Well, define a "seat"...if you add a seat SAN-SLO, you've got a good shot at selling it 2-3 times. That said, you've also got impacts to be had in an extra seat being available at time X allowing another seat to be sold on a different day.
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Those numbers seem reasonable, if perhaps a bit optimistic. The sad thing is that if you kick out overhead, you could probably justify the Auto Train getting a full equipment overhaul/new passenger car order (that train alone could probably supply an order of around 50-55 cars if you were willing to work a power car of some sort into the set, and you could then redistribute the existing cars into the broader LD system...$35m/yr in profits is enough to pay for an order of that size [50 cars at $4m each is $200m, or less than six years' profits], and such an order would probably be sufficient to significantly improve the bottom line of the Auto Train by another few million per year. Doing this would also inject enough cars into the LD system to seriously contemplate a "Capitol Star" proposal or major (if seasonal) capacity bumps on other LD trains (the Builder, when not being torn apart by OTP collapses, would be a big candidate here; the Zephyr east of DEN and some others could as well, and there's always the Sunset East to toss around). Outside of that, even an extra "protect" set sitting in Chicago would be nice.
The Builder is probably off...if only because of all of the complications from trains that didn't run through and so forth. Best to ignore the Builder for now given the number of asterisks which are relevant.
For reference, what do the losses on other lines look like? I'm guessing that the Cap and Crescent's are pretty well-controlled, for example (though the Cap is likely to take a hit from being cut back in terms of sets).
neroden
Engineer
So, note on methodology:
-- overhead per train in 2012 was computed by comparing Boardman's graph to the "fully allocated" numbers
-- total overhead allocated to "long distance business line" in 2014 is from budget (adding up the non-direct costs). Note that overhead has increased by $68 million, or 15% !! Much of this seems to be IT/computer expenses. I believe the expenses are real -- I don't think they are reasonably allocated to specific trains, though.
-- I assumed that the proportion of overhead going to each train remained the same as in 2012 (probably NOT correct), to get an estimate for overhead per train in 2014. This is the main source of error here.
-- Then I backed that out to get profits before overhead, in millions
Result:
Silver Star profit 4.8
Cardinal loss (2.8) *see note 1
Silver Meteor profit 15.3
Empire Builder profit 0.7 *see note 3
Capitol Limited loss (4.9) *see notes 4 & 5 & 8
California Zephyr loss (16.4)
Southwest Chief loss (16.9)
City of New Orleans loss (6.8) * see note 7
Texas Eagle loss (8.1) * see note 6
Sunset Limited loss (16.3) *see note 2
Coast Starlight loss (9.4)
Lake Shore Limited profit 3.7
Palmetto profit 7.2
Crescent loss (7.3) * see note 8
Auto Train profit 35.5
Note 1:
The Cardinal is seriously hampered by 3-a-week. I did some extra work to separate out variable costs and revenues; if you multiply variable costs by 1.5 (for 3 consists instead of 2) and revenues by 7/3 (for daily service instead of three-a-week; this factor has actually been correct in the past for other routes) it should make a profit of 2.3 million before overhead. This is a $5.1 million improvement in the bottom line. Even if there actually are some other extra costs, this should be well worth it.
Note 2:
Applying the same methodology to the Sunset Limited, it should get a $2.3 million boost to the bottom line by going daily.
Note 3:
Regarding the Empire Builder, after poking through the numbers, I actually suspect that BNSF is fully compensating Amtrak for the lost revenue from the Empire Builder in the form of penalty payments for poor OTP. Revenue crashed, but so did costs. If this is correct, then the Empire Builder's financial performance will look a lot worse once it's running on time again. :-( This would also explain why Amtrak has been very friendly about BNSF's OTP collapse (as contrasted with the combative attitude taken toward CN, which is certainly *not* fully compensating Amtrak for delays on the CONO).
Note 4:
The benefit of the Pennsy/Capitol Limited through cars was estimated at $1.1 million/year in the PIP. It is probably worth more now, but I didn't try to guess how much.
