FRA Private Rail Operator Pilot - Ed Ellis Comments & Other

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My speculation is that there will be no Gulf Coast service unless the federal government comes up with some money. The states do not have the stomach to fund it entirely by themselves. They may come up with some local matching funds. As far as any state level support goes, only Alabama and Mississippi may contribute substantially.
It's still a sea change to have any substantial contributions from the state governments of Alabama and Mississippi, which looked hopeless until recently. I wonder, if we looked at the numbers: is it possible for the route to be covered by Mississippi, Alabama, and the cities? (Talahassee and Pensacola would probably put in a little; Mobile and Biloxi significantly more, I'd guess.)

If there's really zero interest from Florida and even the cities in Florida won't put in money, I don't see the full route happening.
 
what can be realistically achieved is better accommodation among all concerned to get more realistic operating agreements. For this to occur the inherent adversarial relationship situation needs to be changed CalDOT and UP somehow managed that. There is a benchmark from that on what realistic costs are to achieve that. Whether that sort of thing can be repeated elsewhere is an open question.But it is quite clear that on a case by case basis better operating conditions for passenger trains can be achieved.
It seems to me that the key is that some organization which has an *interest* in making passenger trains work is also able to *require* that a certain level of maintenance and a certain quality of passenger service happen *by paying for it* over a long-term contract, with the ability to hire someone else if the contractor is not performing. (We have an unfortunate history of states and Amtrak paying for better service and not getting it, which is why I think the "require" matters.)
 
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It seems there are still a pretty significant number of loose ends which the FRA needs to tie up with regards to the legal language of the proposal. The comments from NARP, IPH, and Amtrak all bring up valid points. One of those points which stuck out to me the most was Mr. Ellis's point that poor equipment utilization (Amtrak's system of keeping roughly a fifth of all equipment on stand-by in the event of a bad-ordered car here & there, etc.) has made trying to account for LD trains' financial efficiency very difficult. He also makes a very valid point that Amtrak has been combative in allowing Iowa Pacific to use its facilities to do its job. Putting aside the intricacies of negotiating with Class I's for track access, Amtrak will have to show some more willingness to co-operate and will also have to try not to view LD train operating contractors as competitors.

Those two matters just by themselves could be serious deal-breakers for any company willing to throw its hat in the ring and operate 3 long distance trains at least until we wise up and pass serious legislation to establish a USDOT-managed trust fund with the goal of giving passenger trains their own right-of-way in all major markets rather than just the NEC (which has plenty of its own infrastructure problems to worry about).
 
. One of those points which stuck out to me the most was Mr. Ellis's point that poor equipment utilization (Amtrak's system of keeping roughly a fifth of all equipment on stand-by in the event of a bad-ordered car here & there, etc.) has made trying to account for LD trains' financial efficiency very difficult.
This is one of the most mind boggling aspects of his complaint. It goes with his though about Amtrak trying to get rid of equipment thta has a lot of life in it and Amtrak's lack of overhaul. I call it realistic utilization. I would ask how often his equipment travels in continuous operation for almost 40 hours, covering 2200+ miles and then turning around in less than 8 hours and doing it again...daily. This of course assumes that the equipment has 8 hours off and doesn't run through to other areas.

In the meantime, the equipment is hitting cattle, trucks, pedestrians, trees, and rocks all while having to prepare to travel through the desert on one part of the journey and through a possible snowy mountain. When does his equipment come anywhere close to doing anything like that?

I also firmly believe that access to Amtrak facilities should be negotiated and not taken for granted. Amtrak has to abide by certain rules...and I don't see why other agencies shouldn't just because they aren't federally funded, particularly when they're on Amtrak's property.
 
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Running a company for the benefit of your investors is very different than running an operation for the benefit of the people you serve. Don't keep a car on standby and try and make service, just run short or cancel. It's the way airlines are run today. There are millions of people who live in parts of this country, or need/want to travel to places, that have very limited options for travel. EAS carriers (essential air service) and Amtrak serve those populations. They can not exist as affordable means of travel without some form of subsidy. A private rail operation could not be profitable without the same, given a level playing field. It's just a shell game.
 
I remember running out scenarios for equipment utilization, and Amtrak is in a frustrating position with (particularly) the Eastern LD trains: Their fleet is functionally 50 sleepers and 15 diners at the moment, with no endpoint other than NYP for more than two trains. The situation with Amfleet II coaches is a bit better (125 total) but there's also a bit more spread (still no more than two per non-NYP endpoint). In the case of diners (which are the worst in this regard), this basically means you have to have 4 out (protect at NYP, CHI, and MIA plus one being inspected), a ratio of 26.7%. Even putting two into maintenance at any given time (basically, each car has 28 days out of service per year), on a fleet of 26 that ratio becomes 19.2%. Remember, inspections really only take 6 days IIRC (three one-day inspections plus a single three-day inspection IIRC) but you've got transport time for the three-day inspection plus periodic maintenance.

