safe bet), the NE Regional could well move solidly into the black with respect to operating costs. The NEC, of course, needs a lot of capital funding to get it into a state of good repair, much of it to deal with the accumulated backlog of many decades of insufficient or wildly varying levels of funding. But if the NEC can be brought up to a state of good repair with reduced trip times, say WAS-NYP of 2:15 and NYP-BOS of 2:45 (yes, this would require some serious ROW re-alignments in eastern CT), it may be able to cover both operating and annual maintenance costs out of ticket revenue and commuter train fees.

As for the other corridor services, we may indeed see some which are not currently subsidized by the state at risk of shutting down in several years. But this is where the parts of the $10.1 billion of HSIPR funding that is going to existing Amtrak corridors could prove critical. By improving the on-time performance, reducing trip times, and expanding frequency of service, those corridors should see steady growth in ridership and public profile. And reduced operating losses. It will be more difficult for a state legislature to deny subsidy to a train service with increasing ridership and cost recovery. Of course, that may not stop some anti-transit governors, but can't win them all.

 

[jis]

But if the NEC can be brought up to a state of good repair with reduced trip times, say WAS-NYP of 2:15 and NYP-BOS of 2:45 (yes, this would require some serious ROW re-alignments in eastern CT), it may be able to cover both operating and annual maintenance costs out of ticket revenue and commuter train fees.

All that I can say is that the owner of most of NEC, Amtrak does not seem to think so. They think that at around 100 mins NYP - WAS maybe they could get there for that segment. But that is based on what is admittedly considered to be inflated demographic, jobs and economic growth data based on 2003 - 2005, pre bursting of the bubble based projections.

I was at a meeting at NYMTC the other day and they are in the process of revising demographic data downwards. Unlike in the past recessions where they used to keep the long terms trends the same as before recession and account for the recession just as a local downward blip, and repeatedly found that to turn out to be wrong, They have decided to actually lower the base and not claim that old trend lines will ever be reached in our lifetimes.

This will of course cause lowering of all ridership and facility usage projections to having a negative impact on what the breakeven points will be in all those calculations. And these projections are an essential component for justifying a project to the FRA/FTA/FAA etc. So it will be interesting to see how this plays out.

Bottom line is that both the highways and the railways infrastructure of the region will require support from general funds (federal and state) to be maintained in a state of good repair for quite a while to come. Even NJ DOT Commissioner Simpson admits that in 3 years the only way to keep the TTF in NJ afloat will be to increase gas tax or find some other source to replenish it, and further bonding absent that won;t be an option. So we might as well stop kidding ourselves with fantasies, and figure out how to fund it whether it be tolling, additional gas tax, higher fares or ticket tax to support bonding or whatever.

 

[trainviews]

As for the other corridor services, we may indeed see some which are not currently subsidized by the state at risk of shutting down in several years. But this is where the parts of the $10.1 billion of HSIPR funding that is going to existing Amtrak corridors could prove critical. By improving the on-time performance, reducing trip times, and expanding frequency of service, those corridors should see steady growth in ridership and public profile. And reduced operating losses. It will be more difficult for a state legislature to deny subsidy to a train service with increasing ridership and cost recovery. Of course, that may not stop some anti-transit governors, but can't win them all.

I actually think that Congress' decision to make all states pay for short range service is very problematic.

Of course something had to be done about some states getting their service from the FEDs just because they were lucky enough never to have it axed (i.e. the regional in Virginia to Newport News), while others had to pick up the full tap of getting the service or getting it expanded to a level closer to demand.

But just passing the full bill to all states risk killling some very viable routes or routes that could be viable with targeted updates. It might also hamper expansions (new routes or better frequencies on existing ones), even though the shorter routes following congested and/or much travelled corridors are where the expansion potential (and need) is.

A model of Amtrak/federal subsidy picking up half the tap up to say 20 percent of operating costs, with states having to fund the other half plus anything over 20 percent if that big a subsidy is needed, would encourage states to both set up services and to get them to run in the most economically viable way possible/invest in upgrades.

If no federal funding for that could be found I think it would be worth to axe one or two of the least viable LD routes instead. It would move more people for the same money.

