So, How do we pay for it?

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So, how would you pay for it?

  • I would support additional/new fed. taxes to maintain the current level of LD routes/service.

    Votes: 6 9.7%
  • I would support re-direction of existing fed. tax revnue to maintain the current level of LD routes/

    Votes: 9 14.5%
  • I would support a combination of both.

    Votes: 12 19.4%
  • I would maintain fed. funding at current levels even if insufficient to maintain present level of se

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • I would eliminate all fed. govt. funding and let Pax. LD service be privatized, even if it means eve

    Votes: 5 8.1%
  • I would support even more new/additional federal taxes/revenue for expanding LD pax. service.

    Votes: 30 48.4%

  • Total voters
    62
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AutoTrDvr

OBS Chief
Joined
May 29, 2012
Messages
623
I've been a member of AU for almost two months, but a train enthusiast for most of my life. As a boy, I always enjoyed playing with my dad's 1950's era Lionel train set which I now own (BTW, GG-1, the engine in that set is a working original 1950's Lionel GG-1 with pans, albeit it is 3rd rail transformer track powered).

So, with all the talk about the SWC re-route, I thought this would be a good time for an "initial assessment" to see if my head's on straight, and my understanding of US long distance train travel is in sync with all you "seasoned" AU veterans :) )... and to ask a few questions. Please forgive me if this discussion seems "Duhhh level" obvious to most of you here. As a point of control, I speak only of the Amtrak LD pax. system at it's current level of routes/service, not any increased/restorative level. This would mean acquisition / maintenance of track where needed (e.g. SWC Raton Route), replacement of existing consist equipment when needed (not adding new equipment), and funding for existing crews/staff etc.

As I see it (and feel free to correct me if I'm wrong :unsure: :p :D ):

  1. The current consumer demand for LD train travel, although increasing, is still grossly insufficient to keep it operational (at current level), without significant govt. subsidies (read: taxes). (I'd appreciate anyone's assistance on how much of Amtrak current funding is Govt. vs. pax. revenue).
  2. One of the reasons for the increasing demand, and a current benefit of LD Train travel, is avoidance of the "Kabuki theater" currently associated with air travel. However, there is a diminishing return. As demand for LD train travel increases, so will its attractiveness as a target, yielding even more security scrutiny.
  3. Without the above Govt. subsidies, if LD pax. service were left up to the the private rail cos./track owners (BNSF, UP, etc.), they would terminate all LD service in favor of freight ops, due to lack of profitability.
  4. The Amtrak routes that come the closest to being "profitable" are the Acela, AT and, perhaps the SWC. None actually are profitable or self-sustaining via pax. revenue alone.
  5. Most of us fellow AU'ers are avid train enthusiasts that wish to see LD train travel live on for the pure enjoyment of train travel, not necessarily as a required means of transportation.


So... how do we pay for it, assuming the above is true? I've been struggling with the concept of whether or not LD pax. train travel is worthy of being in the federal govt's portfolio (as are other things like National Defense, entitlements., infrastructure/highways, etc.). Like anyone, I have my concerns about what is on the govt's plate currently (and what should/shouldn't be), as well as what could be, but managed much more efficiently. But I also realize that, as a society, some things require govt. funding (and thus taxes) since the society truly needs them, and they could not be funded by private or other means.

My question (and hence the above poll): Is LD pax.train travel one of them? Would your love/enthusiasm for train travel lead you to support additional/new taxes to keep Amtrak operational at it's present level of service? Would you consider re-directing existing tax revenue away from existing portfolio items (and more towards Amtrak) to fund the present level of service? Or, OTOH, do you feel it should not be govt. funded at all, and let private railroads be responsible for pax. train travel, even at the risk of it being shut down by them for lack of profitability?

Or, are there other alternatives to pay for it?

Many Thanks. :hi:
 
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Instead of using our publicly funding military to protect private oil fields and transport routes while fighting pirates on behalf of Chinese merchant ships I'd cut our military budget back. Don't get me wrong, it'd still be the world's most expensive military, but only just above the world's second most expensive military. However, that should save more than enough to start building a world class high speed rail network with a brand new ROW. It would be very expensive and time consuming to build and yet it would never be tasked with making any money or even breaking even, just like our interstate highway system before it. Amtrak would be funded as-is with inflation related increases until it was no longer needed. I know it will never even be considered, but if it were up to me I'd like to see something along those lines.
 
