Amtrak Accident in Chicago

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Sam, one of my internal sources suggested that the Engineer in charge at the time of the incident was qualified on 8 different rule books, or something to that effect. When you think about the number of railroads in the Chicago area this does seem plausible, since Engineers may be required to run on UP/BNSF/CP (GCOR), CSX (CSX Operating), NS (whatever book they use), CN (whatever book they use), Amtrak, etc. I still firmly believe that modifications should be made to GCOR, and an attempt should be made to get all railroads (at least the big seven) on board with it.
I didn't know there were eight rule books. He must be qualified on some short lines also. Most short lines adopt the RR that they connect with in order that everyone is on the same page.
 
Sunday afternoon, NTSB investigators looked at the mangled tracks where the crash occurred. The Amtrak train was traveling about 40 mph when it applied its brakes for nine seconds and skidded some 500 feet, hitting a stopped freight train on the same set of tracks Friday. <snip>

Amtrak's Pere Marquette train out of Grand Rapids, Mich., was loaded with holiday shoppers and going just over 30 mph when it slammed into a Norfolk Southern freight train near 52nd Street. Sixty-two people were injured.
In 9 seconds, with the brakes applied on emergency, a three-car + loco train could only slow 10 MPH?

Something seems a bit wrong here...
 
The one thing that many people don't understand about Restricted speed is that its a max of 15 MPH (20 on some roads), but you have to be prepared to stop. So if you're going around a curve, and in order to stop within your field of vision you have to do 5 MPH, you do 5 MPH. Road Foreman are known for doing banner tests in locations like that to nail people for that rules violation.
 
Sunday afternoon, NTSB investigators looked at the mangled tracks where the crash occurred. The Amtrak train was traveling about 40 mph when it applied its brakes for nine seconds and skidded some 500 feet, hitting a stopped freight train on the same set of tracks Friday. <snip>

Amtrak's Pere Marquette train out of Grand Rapids, Mich., was loaded with holiday shoppers and going just over 30 mph when it slammed into a Norfolk Southern freight train near 52nd Street. Sixty-two people were injured.
In 9 seconds, with the brakes applied on emergency, a three-car + loco train could only slow 10 MPH?

Something seems a bit wrong here...
I see your point but it does seem about right to me. I've been on shortline, and mainline (amtrak) passenger trains when they went into emergency (thankfully never derailing or causing any serious damage). When the E-brakes are applied there is a very distinct sound of air rushing out of the pipes (you hear this same sound when locomotives are disconnected at stations) after that sound there is usually about 2-3 seconds before you really feel any real braking effect. So in reality it was prob. 3 seconds before the train actually began to considerably slow down. In 6 seconds the train slows about 10 MPH? Thats slowing 5MPH every 3 seconds, someone who is better at math can probably figure out how fast that really is with percentages and all, but is sounds pretty fast to me.
 
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Simpleton, here, reporting in.
Signals and speed be dam*ed, doesn't the problem boil down to one train being on the wrong track?

Isn't it possible that the freight was on the wrong track?

Isn't it possible that a dispatcher put 2 trains on the same track, erroneously?
Actually it's ALL about signals and speed.

Dispatchers put 2 trains on the same track all the time (going in the same direction).

Trains routinely follow other trains on the same track, much like on a interstate highway. The signal system is designed to let the engineer know how fast to safely proceed based on the distance to the next train ahead. A train typically has to have 3 empty signal blocks ahead of him to get a clear signal. You shouldn't be able to get a signal into an occupied block ahead, or at best a restricting signal, which means going "slow enough to stop within half the range of vision". If you see something 100 feet down the track, you have to be able to stop in 50 feet.

Lots of speculation, lots of discussion, the facts will come out when the investigation is completed.
 
The one thing that many people don't understand about Restricted speed is that its a max of 15 MPH (20 on some roads), but you have to be prepared to stop. So if you're going around a curve, and in order to stop within your field of vision you have to do 5 MPH, you do 5 MPH. Road Foreman are known for doing banner tests in locations like that to nail people for that rules violation.
Our railroad (UP) had a HALF the field of vision rule. This was probably set in place to give the other crew, if opposing you, the same chance to stop without a collision. The NS is notorious for the banner test and I'm told that the officials just can't wait to pull them.
 
Lots of speculation, lots of discussion, the facts will come out when the investigation is completed.
Eh, why not make comments of my own too. . .