 

[afigg]

I just rode the Pennsylvanian from NYP to Pittsburgh yesterday. For 95% of the ROW from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh, the ROW is still wide enough for 4 tracks even though it is now mostly two. In places where it is no longer wide enough for 4 tracks, either it's just a move of trackside equipment or there is enough for just a 3rd track. The notable exception being the last 5 or so miles from Swissvale PA to Pittsburgh where 50% of the old ROW has been turned into a busway.

Even at Galitzen, the unused portals could be enlarged and track re-layed.

If there ever was a "low hanging fruit" to restoring rail service at minimal (comparatively) cost, this would be it. With the exception of the eastern and western approaches to horseshoe curve, much of the route could also support higher speed service as well if the rail quality were up to snuff.

It's GOTTA be cheaper to install 1 more track along this line rated for 100mph travel that Amtrak gets priority on than most other high speed rail projects out there.

I'd like to see them raise PA turnpike tolls a half a cent per mile to subsidize this.

We are getting OT for the thread, but what the heck. A major issue with upgrading the current route is that according to the Amtrak timetables, it is 249 track miles from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh - via a route laid out in the mid 19th century. Driving from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh is around 205 miles and approx 3.5 hours, mostly via the PA Turnpike. That is a pretty significant advantage in distance for cars and the Mega/Boltbus services that is very difficult to make up with 90 or 100 mph max speeds over selected segments of the current route. Restoring a 3rd or 4th track over a couple of hundred miles is not going to be a "minimal" cost, even if the ROW is still there and NS is willing to cooperate. May have to improve/upgrade gates and signals for many grade crossings or separate some grade crossings, although I don't know how many there are between HAR and PGH. If Penn Railroad back in the day had made major upgrades to and electrified the corridor all the way to PGH or if the South Pennsylvania Railroad route had been built, Pittsburgh might well have better and much more frequency train service to Philly today.

There is a $1.5 million dollar study (with $750K from the HSIPR stimulus funding) underway to examine the options for Keystone West corridor service. Don't know how wide ranging the study is allowed to be and whether it might also look at options for a new HSR ROW route to Pittsburgh (the politics of choosing the route could get very sticky, let alone getting the funding). Or if it is constrained to what could be done to the current route. Maybe there are some modest cost projects that would reduce HAR-PGH trip times by 30 minutes.

Taking the long view, if PA and Amtrak can get the funding to upgrade the Keystone East corridor and reduce HAR to PHL trip times by 20 minutes, that should make that section perceived more as an HSR line and boost ridership. Then more people and politicians might ask why not extend 125-160 mph type service all the way to Pittsburgh?

Another long term factor is if the California HSR project succeeds and gets built, that will make people ask, why don't we have 3 hour train service between Pittsburgh and Philly? They are the 2 major cities in PA and any HSR route would go through Harrisburg (going through the state capital is always a plus in getting state legislatures to go along) and use the Keystone East corridor, so the route would be in 1 state, which makes the politics easier - provided leaders from both parties support it (big IF) - than HSR projects that cross multiple state lines (other than the NEC). But this is long term - 10-15 years or more.

 

[afigg]

All that I can say is that the owner of most of NEC, Amtrak does not seem to think so. They think that at around 100 mins NYP - WAS maybe they could get there for that segment. But that is based on what is admittedly considered to be inflated demographic, jobs and economic growth data based on 2003 - 2005, pre bursting of the bubble based projections.

I was at a meeting at NYMTC the other day and they are in the process of revising demographic data downwards. Unlike in the past recessions where they used to keep the long terms trends the same as before recession and account for the recession just as a local downward blip, and repeatedly found that to turn out to be wrong, They have decided to actually lower the base and not claim that old trend lines will ever be reached in our lifetimes.

This will of course cause lowering of all ridership and facility usage projections to having a negative impact on what the breakeven points will be in all those calculations. And these projections are an essential component for justifying a project to the FRA/FTA/FAA etc. So it will be interesting to see how this plays out.