I didn't see an option in the poll that I liked, so I didn't vote.

I'd support increased federal tax revenues used to EXPAND and IMPROVE long distance rail service in this great land.
 
I didn't see an option in the poll that I liked, so I didn't vote.

I'd support increased federal tax revenues used to EXPAND and IMPROVE long distance rail service in this great land.
Yup. Same here.

When I first saw the title of the poll, I assumed it would be something like do you use AGR redemptions or pay with money, etc. I would've suggested a "have grandparents pay" button :)
 
People say "Don't subsidize Amtrak!" Every country that has a national railroad subsidizes it! And none ever run "at a profit"! We US taxpayers subsidize airlines (thru the FAA, ATC, airport construction, the BILLiONS given to them after the 9/11 shutdown, etc..., etc...) - yet "the public" doesn't complain when airline XYZ has a quarter loss of $XXX MILLION or $X.X BILLION! Yet it's a fight in Congress to provide Amtrak an amount to allow them just to maintain the routes they ow have!
 
I didn't see an option in the poll that I liked, so I didn't vote.

I'd support increased federal tax revenues used to EXPAND and IMPROVE long distance rail service in this great land.
Yup. Same here.

When I first saw the title of the poll, I assumed it would be something like do you use AGR redemptions or pay with money, etc. I would've suggested a "have grandparents pay" button :)
OK, by popular demand, a new choice is added! I was simply trying to keep statistical control on the results. Sorry. :hi:
 
I didn't see an option in the poll that I liked, so I didn't vote.

I'd support increased federal tax revenues used to EXPAND and IMPROVE long distance rail service in this great land.
Yup. Same here.

When I first saw the title of the poll, I assumed it would be something like do you use AGR redemptions or pay with money, etc. I would've suggested a "have grandparents pay" button :)
OK, by popular demand, a new choice is added! I was simply trying to keep statistical control on the results. Sorry. :hi:
Thanks :)
 
Raise fares, cut staffing, and cut some of the worse performing ones in exchange for utilizing their equipment for improved corridor service. Turn the Cardinal/Hoosier State into a 5-6x daily Chicago-Indianapolis train for instance (though this might require either a waiver on PRIIA or expectation of rather higher revenues).
 
People say "Don't subsidize Amtrak!" Every country that has a national railroad subsidizes it! And none ever run "at a profit"! We US taxpayers subsidize airlines (thru the FAA, ATC, airport construction, the BILLiONS given to them after the 9/11 shutdown, etc..., etc...) - yet "the public" doesn't complain when airline XYZ has a quarter loss of $XXX MILLION or $X.X BILLION! Yet it's a fight in Congress to provide Amtrak an amount to allow them just to maintain the routes they ow have!
What he said. Verbatim. And it needs to be sent to all journalists and every politician, federal, state, and local.

Plus, don't forget the national transportation policy decisions that fund roads, highways, bridges, pipelines, waterways, dredging, locks, harbors, tax incentives for aircraft assembly plants, automobile assembly plants, etc. We sure as he77 don't call THOSE "subsidies," do we? Sorry, I'll stop for now. Thanks, traveler!
 
We pay for it like we pay for everything from Medicare, military, health care, social security, roads, airports, etc - we borrow the money and have our grandchildren pay for it! Why should rail service be any different than anything else? :giggle:
 
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[*]The Amtrak routes that come the closest to being "profitable" are the Acela, AT and, perhaps the SWC. None actually are profitable or self-sustaining via pax. revenue alone.
Southwest Chief comes nowhere close to being among the better financial performers on Amtrak's system.

Last I checked, the best performing LD train, outside of Auto Train, was the Palmetto, which does well for a couple of key reasons.

1) With no dining car, it's cheap to operate, OBS-wise.

2) It shares its route with several other trains, and therefore takes advantage of economies of scale, both in station cost allocation, as well as T&E crew costs.