Anyone else notice the quoted report mentioned RED over YELLOW, and then everyone afterwards {here} says YELLOW over RED?

AND, (preface this with a disclaimer that I've seen no direct quotes of the Dispatcher's radiod instructions) that verbal instructions don't quite match exactly the signal & situation?

Now combine the two. . .

Any of you ever play that fun prank of casually mentioning a number out loud to someone concentrating on counting money? doesn't take much.

NOW, add "reversi factor". My Motorola (Radio) days, we did the security radios for the last Olympics in Los Angeles. I still don't say too much about many of the procedures we had to follow, but one I'll mention (albeit only vaguely) was "Absolutely no opposites. Someone will undoubtedly screw something up and get someone killed."

I'm not interested in passing blame around; just looking at what possible factors might need to be eliminated to prevent the next one.

*************

Next thought: Isn't there some move currently underfoot by the FRA to standardize signals in the US? I as told something like that this past Summer when CSX replaced MANY signals on the Pere Marquette lines here.

*************

Yet another one: Contrary to an earlier post, the wreck made front page with many pictures and bold-face quotes for the past three days, while the invasion of Hillary's office was on page three. But then again, this is Grand Rapids, and the Pere Marquette is considered "our" train and Amtrak's actual ownership is a mere technicality. In fact, it'd be blue, yellow and grey if we could get away with it. BTW, in spite of lots of scary-type quotes about the collision and its pictures, there hasn't been a single peep from the Amtrak-is-dangerous crowd.

Alan, I have copies iff'n you're interested.
 
Simpleton, here, reporting in.
Signals and speed be dam*ed, doesn't the problem boil down to one train being on the wrong track?

Isn't it possible that the freight was on the wrong track?

Isn't it possible that a dispatcher put 2 trains on the same track, erroneously?
Actually it's ALL about signals and speed.

Dispatchers put 2 trains on the same track all the time (going in the same direction).

Trains routinely follow other trains on the same track, much like on a interstate highway. The signal system is designed to let the engineer know how fast to safely proceed based on the distance to the next train ahead. A train typically has to have 3 empty signal blocks ahead of him to get a clear signal. You shouldn't be able to get a signal into an occupied block ahead, or at best a restricting signal, which means going "slow enough to stop within half the range of vision". If you see something 100 feet down the track, you have to be able to stop in 50 feet.

Lots of speculation, lots of discussion, the facts will come out when the investigation is completed.
It's not normal for two trains to be in the same block at the same time in signaled territory. Because this was a yard, perhaps "yard rules" applied and permitted this, but I don't think the dispatcher knowingly sent the amtrak train into an occupied block at any speed.

Do we know for a fact that he was given a signal to proceed at Restricted Speed (15mph max, stopping within half the range of vision) over Medium Speed (a speed not exceeding 40 mph passenger)? I have heard so many conflicting reports.
 
It's not normal for two trains to be in the same block at the same time in signaled territory. Because this was a yard, perhaps "yard rules" applied and permitted this, but I don't think the dispatcher knowingly sent the amtrak train into an occupied block at any speed.
While there certainly does appear to be a yard on the far side, the track that Amtrak was on is considered a mainline track with a maximum authorized speed of 79 MPH, assuming that the engineer has a clear signal. Therefore I would rather doubt that yard rules would be governing that track.
 
"Dispatchers put 2 trains on the same track all the time (going in the same direction).

Trains routinely follow other trains on the same track, much like on a interstate highway.."

How do these things relate to "track warrants", if at all?
 
Track warrants aren't in effect where you're on signaled track in my experience (although I'll admit I don't know GCOR that well). In this case the accident occurred on NS tracks, which aren't governed by GCOR, but rather NS' own rule book.

As far as I know, the signal indication given to the Amtrak train was red over yellow, which depending on the railroad you're on (heck even what part of the railroad you're on) can mean different things. For example, CSX Operating Rule shows Red over Yellow as being a Medium Approach, whereas rule CR-1290 shows it as Restricting. And that's in the same book! Now granted rule CR-1290 stems from CSX taking over Conrail tracks. But this just goes to show, that there needs to be standardization.
 
Track warrants aren't in effect where you're on signaled track in my experience (although I'll admit I don't know GCOR that well). In this case the accident occurred on NS tracks, which aren't governed by GCOR, but rather NS' own rule book.
Indeed NORAC rules were in play here on the former Conrail. Norac used to be the competing school of thought to GCOR, but has fell out of favor due to the simplicity of the GCOR system.