Note 5:
If you remember, I tried to estimate the size of connecting revenue on Chicago hub "corridor" trains from the CL & LSL based on the period when the CL and LSL were suffering from NS's meltdown. This is a very vague estimate, I can't put a solid figure on it. But the value of the connecting revenue generated by the CL on "corridor" trains alone is certainly at least $1 million/year (half a million at each end), and may be more like $10 million. If you consider connecting revenue, cancelling the CL would probably hurt Amtrak's bottom line (...and that of the state governments!)
Note 6:
On the Texas Eagle, watch out for weird variations in allocations related to the Sunset Limited/Texas Eagle through car.
Note 7:
The City of New Orleans is the only train which (before overhead allocation) did worse financially in 2014 than in 2012, by 1.5 million.
Note 8:
The Capitol Limited and Crescent had very small financial improvements from 2012 to 2014 (before overhead) -- less than a million dollars. As noted in note 7, the CONO actually did worse in 2014. All the other trains had substantial improvements, ranging from 3 million (Palmetto) to 14 million (California Zephyr) to 35 million (Auto Train). Of course, all this could be wrong if large amounts of overhead was shuffled between trains.
----
I also ran some projections.
- I tried adding the estimated benefits from the winter consist adjustments
- I tried adding estimated benefits from new Viewliner sleeping cars.
- And I tried simple uniform percentage increases in revenue.
These don't really change the relative rankings much; everything does better. Mostly, the trains which were already doing well financially gain even more of a lead on the ones which weren't. The only exception is the Coast Starlight, which looks like it has a chance to run up the rankings ahead of the Crescent.
In answer to your specific questions:
- the Capitol Limited has stable subsidy requirements, but seems to have hit a ridership/revenue wall with its current configuration; Pennsy-CL through cars would probably change that.
- the Crescent has stable subsidy requirements, but it doesn't seem easy to make it profitable; something like those cut-off cars in Atlanta would probably be needed.
-- overhead per train in 2012 was computed by comparing Boardman's graph to the "fully allocated" numbers
-- total overhead allocated to "long distance business line" in 2014 is from budget (adding up the non-direct costs). Note that overhead has increased by $68 million, or 15% !! Much of this seems to be IT/computer expenses. I believe the expenses are real -- I don't think they are reasonably allocated to specific trains, though.
-- I assumed that the proportion of overhead going to each train remained the same as in 2012 (probably NOT correct), to get an estimate for overhead per train in 2014. This is the main source of error here.
-- Then I backed that out to get profits before overhead, in millions
Result:
Silver Star profit 4.8
Cardinal loss (2.8) *see note 1
Silver Meteor profit 15.3
Empire Builder profit 0.7 *see note 3
Capitol Limited loss (4.9) *see notes 4 & 5 & 8
California Zephyr loss (16.4)
Southwest Chief loss (16.9)
City of New Orleans loss (6.8) * see note 7
Texas Eagle loss (8.1) * see note 6
Sunset Limited loss (16.3) *see note 2
Coast Starlight loss (9.4)
Lake Shore Limited profit 3.7
Palmetto profit 7.2
Crescent loss (7.3) * see note 8
Auto Train profit 35.5
Note 1:
The Cardinal is seriously hampered by 3-a-week. I did some extra work to separate out variable costs and revenues; if you multiply variable costs by 1.5 (for 3 consists instead of 2) and revenues by 7/3 (for daily service instead of three-a-week; this factor has actually been correct in the past for other routes) it should make a profit of 2.3 million before overhead. This is a $5.1 million improvement in the bottom line. Even if there actually are some other extra costs, this should be well worth it.
Note 2:
Applying the same methodology to the Sunset Limited, it should get a $2.3 million boost to the bottom line by going daily.
Note 3:
Regarding the Empire Builder, after poking through the numbers, I actually suspect that BNSF is fully compensating Amtrak for the lost revenue from the Empire Builder in the form of penalty payments for poor OTP. Revenue crashed, but so did costs. If this is correct, then the Empire Builder's financial performance will look a lot worse once it's running on time again. :-( This would also explain why Amtrak has been very friendly about BNSF's OTP collapse (as contrasted with the combative attitude taken toward CN, which is certainly *not* fully compensating Amtrak for delays on the CONO).
