Amtrak Crew rule violation on #80(16)

According to reports in TO there was a major rule violation by the Amtrak Engine crew on #80(16) leading to a shutdown of the railroad between Rocky Mount and Petersburg for almost 5 hours. That would explain 80 and everything following it through that segment running many hours late on the 16th.

Apparently this is what happened. Signals were out of service in the block (scheduled maintenance) between Rocky Mount NC and Delmar NC. The section was operating using EC-1 (CSX version of track warrant, what on NEC is known as Form D). When 80 stopped at RMT it read in its EC-1 authorizing it to pass the block in question, and it proceeded to enter the block. #92 following #80 stopped at RMT and started copying its EC-1 for the block. The plan was for that EC-1 to be authorized when #80 cleared the signal at Delmar. According to CSX rules the signal is supposed to be called. To the astonishment of the dispatcher, the head end of #80 reported the release of the block before it had cleared the block signal at Delmar. The model board in front of the dispatcher was still active and he could see that #80 was still in block when it declared the block cleared!

That brought the railroad to a screeching halt. The crew was immediately disbarred from further operation, and everything was on hold until a replacement crew could be found.

What the #80 crew did was truly dangerous, and doubly so because immediately after that and before they had cleared the block, they had to stop for a passenger emergency, apparently while still in the block that they had declared cleared. So in the worst case scenario 92 could have got its EC-1 authority and proceeded down the block expecting it to be clear to the Delmar block signal, at 59mph, only to find #80 sitting in block ahead of them, possibly with too little distance left for them to stop short of #80.

Anyway, what actually happened will of course be uncovered in the inquiry that is taking place. But the damage was done and all trains were delayed many many hours while #80 could be restaffed and get on its way.

Not a good week for Amtrak crew operations.

Colorful adjectives aside ... how far from the "Delmar signal" was #80 when they reported clear. And also ... just how does a non-moving train (#92) catch a moving train (#80).

Further .. if the dispatcher saw where the trains were, did he not verify the report, rather than shut down everything for hours?

I get the rule violation, I just don't get the "truly dangerous" part of this story.

daveyb99 said:

Colorful adjectives aside ... how far from the "Delmar signal" was #80 when they reported clear. And also ... just how does a non-moving train (#92) catch a moving train (#80).

Further .. if the dispatcher saw where the trains were, did he not verify the report, rather than shut down everything for hours?

I get the rule violation, I just don't get the "truly dangerous" part of this story.

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Jis said that 80 had ceased motion due to a "passenger emergency" before physically clearing the block, if I read his post correctly.

And even if 80 was moving it is still dangerous because 92 is under the assumption they are a certain distance ahead, clear of the block. Any time false information is given to an engineer it increases the risk of an accident. ...if nobody had noticed that 80 was still in the block 92 could have gotten permission to proceed then hello Amtrak on Amtrak pile-up. Have you ever seen "Seconds From Disaster"? Dominoes, man. If you stack enough of them together they all fall down one-by-one.

Geez, I don't even know how that could happen. Perhaps the dispatcher misunderstood the radio communications of the crew on #80... perhaps the crew on #80 didn't know their territory and mistook a different signal for the Delmar signal... those are the first two things I can think of. Either would be pretty bad, but if it's anything other than that, it would be even more bizarre.

daveyb99 said:

Colorful adjectives aside ... how far from the "Delmar signal" was #80 when they reported clear. And also ... just how does a non-moving train (#92) catch a moving train (#80).

Further .. if the dispatcher saw where the trains were, did he not verify the report, rather than shut down everything for hours?

I get the rule violation, I just don't get the "truly dangerous" part of this story.

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Shutdown happened because once the Engineer broke a rule, and the rules require that s/he be immediately disbarred from any further operation of trains. Add that to the fact that this is a single track section and the fiasco is complete.

The danger was that #80 was still in the block that it had declared that it had cleared. Of course as it turns out in this case because of the alert dispatcher the danger was only potential. But if the dispatcher did not notice the discrepancy and had gone ahead and issued the EC-1 to 92 allowing it to proceed in a block at 59mph while another train was sitting in the block, that could have led to a rear and collision. The situation would have been equivalent to a block signal showing clear when the block it protects is still occupied.

Yes, it was pretty bizarre. Very likely some sort of loss of situational awareness on part of the #80 head end. But in some sense this was less bizarre than the Bala Cynwyd incident earlier in the week.

And today 80(17) had an altercation with a pedestrian in North Carolina delaying it 3 hours. See http://www.wral.com/amtrak-train-hits-kills-person-in-mebane/13122186/

Good call by the CSX! When it comes to railroad safety there is no pulling over, climbing or descending to avoid a collision. When rules are violated the involved Crew(s) need to be pulled and either dismissed or retrained. No questions about it.

CSX just followed the rules as they are. Once they knew that a rule had been broken it was not really their call to make, unless of course they wanted to break some rules too and let the crew continue.

Lots of "could of's" ... so my question is: if the dispatcher had an electronic display that contradicted the engineers report, why did he not ask for confirmation.