As far as I know, the signal indication given to the Amtrak train was red over yellow, which depending on the railroad you're on (heck even what part of the railroad you're on) can mean different things. For example, CSX Operating Rule shows Red over Yellow as being a Medium Approach, whereas rule CR-1290 shows it as Restricting. And that's in the same book! Now granted rule CR-1290 stems from CSX taking over Conrail tracks. But this just goes to show, that there needs to be standardization.
Ok the signals that used to govern the ENGLEWOOD interlocking with the NS and the METRA Rock Island line, were changed to color signals about 5 years ago. The signal that was displayed on the 2 track (which A-371-30 approached on) was a R - R - *flashing* Y (restricting) which got confused with a "Slow Approach R - R - Y (solid). I looked at the rules again after the NTSB report came out. The actions of the engineer clearly indicate that they were operating under the slow approach (Rule C 288) not a restricting (Rule C - 290). A contact on the inside told me that only the two engineers were on board the engine. Also that both will be facing disciplinary actions. The engineer in control will be undoubtedly fired. The relieved engineer will also have a fight on their hands for "not adverting an accident" or something to that effect.
 
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As far as I know, the signal indication given to the Amtrak train was red over yellow, which depending on the railroad you're on (heck even what part of the railroad you're on) can mean different things. For example, CSX Operating Rule shows Red over Yellow as being a Medium Approach, whereas rule CR-1290 shows it as Restricting. And that's in the same book! Now granted rule CR-1290 stems from CSX taking over Conrail tracks. But this just goes to show, that there needs to be standardization.
On NS a Red Over Yellow is a "Diverging Approach - Proceed through diverging route observing authorized speed through turnout(s) or crossover(s) , preparing to stop at next signal. Train or engine exceeding Medium Speed must at once reduce to that speed."

If he got a Red over Yellow he was going the correct speed.

NOTE: While I wrote this, the above post was made, I will leave this as an example, but it appears that NAVY118 is more familiar with this territory, I am using NS Signals
 
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Ok the signals that used to govern the ENGLEWOOD interlocking with the NS and the METRA Rock Island line, were changed to color signals about 5 years ago. The signal that was displayed on the 2 track (which A-371-30 approached on) was a R - R - *flashing* Y (restricting) which got confused with a "Slow Approach R - R - Y (solid). I looked at the rules again after the NTSB report came out. The actions of the engineer clearly indicate that they were operating under the slow approach (Rule C 288) not a restricting (Rule C - 290). A contact on the inside told me that only the two engineers were on board the engine. Also that both will be facing disciplinary actions. The engineer in control will be undoubtedly fired. The relieved engineer will also have a fight on their hands for "not adverting an accident" or something to that effect.
According to NS Signal Rules a RED over RED over *Flashing* YELLOW is a "Diverging Route Approach Restricted - Proceed through diverging route, observing authorized speed through turnout(s) or crossover(s), approaching next signal at Restricted Speed, not exceeding 15 MPH. Train or engine exceeding Medium Speed must at once reduce to that speed"

Again, if he got a R - R - *flashing* Y he was still operating within the rule at 40 MPH, in NS Signals.
 
Ok the signals that used to govern the ENGLEWOOD interlocking with the NS and the METRA Rock Island line, were changed to color signals about 5 years ago. The signal that was displayed on the 2 track (which A-371-30 approached on) was a R - R - *flashing* Y (restricting) which got confused with a "Slow Approach R - R - Y (solid). I looked at the rules again after the NTSB report came out. The actions of the engineer clearly indicate that they were operating under the slow approach (Rule C 288) not a restricting (Rule C - 290). A contact on the inside told me that only the two engineers were on board the engine. Also that both will be facing disciplinary actions. The engineer in control will be undoubtedly fired. The relieved engineer will also have a fight on their hands for "not adverting an accident" or something to that effect.
According to NS Signal Rules a RED over RED over *Flashing* YELLOW is a "Diverging Route Approach Restricted - Proceed through diverging route, observing authorized speed through turnout(s) or crossover(s), approaching next signal at Restricted Speed, not exceeding 15 MPH. Train or engine exceeding Medium Speed must at once reduce to that speed"

Again, if he got a R - R - *flashing* Y he was still operating within the rule at 40 MPH, in NS Signals.
From the best information I have seen the indication was R-R-*solid*Y. I wonder if the old Pennsy signals would have made a difference? A --- over \ (restricting) vs a --- over / (slow approach)... I agree the whole multitude of signal definitions is amazing confusing. Around Michigan CSX is putting up Seaboard style signals (1200 series) instead of the PM search lights (even those had a timetable note about G - G). Thats two sets of rules over the same Subdivision....
 