Note 4:
The benefit of the Pennsy/Capitol Limited through cars was estimated at $1.1 million/year in the PIP. It is probably worth more now, but I didn't try to guess how much.
Note 5:
If you remember, I tried to estimate the size of connecting revenue on Chicago hub "corridor" trains from the CL & LSL based on the period when the CL and LSL were suffering from NS's meltdown. This is a very vague estimate, I can't put a solid figure on it. But the value of the connecting revenue generated by the CL on "corridor" trains alone is certainly at least $1 million/year (half a million at each end), and may be more like $10 million. If you consider connecting revenue, cancelling the CL would probably hurt Amtrak's bottom line (...and that of the state governments!)
Note 6:
On the Texas Eagle, watch out for weird variations in allocations related to the Sunset Limited/Texas Eagle through car.
Note 7:
The City of New Orleans is the only train which (before overhead allocation) did worse financially in 2014 than in 2012, by 1.5 million.
Note 8:
The Capitol Limited and Crescent had very small financial improvements from 2012 to 2014 (before overhead) -- less than a million dollars. As noted in note 7, the CONO actually did worse in 2014. All the other trains had substantial improvements, ranging from 3 million (Palmetto) to 14 million (California Zephyr) to 35 million (Auto Train). Of course, all this could be wrong if large amounts of overhead was shuffled between trains.
----
I also ran some projections.
- I tried adding the estimated benefits from the winter consist adjustments
- I tried adding estimated benefits from new Viewliner sleeping cars.
- And I tried simple uniform percentage increases in revenue.
These don't really change the relative rankings much; everything does better. Mostly, the trains which were already doing well financially gain even more of a lead on the ones which weren't. The only exception is the Coast Starlight, which looks like it has a chance to run up the rankings ahead of the Crescent.
In answer to your specific questions:
- the Capitol Limited has stable subsidy requirements, but seems to have hit a ridership/revenue wall with its current configuration; Pennsy-CL through cars would probably change that.
- the Crescent has stable subsidy requirements, but it doesn't seem easy to make it profitable; something like those cut-off cars in Atlanta would probably be needed.
I've been chewing this over, and I do have to wonder...though the relative rankings don't move much, how much do the additional Viewliners (and/or some extra hypothetical coaches...say, some reworked Horizons being used to supplement the Amfleets) impact things in the east? I know that as things stand, all of the eastern LD trains save the Crescent (thanks to the south-of-Atlanta stuff) and the Cap without the Pennsylvanian cars are in the black...the question is by how much.
Also, as a hypothetical...what if the cars were turned in Birmingham instead of Atlanta? Any idea on the impact that would have? Likewise, I can't help but wonder at what would happen if you dropped off part of the crew in Atlanta and just closed those cars down (so you might be 3-4 OBS light south of ATL).
Also, as a hypothetical...what if the cars were turned in Birmingham instead of Atlanta? Any idea on the impact that would have? Likewise, I can't help but wonder at what would happen if you dropped off part of the crew in Atlanta and just closed those cars down (so you might be 3-4 OBS light south of ATL).
Who does the "budget" numbers for ridership and revenue? Take the Downeaster for example, which was projected to have a year-over-year increase in both ridership and revenue despite the knowledge (or at least assumed knowledge) of significant track work taking place and the potential for problems with that. Do they not normally take things like that into account of those "budget" numbers?
A bit of a quirk in the Minutes of Delay by Service numbers - for PanAm, they list the top two delay codes as DSR and PTI - Slow Orders and Passenger Train Interference respectively. Since the Downeaster is the only passenger train service on PanAm's tracks, does that mean the PTI number is one Downeaster train being delayed by having to follow another one?
A bit of a quirk in the Minutes of Delay by Service numbers - for PanAm, they list the top two delay codes as DSR and PTI - Slow Orders and Passenger Train Interference respectively. Since the Downeaster is the only passenger train service on PanAm's tracks, does that mean the PTI number is one Downeaster train being delayed by having to follow another one?
jis
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Are MBTA trains considered passenger interference or host railroad goofups?
I think so. That's how they're treated on Metro-North, at least.
