Amtrak had the means...but not the will

[Gene Poon]

Amtrak had the means to prevent the deadly crash in Philadelphia on May 12...but not the will. Now their lack of will is forever "covered in blood."

A signal and train control system that would have prevented the crash in Philadelphia already exists, courtesy the Pennsylvania Railroad, over fifty years ago. No fancy millions-of-dollars Positive Train Control was needed.

Quoting Andy Byler, a PE with a rail signal and infrastructure contractor (his company's clients include Amtrak, NS and CSX):

The PRR upgraded the Cab Signal System with Automatic Speed Control by penalty brake applications on the NEC in the 1950's. The Cab Signal System includes a code called 120 code (for 120 pulses per minute) which positively enforces a 45 mph speed on the train when the train detects this pulse code in the track circuit.

The PRR legacy Amtrak signal system is called a "speed signal" system, meaning it informs the engineer of permissible speeds instead of a "route signal" system which informs the engineer of diverging routes and relies on his knowledge of physical
characteristics to know the speed permitted on the diverging movement.

All that had to be done was to go into the Central Instrument Houses at Shore and Ford interlockings change the control lines to read a maximum of 120 code between Shore and Ford. This actually was done for all westbound movements to prevent overspeed derailments of this kind a couple of decades back after the wreck at Back Bay and the overspeed incident at Elizabeth. Metro North made a similar change to the CIH's at Spuyten Duyvil after the terrible derailment there 18 months back. The change took them a couple of days to wire and test. So this curve could have been made fail-safe for nearly six decades now if the will to do so had existed.

Would PTC have prevented the wreck? Of course! But Amtrak already had a system in place that would have prevented the wreck and just was not using it in this way because of philosophical opposition to enforcing severe civil speed restrictions through use of the cab signal system and wayside aspects. Even though they profess to have a "speed signal" system, certain people didn't want to use it to enforce train speed unless their hand was absolutely forced by an FRA mandate. That philosophical opposition is inexcusable and now it is covered in blood. And this is not the only location on Amtrak that still needs this treatment. Here are some others (not an exhaustive list):

Northbound into Bridge and Fulton interlockings in Baltimore (125 mph into a 3.75 degree 40 mph curve)

Northbound into Brandy in Wilmington (125 mph into a 4 degree 40 mph curve)

Westbound into Pelham Bay (100 mph into a 3 degree 45 mph curve)

Eastbound into Gap (110 mph into a 4.25 degree 55 mph curve)

Westbound into Gap (90 mph into a 4.25 degree 55 mph curve)

Amtrak could have cut-in this system at the location of the crash for little or no cost, and without PTC. But they didn't.
-GP

Westbound into Gap (90 mph into a 4.25 degree 55 mph curve)

 

[PRR 60]

The only reason I can see for that not being done with the eastbound direction is that the incoming track speed - 80mph - may have been considered safe for the curve (not comfortable, safe). The thought that a train coming east would be operating at 26mph over track speed was probably considered an extremely unlikely scenario. If that thinking is correct, and slowing the train from 80 to 50 is for passenger comfort, not safety, then not imposing the civil speed limit for eastbound traffic could make some sense.

 

[jis]

At the end of the day, a lot can be done, but all costs resource allocation to do it, and some prioritization rules have to be used for doing so. Sometimes a general prioritization rule that makes sense causes on specific corner case to sneak through and cause an accident. To make a great issue of it is certainly a good opportunity to display ones knowledge of the system, but also smacks of a bit of Monday morning quarter backing specially with a provocative title thrown in.

With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, probably Amtrak should apply the same rules that were imposed on MNRR after Spuyten Duyvil. An Approach Medium at Shore would have forced the speed to be low enough to be safe, and even a Cab 60 would probably suffice. As mentioned by PRR, such is the case in the opposite direction since the slowdown is from a much higher speed allowed in the previous section.

 

[Ryan]

It's really easy to sit back and be an armchair quarterback on Monday morning and say "Amtrak should have done this!".

It's a lot harder to be the man in the arena and actually do the work.

I've got utmost respect for one of those people, and not so much for the other. Determining which is which is left as an exercise to the reader.

 

[LurkerZ]

Ahhh yes - Gene Poon from Trainorders. The one who pretends to be an Amtrak champion by consistently pointing out their shortcomings.

Thanks for bringing your "tough-love" over here. Are there any more derogatory quotes from other sources you'd like to share with us, or are you still building a full-on gloat for a later post?