And further, a violation requires a complete shutdown? It does not happen that way in ATC .. pilots are not required to land short if they break a rule or bust a clearance.

I get the seriousness, but seems like a bad system to work in.

What does it mean, to replace an entire crew. Surely a dining car attendant cannot in any way be held responsible for a signal violation?

cirdan said:

What does it mean, to replace an entire crew. Surely a dining car attendant cannot in any way be held responsible for a signal violation?

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TRAIN crew, not OBS crew... Engineer, conductor, asst. conductor, fireman, (if they still had them....)

cirdan said:

What does it mean, to replace an entire crew. Surely a dining car attendant cannot in any way be held responsible for a signal violation?

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Neither CSX nor FRA cares about what the OBS crew does as far as operations go. They only care about the operating crew as far as the rules violations being discussed here are concerned. So replacement would be for Engineer and Conductor typically.

daveyb99 said:

Lots of "could of's" ... so my question is: if the dispatcher had an electronic display that contradicted the engineers report, why did he not ask for confirmation.

And further, a violation requires a complete shutdown? It does not happen that way in ATC .. pilots are not required to land short if they break a rule or bust a clearance.

I get the seriousness, but seems like a bad system to work in.

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The rules require that when a rules violation is detected the operating crew must be removed from duty and not be allowed to operate the train any further. When a rules violation happens on a single track railroad this means now you have a train without an operating crew sitting stationary occupying the single track section until a new qualified crew can get to the train to move it. Until that happens the railroad is effectively shut down. It does not matter whether it is ATC or what. On a single track ATC section with ATC out and operations under track warrant exactly the same thing would happen under the same circumstances.

I think he's talking about planes, and the ATC he's talking about is Air Traffic Control. If a pilot busts a rule, they're not required to land at the nearest airport until a relief pilot can be made available.

It's a silly comparison since you can part a train as soon as the violation is known, you can't park an airplane at 40,000' and wait for a new pilot to show up.

Nobody said anything about "parking a plane". The comment was to land at the nearest airport, which I don't think is such a bad comparison. The reason it isn't done is because of the enormous inconvenience to passengers (or shippers) and cost of getting a crew to an airport at which the company might likely have no presence at all. Yes, the US railroad rules and procedures seem needlessly cumbersome and complicated, maybe left over from a previous technology? A better comparison might be the rules for say Japan Shinkasen. Do they immediately stop the train and bring half the system to a grinding halt just because of one stupid/dangerous mistake that ended up (admittedly through pure luck) having absolutely zero consequences? Maybe I can find something about that on the Internet - if so I'll post it.

WellTrained said:

Nobody said anything about "parking a plane". The comment was to land at the nearest airport, which I don't think is such a bad comparison.

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It is a bad comparison, since landing at the nearest airport still involves operating the plane through a complex evolution (more complicated in fact, since you're landing at an airport that you're likely not familiar with and had no plans to do so). It's in no way similar to stopping the train and walking away.

Yes, the problem is that when the term ATC is used in a railroad forum, a reasonable interpretation of the acronym is "Automatic Train Control". At least that is how I interpreted it.

The reason that US landed up with these strict rules is that whenever leeway was given to make the rules reasonable, apparently the railroad companies tended to get extremely creative with their interpretation. In order to put a stop to that the rules became extremely prescriptive with no possibility of extensions except in extremely extenuating circumstances.

It is a very different situation when automatic protection is in place. Merely missing a speed restriction warning does not cause any nuclear option to fire off. There is penalty application, Things are reset and things carry on after a few minutes delay and possibly a terse yell from the dispatcher. OTOH, when there is no protection in place between you and a potential collision after you run a red signal, that is when all hell breaks lose.

Incidentally at such points I think (but I may be wrong) the rules also require a drug test of some sort these days.

BTW, in your research about Shinkansen, find out what happens when a Shinkansen is running under exceptional circumstances with signal and protection system inoperative and the driver disobeys an explicit instruction in a dangerous way. Just finding out what happens when a minor infraction happens under an automatic regime is not particularly interesting since such things do not lead to disbarment in the US either.

And yes, comparing railroad control with air traffic control is more or less a waste of time.

As info, a violation involving a train or engine occupying a main track without authority (as in the case being discussed here) is potentially decertifying, for the conductor and engineer. Typically the train will be instructed to stop, an the crew removed from service pending a 242 (conductor Certification) and/or 240 (engineer certification) hearing. Assitant Conductors, Firemen, Brakemen, etc typically recieve a similar discipline hearing, but not decertification (even if they are also "certified" as a Conductor or Engineer, because they are not acting in the capacity of Engineer or Conductor, and therefore not subject to decertification.

Many Railroads also require "reasonable cause" drug testing under part 219, this is an optional test under Federal Law, but it's pretty much industry standard to do so on Class I Railroads, as well as on many Class II and Class III Railroads and is usually covered under union agreements or company policy to remain consistent. In some cases, a RFE or DSLE will board a train with the crew, and move the train to a suitable place to clear the main for a re-crew, but that's not always possible. If the 240/242 investigation reveals a violation did occur, or the crew members involve waive their rights to a hearing and accept the violation, the Engineer and Conductor are decertified for a period of 30 days. (there is a provision that allows returning to service at half that time, if certain conditions are met, and the RR chooses to do so). Decertification is covered under Federal Law under parts 240 and 242, and not up to the Railroad to decide how to discipline, decertification is generally cut and dried, if the facts indicate a decertification event occured, a crew will be decertified.