Makes perfect sense - a lot of PanAm's tracks are single track only. I can easily see problems if one train has to wait a while for one going the opposite direction to go through.
neroden
Engineer
Well, I think my guesses on those are pretty inaccurate. I was basically guessing a percentage increase in revenue and a significantly smaller percentage increase in costs... you can try running your own models, or we can wait for 2016 and find out.
The wild guess I've been using is about $2.4 million in improved profit per train per year for adding one sleeper to each train on the LSL/Star/Meteor. I computed it a few different ways and it might be a bit less ($1.8) or a bit more ($2.8), and will probably vary a bit by train, but you get the idea. The incremental benefit is less on the Cardinal (three-a-week, poor equipment utilitization and associated poor ticket yields) and less on the Crescent (where there seems to be excess capacity south of Atlanta). But if the Cardinal went daily, the benefit would be about the same as the LSL/Star/Meteor.
No idea whatsoever! Is there space to cut off cars in Birmingham? The problem is that Birmingham-Atlanta is the really weak bit, apparently Birmingham-New Orleans does all right...
That, we can figure out. Obviously, no savings on fuel or maintenance, and presumably no savings on fixed-cost per-employee benefits. Call wages $26/hour/employee (it goes up to $28). You have to multiply by 1.19 (payroll based benefits), so about $31/hour. Each day, the Atlanta-New Orleans run is about 12 hours south and about 12 hours north, so that's 24 working hours per day: so about $744/day.
The train only runs south of Atlanta 341 days a year at the moment anyway, so that's $253,704/year for dropping one car attendant. Approximately. Applying the PIP plan and going from 5 coaches north of Atlanta (probably 2 attandants) to 2 coaches (probably 1 attendant), while dropping the cafe (1 attendant), would then be $507,408/year.
I asked about Birmingham because that is where Southern cut the Crescent to 3x weekly back in the 70s...so it seemed like a location that might be worth looking into. I'm partly looking at other locations from the ability to stick the cars somewhere...orchestrating the cut-off somewhere other than Atlanta (even if Atlanta were the last legally bookable stop) might prove cheaper if Amtrak were forced to stick in a siding somewhere.
jis
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Birmingham is a real station with yard tracks etc. even today, so as to be able to hold a few cars and turn them, unlike Atlanta, which is just a narrow platform on a main line.
neroden
Engineer
Seems like it might be a good idea. For each employee who worked only NY-Birmingham, that would be about 14 hrs of work time removed, and likewise that much fuel & maintenance of the cars (a harder number to guess). Assuming the Crescent ran on time (cough, cough), you should be able to do NY-Birmingham cars with three consists rather than four, with maintenance in NY. (Theoretically NY-Atlanta could be done with two consists if there were maintenance in Atlanta.)
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jis
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Incidentally, Birmingham is also in the process of building a really nice multi-modal transport center at the Birmingham Amtrak station. So there is some hope. Contrast that with the situation in Atlanta.
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Looking at Amtrak capital needs from a rider perspective is sometimes myopic. Cars and new locomotives are all that is seen. There are so many more capital needs behind the curtain that are not seen by the general public, all of them vying for dollars. Things like 100 year old pipe-section catenary structures corroding from the inside-out, antiquated 138kV substations, obsolete power protection and control systems - and these are just a few that I know. The idea of buying $100 million dollars of rolling stock that is not needed today but might be needed tomorrow has to be weighed against other less sexy items that impact system reliability right now. Amtrak in the NEC is a very complex operation. Amtrak has a high voltage electric power transmission system larger (by circuit miles) than many northeast utilities. It is a whole lot more than cars and locomotives. A brand new Viewliner is not of much use if you can't get power to the electric motor.
jis
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What? You mean things require money to be kept in good state of repair. I thought all tolls for highways and bridges were supposed to be gone after the construction cost was paid off too, no? 
:help:
For the few humorless who don't get it..... that was an attempt at sarcastic humor. So no flames please
:help:For the few humorless who don't get it..... that was an attempt at sarcastic humor. So no flames please
WoodyinNYC
Conductor
I'm generally skeptical of any, ANY plans to shrink Amtrak
to success. I want to grow it out of its problems.
Here, I'm not too worried about cutting off a few cars in Atlanta
or Birmingham.