If you ignore infrastructure costs (granted, a huge expense), the Acela is self-sustaining through passenger revenue.

Raise fares
Already being done. But the laws of economics apply no matter what some people may wish, so Amtrak's goal is to charge the revenue-maximizing price on each train (the theoretical price such that, if fares where higher, you'd lose more from people who decide not to travel than you'd gain from getting more from whoever is left; and if fares were lower, you'd lose more in potential revenue from people who would have paid the higher fare than you'd gain in selling extra tickets thanks to the lower fare). It's a theoretical number because you'll never get it exact, and conditions are changing faster than anyone would be able to adjust for, but nonetheless, you can get pretty close to that number. And if you listen to a lot of the whining on this forum about prices, you'd think Amtrak passed that limit years ago.

cut staffing
On-board staff has already been cut to pretty much the minimum without sacrificing service quality even further (which then goes against your suggestion above about raising fares; if the service is worse, people certainly won't want to pay more for it).

In fact, after Amtrak was no longer under such strict micro-management regarding food service, Amtrak was able to demonstrate on a couple of routes that improved food service (and the associated staffing increases that go along with it) actually can pay for itself through higher ticket prices.

So, you have to choose between higher revenue (ticket prices), or lower cost (reduced staffing), but if you try both at once, the results are likely to be financially disadvantageous.

and cut some of the worse performing ones
The problem with the mindset of "just cut the worst-performing route" is that there will always be a worst-performing route. If you rank trains from best to worst (no matter what criteria you use for the ranking), one is always going to be on the bottom. ("Why can't everybody be above average?") So, if, every year, you just decide to cut the worst, eventually you will have cut everything.

in exchange for utilizing their equipment for improved corridor service.
In other words, kill long-distance trains and add corridor trains. If that's your position, that's fine.

However, there are other factors at play that get in the way of simply adding more frequent service on a corridor...

Turn the Cardinal/Hoosier State into a 5-6x daily Chicago-Indianapolis train for instance (though this might require either a waiver on PRIIA or expectation of rather higher revenues).
...such as, the railroads that own the tracks (CSX for the most part, in the case of Chicago-Indianapolis) are going to demand, roughly, a kajillion dollars (not a scientific estimate) to add capacity necessary to accommodate more frequent trains. That leads to the question, who is going to pay for that?

Then, the question is, will that even pay for itself, or are you still going to lose just as much money? The Pacific Surfliner, with 11 round trips between LA and San Diego (a heavily populated corridor with tons of traffic congestion) doesn't make money, and isn't getting any PRIIA waiver. So, why should Chicago-Indianapolis (with considerably fewer popular destinations in between, much worse or non-existent transit connections outside of Chicago, and a much slower trip that could actually be done faster by bus/car) get such a waiver?

The cost of such a move is permanent loss of passenger rail service east of Indianapolis, including some fairly isolated areas in West Virginia.
 
[*]The Amtrak routes that come the closest to being "profitable" are the Acela, AT and, perhaps the SWC. None actually are profitable or self-sustaining via pax. revenue alone.
Southwest Chief comes nowhere close to being among the better financial performers on Amtrak's system.

Last I checked, the best performing LD train, outside of Auto Train, was the Palmetto, which does well for a couple of key reasons.
Yes, the SWC does not come anywhere close to breaking even. In fact, it loses more money in total dollars of all the LD trains with a fully allocated total loss of $68 million in FY11, not counting Capital Charge (which is not in FY11 numbers). The CZ had the second highest loss at $64.2 million, the Empire Builder in third at $57 million. The AutoTrain lost $32 million. The most expensive LD trains to operate are the 2 night Chicago to west coast trains which should not be surprising when one thinks about it.

The loss per passenger mile is a different matter because the EB had 469K passengers in FY11 (which should have >533K passenger but the extended shutdown due to the floods last year cut ridership and likely increased the losses), the AT 259K passengers. The AT has the lowest loss per passenger miles of the LD trains at 14.6 cents, the EB and TE tied for second at 17.4 cents.