And, for what it's worth, the FRA, under DOT, is very similar to the FAA, and many provisions are very close, so comparing the two really isn't that much of a stretch.

Shortline, thanks for the definitive info. Much appreciated.

Some of the rules between FAA and FRA can be similar, but the equipment that FAA controls is not restricted to operating on tracks. For example it would be pointless to talk about a TCAS system as used on planes for providing advice on evasive action to the crew in the railroad context. Airways are a 3D free flow controlled space. Railroads are essentially a one dimensional semi-static graph space where control is exercised. Thus even the rules that do appear to be similar are so mainly by chance.

Yes ground traffic control at airports is more similar to rail traffic control, but that is not the biggest control issue for air traffic control

Anything that helps maintain practical safety while also helping to avoiding five hour system wide delays sounds like a good thing to me. Bring on the PTC.

What's the limiting factor w/re implementing/using PTC at this point? Don't most of the major RRs already have GPS units installed on all the locos? Is it a case of integrating that data into the dispatching operations, or??? Or are we waiting for the smaller RR companies to catch up. The fact that we can get near-realtime updates w/re locations of Amtrak trains - we can't be that far away (wishful thinking??).

Fred Frailey has a good comment on the state of PTC.

http://cs.trains.com/trn/b/fred-frailey/archive/2013/11/11/there-goes-positive-train-control.aspx

jis said:

Airways are a 3D free flow controlled space. Railroads are essentially a one dimensional semi-static graph space where control is exercised. Thus even the rules that do appear to be similar are so mainly by chance.

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Sure, operating conditions are different, but he regulations are written in much the same manner, 3D or 2 D, it's the same priciple, especially regarding post incident investigation and certification issues, so the conditions may be different, but the rules are not similar by chance, they're by design, in the grand scheme of things....FRA is just 40 years behind in many ways. I expect to see similar medical standards regulations, similar to the FAA flight physicals required of pilots. TCAS regulations are very similar to PTC regulations. Certification standards under part 240 and 242 are very similar to certification standards for pilots under part 91 and 141, operating standards under 135 or other part 14 regulations are very similar to FRA parts 218, 219, 225, etc. It's all the same lawyers, in the end. That's all I was saying. Obviously the conditions are different, but the rules and regulations are written very similarly to those in Aviation, and it's definetly by design. As Railroads embrace and field new technology, the similarities will become even more pronounced.

CHamilton said:

Fred Frailey has a good comment on the state of PTC.

http://cs.trains.com/trn/b/fred-frailey/archive/2013/11/11/there-goes-positive-train-control.aspx

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Interesting article/piece and thanks for posting the link... but two comments: the fact that we can get near realtime updates on Amtrak train locations, must mean something is working; and it sounds like BNSF generated a bad implementation - there really is no need to add a pole and transceiver every two miles - talk about pig-headed engineering. ... one has to wonder if there isn't some grandstanding involved here, ie, BNSF makes it as expensive as possible to implement, and then has rights to complain about how government is anti-business - this could/should have been implemented using the existing cell-phone networks, and couple watt transmitters on the trains so they can be heard by at least one tower. Analogy: think about emergency communications and how they work 99.999% of the time - when a trains needs to transmit its location, if it doesn't get an ack back, then simply retransmit until it does - eventually (10-15 seconds they will, or the other end of the tunnel, they will). Here out in the sticks, with lots of canyons etc, the police still are able to communicate; and with one's cell, one can go about almost anywhere, and have a signal... and since the locos would be on the transmitting side, they can simply use more than 10mw that a cell is using - go to 2w, go to 5w and be heard (like the cell towers do).

Shortline said:

jis said:

Airways are a 3D free flow controlled space. Railroads are essentially a one dimensional semi-static graph space where control is exercised. Thus even the rules that do appear to be similar are so mainly by chance.

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Sure, operating conditions are different, but he regulations are written in much the same manner, 3D or 2 D, it's the same priciple, especially regarding post incident investigation and certification issues, so the conditions may be different, but the rules are not similar by chance, they're by design, in the grand scheme of things....FRA is just 40 years behind in many ways. I expect to see similar medical standards regulations, similar to the FAA flight physicals required of pilots. TCAS regulations are very similar to PTC regulations. Certification standards under part 240 and 242 are very similar to certification standards for pilots under part 91 and 141, operating standards under 135 or other part 14 regulations are very similar to FRA parts 218, 219, 225, etc. It's all the same lawyers, in the end. That's all I was saying. Obviously the conditions are different, but the rules and regulations are written very similarly to those in Aviation, and it's definetly by design. As Railroads embrace and field new technology, the similarities will become even more pronounced.

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OK. I do agree with that. Thanks for the clarification.