Bottom line is that both the highways and the railways infrastructure of the region will require support from general funds (federal and state) to be maintained in a state of good repair for quite a while to come. Even NJ DOT Commissioner Simpson admits that in 3 years the only way to keep the TTF in NJ afloat will be to increase gas tax or find some other source to replenish it, and further bonding absent that won;t be an option. So we might as well stop kidding ourselves with fantasies, and figure out how to fund it whether it be tolling, additional gas tax, higher fares or ticket tax to support bonding or whatever.

I think Amtrak and the NEC will always need federal/state assistance with the big ticket projects, mainly major bridge and tunnel replacements or expansions or refurbishments. The capital costs of modern large infrastructure projects is not something the private sector can really handle, which is why the government builds the highways and sets up chartered authorities to build/maintain airports. But, what I was trying to say, is that high enough ridership numbers on the NEC may eventually be enough to cover the year to year equipment, track and system maintenance, if the NEC were ever able to get caught up on reaching a state of good repair end to end.

A major advantage that Amtrak has on the NEC is that it is an all electrified corridor. As oil prices and fuel costs go up, Amtrak can better compete against the airlines and the bus services. We are likely in a short term spike in oil prices due to Libya, unrest in the Middle East combined with tight supplies. But, baring new major super giant old field discoveries that can be brought into production in a few years, the long term prospects for oil prices are up and available supply is down. If Amtrak can get funding to continue to improve the NEC and reduce trip times, the projections for the NEC and the NEC feeder corridor ridership may be seriously too low. Same goes for other corridors, but diesel fuel costs will drive their costs up, if not as much as the airlines.

 

[jis]

I think Amtrak and the NEC will always need federal/state assistance with the big ticket projects, mainly major bridge and tunnel replacements or expansions or refurbishments. The capital costs of modern large infrastructure projects is not something the private sector can really handle, which is why the government builds the highways and sets up chartered authorities to build/maintain airports. But, what I was trying to say, is that high enough ridership numbers on the NEC may eventually be enough to cover the year to year equipment, track and system maintenance, if the NEC were ever able to get caught up on reaching a state of good repair end to end.

Clearly there is a ridership number at which such could be achieved at some per seat mile revenue (RASM). My point is we are nowhere near that point and won't be for a looooong time to come.

I was told that the cost of getting NEC to state of good repair and then keeping it there is of the order of $700 to $900 million per year for the next umpteen years. If that is the case then incremental improvements in speed won't get us to self sufficiency even of just maintaining the tracks and rolling stock any time soon. This year we will be just past 1/9th of what is needed just for state of good repair from the estimates of revenue - above rail costs on the NEC.

BTW Warrington also sold this wondrous idea of self sufficiency, and his theory was Acelas and Express Service should have got us there already. But those that had actually taken out and abacus and run Warrington's numbers knew that he was smoking potent stuff. Currently Amtrak does not even make enough surplus to predictably replace the rolling stock at the end of its lifecycle on the NEC (let alone anywhere else), even without considering additional equipment, which would be necessary to enhance capacity to be able to make that extra money.

In a different thread I had mentioned how Amtrak can leverage its current small surplus to make some equipment purchase by amortizing financing over the lifetime of the equipment. Reportedly it is indeed doing that with some, if not all of the orders that have been placed recently. But that is something to consider for getting over the current budgetary silliness and assuming that things will ease at some point soon. You can do so only so many times. Eventually you have to get ahead of the game, and it is not clear that Amtrak can do that without significant contribution from outside.

The folks at Amtrak who do these analysis for a living clearly stated that the only hope of breaking even and getting a surplus of sufficient size is to go for the true HSR vision and build it expeditiously. They clearly stated that just doing the 2030 infrastructure plan, in their reckoning will not make Amtrak self-sufficient above the rail taking equipment replacement and ROW state of good repair into account. So I am just the messenger here. This was discussed at length both in Boston and in Atlantic City by Amtrak's NEC management team.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

But the NEC states may not need to if the trend lines continue. The January 2011 Monthly report shows the NE Regionals on the NEC spine operating at a (very) slight profit for October-January with a +0.1 cent cost per passenger mile above expenses. The cumulative 5 month numbers slipped a little in the February report with a -1.1 cent loss per passenger mile, but this is still very close to breaking even. The February 2010 numbers were a operating loss of 8.8 cents per passenger mile in comparison. The Acela had a positive return of +23.6 cents per passenger mile.