The financial performance numbers for each route or service is available in the revised September 2011 Monthly report. The trains that turned a actual net operating profit above the rails in FY11 were the Acela, the NE Regionals, the VA Regional to Lynchburg. The VA Regionals to Richmond and Newport News almost broke even. Interestingly the Carolinian was not that far away from breaking even with ticket revenue at around 80% of the fully loaded cost plus food & beverage revenue that is not broken out, but that could be another 4-5% of the loaded cost. All the other trains lost money. (NOTE: the total revenue column on the route financial table for the state supported and SD corridor trains includes the state subsidy. Look up the ticket revenue for the year on page 24 to see what the direct income was.)

The fact that the Acela and the NE Regionals are operating at a net operating profit is a big deal. Indicates that 110 mph corridor service may be able to pay for themselves operationally once the trip times become competitive with driving or flying.

As for the LD trains, how do we pay for them? As we have been doing with subsidies from the federal budget. But we also invest in expanding and improving corridor services; fixing freight rail bottlenecks on the LD train routes; and new equipment for the LD trains. More reliable and faster LD trains operating more of their route miles over corridor routes will improve their cost recovery percentages and lose less money. As airfares increase and small market airports get service cuts, the LD trains will become a lifeline to many smaller cities and towns.
 
[*]The Amtrak routes that come the closest to being "profitable" are the Acela, AT and, perhaps the SWC. None actually are profitable or self-sustaining via pax. revenue alone.
Southwest Chief comes nowhere close to being among the better financial performers on Amtrak's system.

Last I checked, the best performing LD train, outside of Auto Train, was the Palmetto, which does well for a couple of key reasons.

1) With no dining car, it's cheap to operate, OBS-wise.

2) It shares its route with several other trains, and therefore takes advantage of economies of scale, both in station cost allocation, as well as T&E crew costs.

If you ignore infrastructure costs (granted, a huge expense), the Acela is self-sustaining through passenger revenue.
Fair enough. I wasn't sure, really. I have no clue as to how to dig into Amtrak financials at this point. I'm sure the info. is available somewhere out there.

Raise fares

...

and cut some of the worse performing ones
The problem with the mindset of "just cut the worst-performing route" is that there will always be a worst-performing route. If you rank trains from best to worst (no matter what criteria you use for the ranking), one is always going to be on the bottom. ("Why can't everybody be above average?") So, if, every year, you just decide to cut the worst, eventually you will have cut everything.
Precisely! The general objective surrounding my question is is to maintain service at its present level... not to cut anything. If one is of a mind to start cutting, then you may as well cut it all into oblivion, since LD pax. service will never get the consumer demand it needs to be completely self-sustaining (as it was in the 40's-50's)... not unless something serious happens to air travel and it goes belly up (which wasn't as prevalent in the 40s-50's when train travel was)...

As an aside, I think what makes train travel a more viable option today in Europe and Japan, etc., are the shorter continental distances... probably not worth investing as much in domestic air travel within Europe or Japan or similar places. HSR makes much more sense. But to go coast to coast in the USA... most would opt for the 5+ hours by air, as opposed to whatever it is by train. So, as stated above, unless something happens and all domestic aircraft get "grounded" at once, I think we will never get that kind of demand back in LD train travel. But that doesn't mean it should go away, either.
 
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Japan actually has a pretty healthy domestic air market. They even fly specially configured high density wide bodies between cities served by the Shinkansen, and they also have a pretty decent highway system that is quite heavily used.

I think the biggest problem in the US is lack of viable/usable local transit in most places, more than inter-city distances specially east of the Mississippi.
 
Japan actually has a pretty healthy domestic air market. They even fly specially configured high density wide bodies between cities served by the Shinkansen, and they also have a pretty decent highway system that is quite heavily used. I think the biggest problem in the US is lack of viable/usable local transit in most places, more than inter-city distances specially east of the Mississippi.
There is also the fact that many Americans would simply refuse to walk (or waddle) more than a few steps from whatever their transportation method is to their destination. Even if we had the same systems as Japan or Europe many Americans would never use it because it still requires walking a few blocks on either end to get from your origin to your destination. If you doubt me just look at the humongous sweaty blobs that require some of the world's largest vehicles to comfortably transport their enormous size.
 