 

[Tom]

Yes, PTC or a similar system would have prevented this accident and therefore this accident highlights the priority PTC should be given. A couple of points however: 1) Thousands of trains have gone down this section of track safely over many years. Safe operation was completely normal. This train went off the tracks. The fact is no one knows why the train was speeding and we should all wait for the NTSB to share the facts before prognosticating. There is a great big piece of this story that no one has right now. 2) More often than not, when PTC is discussed, the negative nellies (well represented on these boards) complain it is wasted money on pie in the sky technology.

Though I have my share of criticisms for Amtrak and its management, I have grown to be more than leery of many regulars on rail related boards who, when it comes to Amtrak, need to go on meds. They have lost all ability to see themselves. I have figured out who they are, skip their entries and see no need to involves myself in their hysteria. Certainly Trainorders is the center of that universe.

Gene Poon is obsessed by Amtrak; has an us vs. them way of looking at the NEC; and has the grudge of all grudges against Joe Boardman. His comments and ability to pounce on anything negative about Amtrak alternately make me chuckle. They are so predictable.

 

[jis]

This is one reason that I participate in these fora just with pure information to the best of my ability instead of spending time on individuals and their idiosyncrasies. That tends to be distracting and a waste of time.

In my day job, among other things I work on international standards, which involves negotiating with multitude of characters from multitude of cultures with multitude of behavioral and cultural idiosyncrasies. It is completely hopeless to focus on those and let such worry you. It is easier to focus on the subject matter at hand and address the whole thing is third person if possible. That is how one makes the most progress in communications of this sort. And yet as you notice, there are ways of gently bringing out undesirable behavior to the attention of whoever wants to pay attention (specifically the person chairing such, if there is one - usually there is), and we do so in such international fora too. But it has to be done using the proper protocol

 

[RIverviewer]

Two links from Philly.com this afternoon:

http://www.philly.com/philly/business/transportation/20150515_Amtrak_failed_to_install_train-speed_control_at_dangerous_Frankford_curve.html

And...

http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20150515_Amtrak_facing_costly_personal-injury_claims_from_crash_victims.html

 

[andersone]

My interest is not so much how it happened,,, with due respect to the victims and their loved ones,,, but how we can work towards not making it happen again

I live in a work culture where safety has a cost and we want it to be in dollars not pain and suffering

Perhaps this tragedy will provide the resources to work towards a safer end,,, and rather makes any discussion of flowers and cloth table clothes rather mundane

 

[jis]

All of NEC main line trackage is scheduled to have PTC in the form of ACSES + CCTC Cab Signal in operation by 1 January 2016, which if it were in place already, would have prevented this accident.

 

[Paul CHI]

FWIW, A new article in CNN Money says that a primary cause of Amtrak's delay in setting up PTC was the difficulty in purchasing the radio bandwidth needed from a private party that owned the band and was in litigation.

http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/15/technology/amtrak-braking-system/index.html?iid=HP_LN

I'm a bit puzzled by Boardman's "we take complete responsibility" statement. What does that mean?

 

[Thirdrail7]

Though I have my share of criticisms for Amtrak and its management, I have grown to be more than leery of many regulars on rail related boards who, when it comes to Amtrak, need to go on meds. They have lost all ability to see themselves. I have figured out who they are, skip their entries and see no need to involves myself in their hysteria. Certainly Trainorders is the center of that universe.

Gene Poon is obsessed by Amtrak; has an us vs. them way of looking at the NEC; and has the grudge of all grudges against Joe Boardman. His comments and ability to pounce on anything negative about Amtrak alternately make me chuckle. They are so predictable.

Indeed. Trainorders is known for protecting his posts if you correct him...which is usually the case. he is also known to "hit and run." He'll make a post (like this) and stir up the board, and never respond to the fact that he is wrong.

My guess is he has some sort of stock in the board and they pay him to plant stories.

So, I fully expect him to never see this post, but in case he drops in:

Ummm....Genepoon....Pelham Bay westbound is protected by a cab signal drop on both tracks.

The curve northbound into Brandy is protected by signal indication on both tracks. The most favorable signal you can get going north on 2 track is an Approach Limited. The most favorable signal you can get on 3 track going north is an Advance Approach.

Northbound into Bridge is not protected but the track speed was 75mph until recently. Granted, it was raised but where are you drawing the line? Until PTC is installed, any train on any track can exceed the maximum authorized speed at any time and be involved in an incident.

if you want to go with the "what if" route, you might as well only go 20mph and shut down now.

