Navy 118
Train Attendant
from Gene Poon of trainorders.com
Amtrak has acknowledged, in the aftermath of the wreck of Train 371(30), the Pere Marquette, the following:
The train crossed from Main Track One to Main Track Two at an interlocking approx. 1 1/2 miles prior to the location of the crash.
The dispatcher knew a freight train was standing on Main Track Two ahead of the Amtrak train. This fact was not communicated to the Amtrak crew (nor did it have to be, the signal aspect says this is a possibility and the Amtrak crew was required to be prepared for the possibility...read further. -GP)
A relief engineer had boarded the train due to possible Hours of Service expiration of the originating engineer. However, since those Hours of Service had not yet actually expired, the originating engineer was still operating Train 371(30).
The signal at the interlocking where the train crossed from Main Track One to Main Track Two required operation of the train at Restricted Speed, such that the crew control the movement to permit stopping within one half the range of vision short of...among other things...other trains or railroad equipment occupying or fouling the track, not to exceed 20mph outside interlocking limits and 15mph within interlocking limits.
The train proceeded through the interlocking at the prescribed 15mph and then sped up, exceeding Restricted Speed and colliding with the standing freight train occupying the same track.
Amtrak specifies the following actions to prevent this from happening again:
Employees are permitted to ride the head end only in performance of their duties and must not interfere with the engineer's observations, vigilance and operation, while being themselves vigilant to conditions. In addition to required radio communications of observed signal aspects, all such employees in the cab who are qualified on operating rules must be alert to signals and call out signals to each other when seen. Any discrepancy must be resolved immediately. If the engineer fails to reduce speed or stop when required, any other such employee in the cab must take immediate action.
Amtrak rules require that a signal aspect requiring speed reduction, a stop at the next signal, operation at Restricted Speed, or a move to a diverging route be called out with train identification, signal name and track number by radio. A crew member in the train must acknowledge. More restrictive rules apply on some railroads (including Norfolk Southern, where the collision occurred); if so, those rules must be complied with.
Amtrak further specifies that proper technical knowledge (of the differing rules and signal aspects that may apply to a single train traveling its route), awareness of the situation that an involved train is encountering (such as a signal not being capable of displaying an aspect that the engineer may be calling out), and communications among employees in case an error is made, could have prevented this crash.
Amtrak has acknowledged, in the aftermath of the wreck of Train 371(30), the Pere Marquette, the following:
The train crossed from Main Track One to Main Track Two at an interlocking approx. 1 1/2 miles prior to the location of the crash.
The dispatcher knew a freight train was standing on Main Track Two ahead of the Amtrak train. This fact was not communicated to the Amtrak crew (nor did it have to be, the signal aspect says this is a possibility and the Amtrak crew was required to be prepared for the possibility...read further. -GP)
A relief engineer had boarded the train due to possible Hours of Service expiration of the originating engineer. However, since those Hours of Service had not yet actually expired, the originating engineer was still operating Train 371(30).
The signal at the interlocking where the train crossed from Main Track One to Main Track Two required operation of the train at Restricted Speed, such that the crew control the movement to permit stopping within one half the range of vision short of...among other things...other trains or railroad equipment occupying or fouling the track, not to exceed 20mph outside interlocking limits and 15mph within interlocking limits.
The train proceeded through the interlocking at the prescribed 15mph and then sped up, exceeding Restricted Speed and colliding with the standing freight train occupying the same track.
Amtrak specifies the following actions to prevent this from happening again:
Employees are permitted to ride the head end only in performance of their duties and must not interfere with the engineer's observations, vigilance and operation, while being themselves vigilant to conditions. In addition to required radio communications of observed signal aspects, all such employees in the cab who are qualified on operating rules must be alert to signals and call out signals to each other when seen. Any discrepancy must be resolved immediately. If the engineer fails to reduce speed or stop when required, any other such employee in the cab must take immediate action.
Amtrak rules require that a signal aspect requiring speed reduction, a stop at the next signal, operation at Restricted Speed, or a move to a diverging route be called out with train identification, signal name and track number by radio. A crew member in the train must acknowledge. More restrictive rules apply on some railroads (including Norfolk Southern, where the collision occurred); if so, those rules must be complied with.
Amtrak further specifies that proper technical knowledge (of the differing rules and signal aspects that may apply to a single train traveling its route), awareness of the situation that an involved train is encountering (such as a signal not being capable of displaying an aspect that the engineer may be calling out), and communications among employees in case an error is made, could have prevented this crash.