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As an aside, I think what makes train travel a more viable option today in Europe and Japan, etc., are the shorter continental distances... probably not worth investing as much in domestic air travel within Europe or Japan or similar places. HSR makes much more sense. But to go coast to coast in the USA... most would opt for the 5+ hours by air, as opposed to whatever it is by train. So, as stated above, unless something happens and all domestic aircraft get "grounded" at once, I think we will never get that kind of demand back in LD train travel. But that doesn't mean it should go away, either.
If you take the entire European continent, it's actually larger than the continental United States ("lower 48"). If you just count "western Europe," it's still about the size of the US east of the Mississippi River. There's nothing about the size of the United States that makes passeneger rail travel impractical in modern times.

It has more to do with development patterns, and, as jis noted, the complete lack of local transit connections (which goes hand-in-hand with the development patterns).
 
What is Amtrak’s Problem? July 15th, 2012

Opinion by Noel T. Braymer

Amtrak’s problem is the same problem the railroads had for most of the 20th Century: too much overhead costs and not enough revenue. After the Civil War to just before World War I the railroads built many lines of questionable value. Local governments also often subsidized railroad construction to build in places which didn’t pay off. With government regulation the railroads had trouble eliminating money losing lines and rates were often too low to be profitable. After World War II the railroads lost many freight customers to trucking and new highways while stuck with surplus pre-war infrastructure. These problems for the railroads were greatest in the Northeast and Mid-West. This came to a head in 1970 with the bankruptcy of the PennCentral and only turned around with railroad deregulation after 1980.

Amtrak was created mainly to bail out the PennCentral. The original plan for Amtrak was simple: Amtrak would have minimal overhead. It would have few employees and own very little property. Amtrak by law wasn’t allowed to run commuter rail service because that was not profitable. The model for this was the Pullman Company. The plan was Amtrak would own passenger cars and Amtrak employees would be the on board staff. But the locomotives and road crews would belong to the host railroad. Amtrak would lease the stations and create a unified ticketing system and organize the trains to connect with each other. By consolidating the different railroad passenger services to save money, keeping overhead costs low and eliminating the weaker rail passenger services the hope was that Amtrak would make a modest profit. What went wrong is first Amtrak was greatly under capitalized to go into business and second the PennCentral was still in trouble.

By 1976 Congress gave Amtrak the North East Corridor to help Conrail the reorganized PennCentral have a chance at profitability. The cost of running the NEC with little freight and most of the commuter rail traffic in the county was a major reason PennCentral was in the red. Shortly after this happened Amtrak’s costs exploded and by 1979 there was political pressure to reduce Amtrak’s costs. Amtrak cut several mostly long distance trains in an effort to save money. The result was losses went up. The reason for this was revenue was reduced more than costs by cutting trains. In July of 1982 Dr. Ron Sheck then Geography Professor at New Mexico State published a paper after years of research of European Rail Passenger services that had an operating profit. The solution for Amtrak according to Dr. Sheck was run more trains while increasing ridership faster than costs. That meant running trains more frequently on existing lines with connecting services and running sections of trains to open more markets for Amtrak. This plan required spending money including adding over 3,000 new passenger cars for a total of 4,500 for Amtrak in order to carry enough passengers to break even. On a small scale we had seen this work by 1982 on the San Diegans as more service was added passenger counts and revenues increased faster than expenses. This happened again later on the Capitol Corridor. Dr Sheck’s report called Amtrak 90: A Route to Success showed how these changes could lead to Amtrak covering costs by 1990. You can read the Executive Summary at the URPA website.