Get to a pool of 50 cars (e.g. sleepers) and even putting two more into the protect pools and four total into maintenance brings your ratio to 18% (9 of 50). Double the fleet again (presuming no new endpoints) and you probably only need another two into the protect pool and four into maintenance. The ratio is now 15% (15 of 100). Bring it to 150 and add a new endpoint and you can probably put four into maintenance and two into protect. Ratio is now 14% (21 of 150). Go to 200 and do the same again. Ratio is down to 13.5% (27 of 200) but your protect pool is now 11 (say, 4 NYP/3 MIA/3 CHI/1 BOS or WAS) and you can still "lose" any car for nearly a month of the year. Go to 400 (roughly where Amfleet coaches are now) and you can probably only allocate another 7 to protect (18 total...probably 7 NYP/4 MIA/4 CHI/1 BOS/1 WAS/1 NOL). Even without adjusting the maintenance ratio you're now down to 12.5%.

12.5% is a massive improvement on 20-25%, and it's worth noting that you can ride it a bit more on a seasonal basis (e.g. Christmas/Thanksgiving/major holidays), if you draw back on your out-of-service assumptions (20 days/yr per car reduces the cover requirement from 8% to about 5.5%...giving you another 2.5% on utilization), or with other measures.

TL;DR: Amtrak's fleet utilization is often hurt by small fleet sizes for individual car types. Larger fleets go a long way towards solving this issue.
 
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I've always maintained that if private industry wanted the passenger rail business congress would willingly hand it over to them. There might be some benefits to having some routes privatized but there is a real danger as well. If a private rail operator negotiates the rights to run an existing Amtrak route, runs it, then later goes bankrupt, then what happens? Does the route get discontinued or does Amtrak stand ready to suddenly step back in? It may take a very close working partnership between government and private industry to make this happen and to provide safeguards for continual service. This is done with the many publlc/private commuter routes around the larger cities so IMO it can be made to work on shorter LD runs.
 
In the UK, rail regulators have stepped back into running the GNER for a period after the previous private operator quit, and before Virgin took it back into private sector.

The problem with FRA's proposal is that it is too flimsy. You need a much more robust and better funded scheme if you are serious about privatization for the long haul. The current proposal is more aligned towards privatization to eventual extinction. That is my primary worry. In my perception, neither Congress nor the FRA really wants to set up anything with a desire to operate anything for the long haul. They just want things to putter along on the edge of extinction.
 
What you'd probably want in the regulation is something to this effect:
-If the private operator bails, Amtrak gets to step back in (potentially hiring off their employees to keep service running). This is eased if the train is still "nominally Amtrak" and being run under Amtrak's rights (i.e. the effective arrangement at A-Day).

-If they bail as well, then notwithstanding whatever arrangement the operator might have with a lender, Amtrak gets to use their equipment if need be to keep the route running (even if they have to pay some amount to lease it). Basically, the bank might be able to foreclose on an equipment set and take ownership, but Amtrak would have the first right of refusal on possessing and using it even if they had to work out a lease.
 
This whole law is just to placate the conservative Republicans who are disgusted by any type of government spending except for the military. It's not really a serious matter. I can see an outfit like Keolis or even Iowa Pacific running a state supported service, but I don't think any sane business person would want to operate a long distance train. If they made money, there would be no Amtrak in the first place. Heck, if they made money they'd still be a New York Central or Pennsylvania railroad.
 
In my perception, neither Congress nor the FRA really wants to set up anything with a desire to operate anything for the long haul. They just want things to putter along on the edge of extinction.
One thinks that is how Amtrak has been funded and care for these last 40 years. On the edge of extinction.
 
Getting back to my post regarding privatization; I would like to clarify. If you look around the USA , some state governments have contracted out the operation of the their commuter lines to private RR operators. The BNSF/Metra in CHI and and the TriRail Line operated by Transdev. in So Fla come to mind. Government owning and managing the line with private railroads operating them, could be in the future for shorter run LD passenger service. The climate in Washington has usually been either hostile or MIA when it comes to Amtrak. The service has gotten smaller over the years and many good routes have been lost; Pioneer, Three Rivers, Desert Wind, Floridian, Broadway Ltd, Sunset Eastern leg, to name a few. Perhaps Amtrak would get a better reception if it partnered with the private railroads and if this proved to be a money saver, expansion may result.
 
The service has gotten smaller over the years and many good routes have been lost; Pioneer, Three Rivers, Desert Wind, Floridian, Broadway Ltd, Sunset Eastern leg, to name a few. Perhaps Amtrak would get a better reception if it partnered with the private railroads and if this proved to be a money saver, expansion may result.
The "on paper" annual loss for the long-distance services has generally been declining over the past few years anyway. Excluding capital costs, had the budget remained the same there would (in theory) be room to restore some of those missing trains. Of course, the true finances for Amtrak in general and the long-distance trains in particular are hardly so simple.
 
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