 

[Headache]

The investigations will flush out the idiots. You can't reason with trolls who have made up their minds already about what occurred even though they don't know a thing about what the cause was at this time. This is one of the reasons why I don't allow guest posting on my board.

Maybe if they'd spend more time contacting their congress persons to get more money into passenger rail rather than being a keybored(pun intended) crybaby the world would be more productive; but then that might take away the crown they've placed on themselves.

 

[benjibear]

Does this system that is around 60 years old even still operate reliable? And is there anyone that knows how to maintain it? As an electrical PE, anything that is over 30-40 years old needs replaced or extensively upgraded.

 

[SarahZ]

he is also known to "hit and run." He'll make a post (like this) and stir up the board, and never respond to the fact that he is wrong.

My guess is he has some sort of stock in the board and they pay him to plant stories.

Ah, a professional troll. Got it. Thanks for the heads-up.

 

[Ryan]

Does this system that is around 60 years old even still operate reliable? And is there anyone that knows how to maintain it? As an electrical PE, anything that is over 30-40 years old needs replaced or extensively upgraded.

Yes.

Yes.

No it doesn't.

 

[neroden]

Does this system that is around 60 years old even still operate reliable? And is there anyone that knows how to maintain it? As an electrical PE, anything that is over 30-40 years old needs replaced or extensively upgraded.

Components are replaced before they fail. However, yes, there are plans to replace nearly all the components, and Amtrak doesn't have enough capital funding. Just like with the 100 year old bridges. Just like with the 100 year old tunnels. Just like with the 80-year-old catenary wire. And so on.

 

[PRR 60]

Does this system that is around 60 years old even still operate reliable? And is there anyone that knows how to maintain it? As an electrical PE, anything that is over 30-40 years old needs replaced or extensively upgraded.

Components are replaced before they fail. However, yes, there are plans to replace nearly all the components, and Amtrak doesn't have enough capital funding. Just like with the 100 year old bridges. Just like with the 100 year old tunnels. Just like with the 80-year-old catenary wire. And so on.

Catenary wire is not 80 years old either. It's been replaced and upgraded.

 

[PRR 60]

he is also known to "hit and run." He'll make a post (like this) and stir up the board, and never respond to the fact that he is wrong.

My guess is he has some sort of stock in the board and they pay him to plant stories.

Ah, a professional troll. Got it. Thanks for the heads-up.

That's his opinion. That does not make it a fact.

I should note that the basic premise posted by the OP - that a simple fix that could have prevented this accident was available but Amtrak elected not to use it - turned out to be factual. I would disagree with the implication that this was a grossly negligent disregard of safety. I think it was a choice made with the best of intentions. However, the fact is that the existing signal system could have bee set to actively enforce a safe speed through that curve (as it has been at other locations), and it was not. Amtrak is now making the changes at this and other locations at risk.

 

[SarahZ]

he is also known to "hit and run." He'll make a post (like this) and stir up the board, and never respond to the fact that he is wrong.

My guess is he has some sort of stock in the board and they pay him to plant stories.

Ah, a professional troll. Got it. Thanks for the heads-up.

That's his opinion. That does not make it a fact.

I should note that the basic premise posted by the OP - that a simple fix that could have prevented this accident was available but Amtrak elected not to use it - turned out to be factual. I would disagree with the implication that this was a grossly negligent disregard of safety. I think it was a choice made with the best of intentions. However, the fact is that the existing signal system could have bee set to actively enforce a safe speed through that curve (as it has been at other locations), and it was not. Amtrak is now making the changes at this and other locations at risk.

True enough. I just really, really despise the "stir them up and run away" posting practice.

 

[Thirdrail7]

he is also known to "hit and run." He'll make a post (like this) and stir up the board, and never respond to the fact that he is wrong.

My guess is he has some sort of stock in the board and they pay him to plant stories.

Ah, a professional troll. Got it. Thanks for the heads-up.

That's his opinion. That does not make it a fact.

be factual. I would disagree with the implication that this was a grossly negligent disregard of safety. I think it was a choice made with the best of intentions. However, the fact is that the existing signal system could have bee set to actively enforce a safe speed through that curve (as it has been at other locations), and it was not. Amtrak is now making the changes at this and other locations at risk.

SarahZ: I did not call him a troll and I do not have any proof that he is in cahoots with the trainorders.

However, the rest of the post the PRR choose to quote is indeed a fact.

If you are so sure that this is my "opinion" riddle me this: He logged on as a guest on this board, made the post and disappeared. This is not the first time on this board.