But Amtrak remained fixated on the East Coast. Amtrak owned the NEC which came with a solid voting block of 18 Senators plus had the majority of Amtrak’s trains and employees. Amtrak’s efforts for most of its existence have been centered on getting Congress to give it enough money to keep running. To keep the NEC as is Amtrak has been more than willing to cut trains anywhere else or demand more money to keep local non NEC services running. Also Amtrak has been trying to create a High Speed Rail service on the NEC. A major problem with running high speed rail service on the NEC is it has little surplus capacity because of heavy commuter rail traffic. Of the roughly 1600 trains a day on the NEC 153 belong to Amtrak. Bypass tracks would be needed to run fast express trains around commuter trains. But adding track capacity on the NEC is expensive because of lack of space to add tracks without viaducts or tunneling. Amtrak’s start up of the Higher Speed Acela around 2002 almost put the company out of business. It was also during the late 90’s while Amtrak was in trouble from the start up of the Acela that the operating costs Amtrak charged for the San Diegans went from $13.3 million in 1992 to $37.5 million by 1999. Today Amtrak claims that the 15 long distance trains cost it $530 million dollars a year in losses. But past experience shows eliminating those trains wouldn’t save money. Yet Amtrak is responsible for the majority of the costs of the NEC and claims it almost breaks even despite being a minority user.

The result of this is Amtrak lives a day to day existence with little security since it has failed to come to terms with what it needs to do to succeed: increase revenues faster than costs. Instead for most of Amtrak’s existence its efforts to reduce costs have resulted in holding back or reducing revenues more than costs. A good example of trying to save money resulting in higher costs is deferred equipment maintenance. It is not unusual for Amtrak to have over 20 percent of its locomotives out of service with regions like the West to have up to 30 percent out of service. In France a high standard to be sure the TGV has less than 10 % of its equipment out of service. Amtrak has no plans to expand its car fleet outside of the NEC, only to replace existing equipment which is keeping them from expanding ridership and revenue needed to cover overhead. The result of Amtrak’s deferred maintenance is more breakdowns, late and cancelled trains and lost revenues. The Long Distance Trains are often crowded but additional equipment is not available to take more willing customer’s money. Amtrak has 433 active Superliner Cars of which Amtrak uses 326 daily to run their current schedule. That is 107 available Superliner Cars that Amtrak isn’t using because it thinks it is saving money leaving equipment idle. If Amtrak used 376 Superliner cars a day that would be 50 more cars on the Long Distance Trains carrying more passengers and still leave 57 cars available for maintenance.
 
A New Model For American Passenger Rail July 17th, 2012

By: Dick Spotswood. Originally published in the Steel Wheels newsletter, May/June 2012.

THE DILEMMA:

In the past decade it has become obvious that Amtrak, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, regards its principal responsibility as making the Northeast Corridor America’s first true high-speed rail route.

That’s a worthy goal and no easy task. Running from Boston south through nine states and the District of Columbia, the Northeast Corridor is the central transportation axis for southern New England and the Middle Atlantic states.

The dilemma is that Amtrak’s mandate is not limited to the northeastern states. Amtrak’s official name is the NATIONAL Railroad Passenger Corporation. Some forget that the rail passenger corporation’s mandate has always been to provide a truly national rail system. Unfortunately, it’s a role that the current Amtrak board and its permanent staff gives mere lip service.

It is time for America to have two intercity rail passenger operators: The current Amtrak in the eight-state/District of Columbia Northeast Corridor and a brand-new passenger corporation providing a high level of services for the remaining forty-two states.

Amtrak’s current priority, whether it is staff time, innovation, planning or allocation of fiscal resources, is the right-of-way between Boston and Washington. The reality is that the Northeast Corridor is perceived by the corporation as the prime reason for its existence. The national system serves as little more than a useful political device when it comes time for the public passenger carrier to seek federal subsidies.

When times are tough, as they are now, those trains provides Amtrak’s current management was a convenient scape goat: blame deficits on long-distance trains. While based on erroneous data, it’s a task facilitated by Amtrak’s dysfunctional accounting system and a political agenda that places the Northeast Corridor as priority one.

Amtrak’s focus is on this 455-mile stretch of Middle Atlantic-Southern New England mainline trackage. That leaves than the remaining national system’s approximately twenty-one thousand route miles across the American west, Midwest and the South as an unwanted stepchild. Some of Amtrak’s limited focus is due to practical concerns; but a big part is an East Coast centric corporate cultural that overwhelms both staff and board. The final element is political

From an Amtrak management and board point of view, concentrating on the Northeast Corridor and especially their Acela high-speed train service provides a manageable project within the professional capabilities of their current staff. Acela has had its problems, not an wholly unexpected development given the pathetic lack of American-based high-speed rail expertise.