Just makes me wonder if part of the problem south of Atlanta
isn't the lousy connections at New Orleans? We saw recently
that a very substantial part of the LD traffic thru Chicago is
passengers transferring to or from corridor services.
How much more revenue could the Crescent get from connecting
passengers if the Sunset Limited ran daily instead of 3/7th?
Thinking Atlanta-Houston or Birmingham-San Antonio, for
example, there could be money there.
Iirc, the projected revenue from the schedule change allowing
connecting passengers in L.A. to/from the Coast Starlight and
Sunset Ltd was somewhere $10 or $20 million. Likewise a study
on extending the Heartland Flyer, north from Oklahoma City up to
Kansas City, projected some $10 or $20 million revenue iirc for
the Southwest Chief from passengers connecting to/from, during
the night at a lonesome station north of Wichita.
Restoring service New Orleans-Biloxi-Mobile might bring in a bit
more revenue from connecting passengers as well.
While contemplating this flock of pigs, we might as well recall the
route that Louisiana's Gov Bobby Jindal supported, before he was
told that Obama liked trains and therefore he should hate trains.
That route was New Orleans-Baton Rouge-Alexandria-Shreveport-
Marshall-Dallas-Ft Worth. Those potential connections would surely
strengthen the Crescent as well.
This comment is not meant to blow off PRR 60's basic observation
that Amtrak needs serious money to attain state of good repair,
as well as making capital investments to improve service elsewhere.
But I do want to keep some attention on the notion that whenever
Amtrak can grow, usually it will get better.
to success. I want to grow it out of its problems.
Here, I'm not too worried about cutting off a few cars in Atlanta
or Birmingham.
Just makes me wonder if part of the problem south of Atlanta
isn't the lousy connections at New Orleans? We saw recently
that a very substantial part of the LD traffic thru Chicago is
passengers transferring to or from corridor services.
How much more revenue could the Crescent get from connecting
passengers if the Sunset Limited ran daily instead of 3/7th?
Thinking Atlanta-Houston or Birmingham-San Antonio, for
example, there could be money there.
Iirc, the projected revenue from the schedule change allowing
connecting passengers in L.A. to/from the Coast Starlight and
Sunset Ltd was somewhere $10 or $20 million. Likewise a study
on extending the Heartland Flyer, north from Oklahoma City up to
Kansas City, projected some $10 or $20 million revenue iirc for
the Southwest Chief from passengers connecting to/from, during
the night at a lonesome station north of Wichita.
Restoring service New Orleans-Biloxi-Mobile might bring in a bit
more revenue from connecting passengers as well.
While contemplating this flock of pigs, we might as well recall the
route that Louisiana's Gov Bobby Jindal supported, before he was
told that Obama liked trains and therefore he should hate trains.
That route was New Orleans-Baton Rouge-Alexandria-Shreveport-
Marshall-Dallas-Ft Worth. Those potential connections would surely
strengthen the Crescent as well.
This comment is not meant to blow off PRR 60's basic observation
that Amtrak needs serious money to attain state of good repair,
as well as making capital investments to improve service elsewhere.
But I do want to keep some attention on the notion that whenever
Amtrak can grow, usually it will get better.
neroden
Engineer
You do know most of the Viewliners are being hauled by diesel locomotives most of the time, right?
I'm all about the behind-the-scenes upgrades, normally.
However, the cars are more urgent because there's a manufacturing limitation -- there isn't a huge railcar manufacturing industry in the US, so it's important to order cars while the production line is running. It's much, *much* cheaper to do an add-on order than to shut down the factory and then start it up again. And rolling stock *is* the absolute limiting factor on Amtrak service right now.
Amtrak can get electrical work done any time; most of the parts are stock. (Or would be stock except for the idiotic continued use of non-standard frequencies, which I've ranted about before. Apparently Amtrak has decided to be penny-wise and pound-foolish in this regard.) If it's a tradeoff between getting more cars now while the production line is open or putting off electrical upgrades for a year or two, it's a complete no-brainer -- get the cars now.
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WoodyinNYC
Conductor
Isn't Amtrak answering this argument for us? Electrical and
other infrastructure on the NEC will be paid for by the Acelas,
if possible. Long distance capital spending is in a different silo.