Secondly, I have been on trainorders. You needn't take my word for it.....I'm sure they will be happy to give up my identity or you can look on there for my posts. I use the same screen name. I have responded to his erroneous posts that he puts up and when the actual truth appears, there is no response.

Again, you needn't take my word for it. You can go on trainorders and read up for yourself. My personal entrance came when he posted against all laws of reality that the 613/612 combination was dragged for a few hundred miles with a "glowing red wheel," which some buff passed off as a fact on the place I usually post. When the truth was posted, people demanded answers. Naturally, there was no response.

Once again, you needn't take my word for it. The posts are still there.

These are actual facts...not opinion.

Just like his wrong facts posted above that certain curves that aren't protected are indeed protected.

Will he come back and say "Oh, I learned something...thanks."

I'm willing to bet the answer is no unless someone summons him. If that doesn't happen, the next time you see him will be to do what was done above...complain, and run.

As for the fact that you think is true that it is a simple fix, I'm really waiting to see how this "simple fix" occurs. Since you're weighing in so much PRR60, let ask your opinion and for the record:

***This is just a casual comment that has nothing to do with any sort of incident. I'm am responding to a general post in a general manner. No specifics are addressed or implied.***

If the feds do indeed mandate protection for speed restrictions on all curves where the prevailing track speed is 20 mph or greater than the restricted curve speed, how is this simple? The NEC has 5 different speeds on certain tracks. Who are they tailoring the cab signal drop for? Example, the curve at the south end of the Susquehanna River Bridge is 95 for "B' trains that are approaching at 125mph. A type "C" train is dropping from 110mph to 90mph. A type "D" train is doing nothing the speed is a consistent 90mph. A type "E" train, drops from 50mph to 30mph.

The obvious answer is probably code the approach for speed of the train that is approaching the fastest. In this case, it would be an Acela, whose type "A" designation allows the train to approach and enter that same curve (that every other train is dropping for) at 125mph.

I don't believe it as cut and dry as other railroads that may have 2 or 3 different speed profiles.

Additionally, it is my opinion the order also leaves much to be desired since to be honest, this come into play.

The FRA also ordered Amtrak to analyze safety risks at all of its curves on its busy Northeast Corridor and immediately install speed-control technology in areas where speed limits are significantly higher in advance of curves that have slower restrictions.

Let's take the curve at Bay which is protected from the north. This is because the approach is a 50mph drop in speed. However, coming from south, there is no change in track speed, since the speed is already low.

There is absolutely nothing stopping an errant engine from getting into that curve, and it will be in compliance with the new order, because this is the problem:

Signals are set up assuming the MAS is followed. If a train is operating 125mph in an 80mph and goes by an approach and blows the next stop signal, it wasn't really the fault of the signal system. If you code the track based upon track speed, all the drops in the world aren't going to do much good if the train (for whatever reason) is grossly over speed.

To me, the only real answer is to basically lower the speed or protect every single curve that can't handle a train traveling significantly over the speed limit, regardless of the actual amount of speed drop.

 

[SarahZ]

I was being glib. I never said you called him that.

 

[Gene Poon]

An official statement from Amtrak says that the railroad will comply
with the FRA's upcoming emergency order to immediately implement the
legacy PRR speed control that has been available to them for decades,
where Amtrak Train 188 derailed at speed, killing eight and injuring
over a hundred.

As if they had any choice...

The FRA will also order Amtrak to study and consider implementation

of the same system at other potentially dangerous curves where there

a substantial reduction in speed is required. Amtrak has said it will

comply with this, too.

Bear in mind, this is not the expensive PTC that Amtrak and Boardman
have been touting "for December 2105." It is an adjunct to the cab
signal system in place for decades, installed by the Pennsylvania
Railroad 60 years ago. It has even been operational on tne VERY SAME
CURVE southbound, but not northbound where Amtrak 188 wrecked.

Joe Boardman even said, in a TV interview on the scene, that the
system is in place and functioning, southbound only. Asked why not
northbound, he replied that "we don't think it' necessary."

And that is just the kind of statement by a CEO that the victims'
attorneys will LOVE.

(NOTE: for some reason I was blocked from accessing this forum for

some time after the first post in this thread. I have been told that somebody

may have thought that it was written by an impostor!

 

[Just-Thinking-51]

Accounts are free. Time to sign up.

 

[DryCreek]

Do the SEPTA trains using this very same track have the same issue that Amtrak trains do? If so, I guess that just because they haven't been involved in an incident at the same location and direction they get a pass?