For everyone playing along at home :)

Red over Red over *Solid* Yellow in NS Signals is: "Restricting - Proceed at Restricted Speed"

In this case, the engineer was exceeding the limit if he was operating over 15MPH. One has to wonder if cab signals malfunctioned as well?

Is it not interesting that a solid yellow, and a flashing yellow can make that big of a difference?
 
The long and short of the problem is, If an engineer is confused about signals, or what territory he/she is on, then he or she has no business in the cab, as they are not considered qualified.

A signal test for each railroad must be passed with nothing less than a 100% score.

Signals are there for a reason, not just for ammusement of railfans.
 
The long and short of the problem is, If an engineer is confused about signals, or what territory he/she is on, then he or she has no business in the cab, as they are not considered qualified.A signal test for each railroad must be passed with nothing less than a 100% score.

Signals are there for a reason, not just for ammusement of railfans.
That's pretty obvious. But if you look back through this thread journey, you'll see that the engineer was qualified on 8 different rule books. Easy to study for a test, take it, and then get all those certs confused in your head.

What's wrong with just a simple Green, Yellow, and Red?

I'm a pilot. I have a commercial rating, but I don't fly airliners. There are airline pilots who wouldn't last a half hour in a Cessna. There are even different operating rules whether your're flying for pleasure or for hire. But those differences are really limited. When it comes down right to the nitty gritty, if there is a radio failure - no matter if I'm in a Piper Cub or an Airbus 380 - the signal lights from a control tower mean the same thing to every pilot. The markings on a runway mean the same thing to every pilot.

Now, the rules DO change when going international. That's a different animal all together.
 
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There is a lot more to signals than just go, caution, stop, If a engineer is qualified on a rulebook, he is qualified on signals.

If he/she does not know where they are, that is part of being qualified, qualified does not mean you can get a train over road on a nice sunny and 70 degree day, it means you can run it in a snowstorm, in thick fog, or with any type of scenario trown at you.

My son is commercial pilot and for that matter qualified on a few planes, but even he does not expect airports to be built same, so stupid people can land and find their way.

These locomotive engineers schools of today pump out choo choo operators, not engineers , they are railroad puppy mills.

I get every student passing through our program and lately I have been scared of what I see.

Some of these kids are so green they still smell of Similac and Gerber, no maturity and a game system mentality, they all feel if something happens the union will push the reset button and game just starts over.
 
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It's not normal for two trains to be in the same block at the same time in signaled territory. Because this was a yard, perhaps "yard rules" applied and permitted this, but I don't think the dispatcher knowingly sent the amtrak train into an occupied block at any speed.
While there certainly does appear to be a yard on the far side, the track that Amtrak was on is considered a mainline track with a maximum authorized speed of 79 MPH, assuming that the engineer has a clear signal. Therefore I would rather doubt that yard rules would be governing that track.
Alan,

If memory serves me right, you can establish yard limits, either temporary or permanent, anywhere in ABS territory. I'm sure this isn't ABS but the possibility still exists. But you are right~ a first class train in ABS can proceed at maximum authorized speed IF they have a clear or green signal.
 
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I would assume by now the wreckage is cleared and track repaired (if that was necessary). Would the entire consist need to be out of service for a while to be repaired? Taken to Beech Grove? Any ideas on if the engine is repairable or not?
 
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Not directly relevant to our discussion of the accident in Chicago, the NTSB just released a report on the January 2006 Norfolk Southern accident in Alabama. That's twenty-three months after the accident, as a data point for how long these reports can take to come out, which was one of the questions asked here regarding the Chicago accident.
 
Not directly relevant to our discussion of the accident in Chicago, the NTSB just released a report on the January 2006 Norfolk Southern accident in Alabama. That's twenty-three months after the accident, as a data point for how long these reports can take to come out, which was one of the questions asked here regarding the Chicago accident.
Odd... in that report is says that there is no such signal as a "Green over Red" but in fact there is. Green over red is Clear on NS.
 
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