LOL.
Anyway, it probably isn't helpful to divide ourselves over where
to spend the money we don't have. That allows Amtrak's haters
another chance to fog up matters with poisonous fog.
We're all impatient, of course, but I'm pretty impressed that Amtrak,
Joe Boardman, and the team, have been making real progress
on every front. Sadly, when the financial meltdown hit late in 2008,
nobody was really ready to spend the Stimulus money that was part
of the economic repair program. But Amtrak, the FRA, and a handful
of states were able to scramble.
The result has been major spending on infrastructure on the NEC,
in the Midwest, and here and there around the country.
Equipment shortages and maintenance problems have been
partly addressed with repair of wrecked and parked stock, and
with the orders for the electric locomotives for the NEC and
the diesel engines for the Midwest corridors, new bi-levels for
the Midwest which will free up almost 100 Horizons for use
elsewhere. The puny $300 million to replace Heritage diners
and bag cars, and add 25 sleepers (equivalent to 30 counting
half the 10 bag dorms) is not enuff to finish the particular job
they are supposed to fix. Another $100 million or so would
make all the difference.
Now with progress happening while we watch, everyone is more
aware of how much more needs to be done, both with a bit of
new equipment, and with repair and expansion of infrastructure.
All we need now is much more money and much less stupid from
Congress. Given the magnitude of those problems, I'm cautiously
optimistic that while the rate of progress will drastically drop, it
will continue for a while longer.
jis
Permanent Way Inspector
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I don't think anyone realistically believes that Acela revenues will be enough to carry out the necessary NEC infrastructure work. Acela money will probably be enough to buy rolling stock and fund quite a bit of the maintenance. But will not be enough to fund infrastructure upgrade. That will have to be investment from elsewhere sourced from state, federal and possibly even some private money if push comes to shove.
Fortunately even some of the Republicans from NEC land are now on board for finding such funding since they are coming to realize that as the NEC goes, so goes the economy of the Northeast Corridor region.
Fortunately even some of the Republicans from NEC land are now on board for finding such funding since they are coming to realize that as the NEC goes, so goes the economy of the Northeast Corridor region.
Jis: You mean to say that there are actually some Republican Congress Ctitters left that have common sense when it comes to funding public services? Alright!!!!!!!
You'd probably need to adjust the Crescent's times by an hour or two in each direction (doable at least in theory) to make for a reliable cut-off (1150-1424 is not a sufficient time), but if you could slide the SB back by an hour (WAS departure at 1730 instead of 1830) and possibly move the NB slightly later you might be able to make it work. I'd actually be curious as to how often the two Crescents meet north of Birmingham (and I see this as important because if you can turn a share of the crew at Birmingham or somewhere in the vicinity, that's a day less of work for them, savings and all).
They're mostly up north, from what I can tell...you don't tend to get too many anti-Amtrak votes from eastern Virginia, for example. From what I can tell, if you're close to the NEC party doesn't matter as much on this front (Christie being an outlier, but the various complexities of ARC are something I think we bashed to death on here), though of these states Pennsylvania is big enough that it is quite possible to have a statewide official who doesn't qualify as "close" w.r.t. the NEC (since Pittsburgh and the T can outvote Philly).
neroden
Engineer
Pennsylvania is often described as being composed of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and "Pennsyltucky" in between. This isn't quite fair because it doesn't really describe the coal belt (Allentown to Scranton).
Basically, Pennsyltucky elects the worst sort of Appalachian anti-rail right-winger, the sort who will oppose any rail project no matter how solid the business case, and the other regions are generally passenger-rail-friendly (even Allentown, which has none). A long history of gerrymandering means that Pennsyltucky can frequently outvote the cities, unfortunately. It's not as bad as the gerrymandering/malapportionment mess in New York, though.
Basically, Pennsyltucky elects the worst sort of Appalachian anti-rail right-winger, the sort who will oppose any rail project no matter how solid the business case, and the other regions are generally passenger-rail-friendly (even Allentown, which has none). A long history of gerrymandering means that Pennsyltucky can frequently outvote the cities, unfortunately. It's not as bad as the gerrymandering/malapportionment mess in New York, though.
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