Amtrak, using the magic of accounting (AKA cowpoo) might be able to make the regionals and Acelas look like they are making an operating profit. But that ignores their avoidable costs entirely. The Acela, in order to operate, requires a much finer grade of track through all 135+ segments. If Acela didn't run, the track would not need to be maintained so finely, and costs for maintaining the NEC would go down if the Acela was replaced by 125 mph trains and/or downgraded to 125 mph max. Likewise, if all the 125 regionals got downgraded to LD 110 mph speeds, the costs would go down further still.

The NEC is not, has not been, and will never be a profitable venture. It costs too damned much to maintain all that plant. It is an overly large plant, constrained by bottle necks in a few key points that make its overall capacity almost laughably overboard. Since one can not get more than 35 trains an hour through the North River tunnels, (or over Portal) it becomes something of a moot point that the 4+ track main south of Newark Penn can handle hundreds of trains an hour. In order to make the NEC viable, it needs to be a 4 track main minimum from Washington Union station all the way to Boston South. And all the commuter railroads would have to pay their fair share (they don't). And then you have a ghost of a chance.

And that assumes you consider the investment in creating all that improvement a sunk cost, which is not reasonable if Amtrak is a business. If Congress maintains Amtrak's subsidy at current levels, and Amtrak gets more efficient (i.e., loses less money) operating and maintaining its network, Amtrak can go places. They can operate based on the fact that they are being overfunded historically. I flinch at writing that, since it doesn't really show the real story- perhaps less underfunded would be more accurate.

 

[afigg]

Clearly there is a ridership number at which such could be achieved at some per seat mile revenue (RASM). My point is we are nowhere near that point and won't be for a looooong time to come.

I was told that the cost of getting NEC to state of good repair and then keeping it there is of the order of $700 to $900 million per year for the next umpteen years. If that is the case then incremental improvements in speed won't get us to self sufficiency even of just maintaining the tracks and rolling stock any time soon. This year we will be just past 1/9th of what is needed just for state of good repair from the estimates of revenue - above rail costs on the NEC.

BTW Warrington also sold this wondrous idea of self sufficiency, and his theory was Acelas and Express Service should have got us there already. But those that had actually taken out and abacus and run Warrington's numbers knew that he was smoking potent stuff. Currently Amtrak does not even make enough surplus to predictably replace the rolling stock at the end of its lifecycle on the NEC (let alone anywhere else), even without considering additional equipment, which would be necessary to enhance capacity to be able to make that extra money.

In a different thread I had mentioned how Amtrak can leverage its current small surplus to make some equipment purchase by amortizing financing over the lifetime of the equipment. Reportedly it is indeed doing that with some, if not all of the orders that have been placed recently. But that is something to consider for getting over the current budgetary silliness and assuming that things will ease at some point soon. You can do so only so many times. Eventually you have to get ahead of the game, and it is not clear that Amtrak can do that without significant contribution from outside.

The folks at Amtrak who do these analysis for a living clearly stated that the only hope of breaking even and getting a surplus of sufficient size is to go for the true HSR vision and build it expeditiously. They clearly stated that just doing the 2030 infrastructure plan, in their reckoning will not make Amtrak self-sufficient above the rail taking equipment replacement and ROW state of good repair into account. So I am just the messenger here. This was discussed at length both in Boston and in Atlantic City by Amtrak's NEC management team.

Of course, achieving a glide path to "self sufficiency" by stopping about all maintenance work for a system that had decades of underfunding beforehand and putting everything in hock is not going to end well. The problem is getting the NEC to a "state of good repair". Getting even the $700 to $900 million a year for a sustained period is difficult enough. The final FY11 appropriations for Amtrak was only $921 million for capital and debt service, which only leaves around $650 million? for the NEC, equipment purchases and everything else. Hopefully Amtrak can get several NEC and NEC related projects funded from the returned Florida HSR funds to make some progress on the NEC infrastructure during the next several difficult budget years.

If the Amtrak number crunchers who know the details and numbers say that it will take true HSR to break even, hard to argue with them. But since the NEC has never been caught up on replacing old infrastructure in the Amtrak era, hard to say how much more revenue it could be generating if Amtrak had more Acela trainsets, WAS-NYP times of 2:30 and NYP-BOS times of 3 hours for the Acelas and correspondingly faster trip times for the NE Regionals. I think high fuel costs will push ever more people to take the NEC in the coming years, but the system will be severely strained due to lack of spare capacity and aging equipment because of inadequate funding for so long. The ACS-64 locomotives may be badly needed by the time they start entering service.

 

[transit54]

The Acela, in order to operate, requires a much finer grade of track through all 135+ segments. If Acela didn't run, the track would not need to be maintained so finely, and costs for maintaining the NEC would go down if the Acela was replaced by 125 mph trains and/or downgraded to 125 mph max. Likewise, if all the 125 regionals got downgraded to LD 110 mph speeds, the costs would go down further still.

The NEC is not, has not been, and will never be a profitable venture. It costs too damned much to maintain all that plant.

To some degree, I think this is beside the point. In the US (and in most developed countries) passenger transportation providers are asked to make a profit over and above the costs of infrastructure. Airlines don't include the costs of building and financing airports into their bottom line - Greyhound or Megabus doesn't have to pay for the construction or upkeep of the highways they use (yes, the pay a portion of the latter as fuel taxes, but its nowhere near the full operating cost). One of the largest problems with Amtrak is that they are held to a different standard of business and expected to maintain their infrastructure as well as cover their above-the-rails costs.

In nations with true HSR (and even in nations without it, but with plentiful trains like Switzerland) the government covers the cost of the infrastructure and railways are expected to cover their operating costs. That's the only workable method. Now in this country there isn't substantial passenger track, so Amtrak is in the position it's in. But I firmly believe that if the US were to build Amtrak a system of dedicated, 110-125 MPH track (which isn't even true HSR), Amtrak would have no problem turning and operating profit on those lines.

 

[jis]

I agree with Transit. I would be quite satisfied to see the TOC (Train Operating Company) part of Amtrak become profitable to the extent that they are able to predictably maintain and replace the necessary rolling stock, whether it be through ownership or through lease and maintenance contracts.

Track, ROW etc. should be dealt with separately and should be expected to be funded by FRA/FTA or states or a combination thereof.

To get there though, at least from the perspective of accounting NEC maintenance needs to be more clearly separated from train operations on the one hand, and rolling stock acquisition and maintenance on the other hand, and there needs to be a clear payment for services from the TOC portion to the Infrastructure portion for the former, similar to payments that are made by say NJT to Amtrak Infrastructure, and from TOC to rolling stock maintenance/acquisition for the latter. I am not sure to what extent this clean separation exists today.

 

[Green Maned Lion]

Amtraks accounting system, from what I've seen of it and discussed with some of it's number crunchers, is set up to make the company as politically palatable as possible. This includes, but is not limited to, moving expenses around to make the Corridor and state subsidized services look as profitable/inexpensive as possible. I expect that the state subsidized services will become less profitable over the next dew years as funding becomes tight and Amtrak attempts to make the states pay more of the true costs.

 

[jis]

Amtraks accounting system, from what I've seen of it and discussed with some of it's number crunchers, is set up to make the company as politically palatable as possible. This includes, but is not limited to, moving expenses around to make the Corridor and state subsidized services look as profitable/inexpensive as possible. I expect that the state subsidized services will become less profitable over the next dew years as funding becomes tight and Amtrak attempts to make the states pay more of the true costs.

I am not aware of any state supported corridor that is profitable without counting the state subsidy as non-ticket revenue. Are you aware of any? Given that, I must admit I don't understand your comment above.

Can you perhaps give a few specific examples so that I can get a better understanding of what you are trying to say? Thanks.

 

[Oldsmoboi]

I just rode the Pennsylvanian from NYP to Pittsburgh yesterday. For 95% of the ROW from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh, the ROW is still wide enough for 4 tracks even though it is now mostly two. In places where it is no longer wide enough for 4 tracks, either it's just a move of trackside equipment or there is enough for just a 3rd track. The notable exception being the last 5 or so miles from Swissvale PA to Pittsburgh where 50% of the old ROW has been turned into a busway.

Even at Galitzen, the unused portals could be enlarged and track re-layed.

If there ever was a "low hanging fruit" to restoring rail service at minimal (comparatively) cost, this would be it. With the exception of the eastern and western approaches to horseshoe curve, much of the route could also support higher speed service as well if the rail quality were up to snuff.

It's GOTTA be cheaper to install 1 more track along this line rated for 100mph travel that Amtrak gets priority on than most other high speed rail projects out there.

I'd like to see them raise PA turnpike tolls a half a cent per mile to subsidize this.

We are getting OT for the thread, but what the heck. A major issue with upgrading the current route is that according to the Amtrak timetables, it is 249 track miles from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh - via a route laid out in the mid 19th century. Driving from Harrisburg to Pittsburgh is around 205 miles and approx 3.5 hours, mostly via the PA Turnpike. That is a pretty significant advantage in distance for cars and the Mega/Boltbus services that is very difficult to make up with 90 or 100 mph max speeds over selected segments of the current route. Restoring a 3rd or 4th track over a couple of hundred miles is not going to be a "minimal" cost, even if the ROW is still there and NS is willing to cooperate. May have to improve/upgrade gates and signals for many grade crossings or separate some grade crossings, although I don't know how many there are between HAR and PGH. If Penn Railroad back in the day had made major upgrades to and electrified the corridor all the way to PGH or if the South Pennsylvania Railroad route had been built, Pittsburgh might well have better and much more frequency train service to Philly today.

There is a $1.5 million dollar study (with $750K from the HSIPR stimulus funding) underway to examine the options for Keystone West corridor service. Don't know how wide ranging the study is allowed to be and whether it might also look at options for a new HSR ROW route to Pittsburgh (the politics of choosing the route could get very sticky, let alone getting the funding). Or if it is constrained to what could be done to the current route. Maybe there are some modest cost projects that would reduce HAR-PGH trip times by 30 minutes.

Taking the long view, if PA and Amtrak can get the funding to upgrade the Keystone East corridor and reduce HAR to PHL trip times by 20 minutes, that should make that section perceived more as an HSR line and boost ridership. Then more people and politicians might ask why not extend 125-160 mph type service all the way to Pittsburgh?

Another long term factor is if the California HSR project succeeds and gets built, that will make people ask, why don't we have 3 hour train service between Pittsburgh and Philly? They are the 2 major cities in PA and any HSR route would go through Harrisburg (going through the state capital is always a plus in getting state legislatures to go along) and use the Keystone East corridor, so the route would be in 1 state, which makes the politics easier - provided leaders from both parties support it (big IF) - than HSR projects that cross multiple state lines (other than the NEC). But this is long term - 10-15 years or more.

The Governor here, despite having some shades of Teabag around his ears, is at least tepidly supportive of the idea of increased rail service between the two ends of the state.

My entire reasoning behind suggesting this route for improvement is that relative to new HSR proposals the costs would be lower. Other than the approaches on either side of Horseshoe Curve, much of the line could run at higher speed than the current 79mph limit. Indeed in 1956, the Broadway Limited was able to do the run from Pittsburgh to Harrisburg in 4 hours 40 minutes as opposed to the 6 hours it takes Amtrak today over the same ROW.

 

[jis]

My entire reasoning behind suggesting this route for improvement is that relative to new HSR proposals the costs would be lower. Other than the approaches on either side of Horseshoe Curve, much of the line could run at higher speed than the current 79mph limit. Indeed in 1956, the Broadway Limited was able to do the run from Pittsburgh to Harrisburg in 4 hours 40 minutes as opposed to the 6 hours it takes Amtrak today over the same ROW.

Actually the cost of adding a track will not be as low as you are imagining. And how many stops did the Broadway Limited have between Pittsburgh and Harrisburg (AFAIK in 1958 the only stop was Altoona)? What priority was it given? What was its official maximum allowed speed? Was it substantially more than 80mph? If not, does the fact that now the max speed is 79 mph have a significant effect? Isn't a large proportion of the additional time accounted for by additional stops and padding to account for freight interference?

Also, why would this route cost less to add an additional track than the CSX Water Level route with a much easier alignment, which actually serves many more cities and towns with overall higher population?

Lots of questions....