It’s even consistent with the plan proposed two years ago by House Transportation Committee chair John Mica (R-Florida) and Rail Subcommittee chair Bill Shuster, R-Pennsylvania, to privatize development and operation of the Northeast Corridor. Whether operated, as now, as a quasi-public agency or, as Mica and Shuster proposed as a private railroad, the Northeast Corridor has the volume of passenger traffic and the potential for increased freight services that should make it a viable stand-alone railroad under either scenario… if properly managed.

CULTURE:

The corporate cultural aspect of the dilemma is harder to quantify, but very real. The men and women who manage Amtrak are based in Washington, D.C. Most have spent the bulk of their professional lives in those very same Middle Atlantic States. When they, their friends and family think of rail, they naturally focus on what they personally are familiar with.

They ride Northeast Corridor trains with some frequency. When they look out the windows of their Washington Union Station-based national Amtrak headquarters, they see the Northeast Corridor fleet, along with excellent Maryland and Virginia commuter operations. The few long distance trains to Florida, the Midwest and the South appear as oddities with weak constituencies. They are easy to ignore and can even be entirely written off with little political or bureaucratic risk… so far.

It’s so easy for most of us residing in the bulk of the continental United States to forget but Northeasters suffer from a provincialism that regards much of America, even California, as a backwater. They vaguely understand that Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago and for the well-traveled, perhaps Seattle or Denver, do exist. More often these far-off exotic locales are out-of-sight and out of mind. They consider us “the Coast” or “The West.” The later is defined anywhere west of Buffalo. We live in cities and town where Easterners go on vacation but certainly not where they perceive many Americans actually live.

The very notion that real live people live in small towns like Whitefish Montana, Ottumwa Iowa, Flagstaff Arizona, Meridian Mississippi or even Santa Barbara, are incomprehensible to the good folks of all socioeconomic classes who live and work in or between Washington, Manhattan or Boston.

As long as that East Coast culture represents the world view of Amtrak managers, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation or its privatized successor will be “national” in name only.

POLITICS:

The politics of all of this is understandable. In the eight Northeast Corridor states Amtrak and commuter rail is a big deal. Much of the Middle Atlantic States’ voting public utilizes these rail service and makes it known to their elected officials that they consider passenger rail a priority. Just like their constituents, their elected officials personally use the system and “get it.”

When he was a Delaware senator, “Amtrak Joe” Biden was famous as a regular rail commuter. Not to be forgotten is that his frequent seatmate was Pennsylvania’s Arlen Specter, both of whom would regularly run into fellow Congressional rail commuters headed home after a hectic day at the Capital.

In itself that’s a terrific situation giving passenger rail in general and Amtrak in particular high visibility crucial at budget times. The lamentable but inevitable secondary result is that federal support for rail passenger service tends to be aimed only at those services that Eastern Congressmembers and their constituents personally experience. Ditto for the good folks at NARP.

Unfortunately, the unintended result is that the national long-distance system and those corridors outside of the Northeast are ignored or wrongly dismissed as underutilized anachronisms.

The negative effects of this Southern New England-Middle Atlantic orientation is visible on every Amtrak long distance train resulting in an inconsistent (at best) on-board passenger service.

Old equipment poorly maintained all staffed by a mixed bag of employees is the norm. While some Amtrak’s employees are highly dedicated and professional, too many others emulate the worst traits practiced by indifferent private passengers railroads or government bureaucrats s a scenario directly stemming from a management preoccupied with the Northeast Corridor.

To any impartial follower of the national rail passenger scene, it’s clear that unless a prompt order is made for new long-distance passengers cars, the national service will wither away within a decade or two. That’s how long the present roster of coaches, sleeping cars and diners have before being hauled off to the scrap heap. Given the huge lead time in ordering any new equipment, the current delay by Amtrak management to address this critical need is appalling.

Likewise, senior Amtrak managements doesn’t even possess the basic budgetary tools necessary to evaluate the costs and expenses of long distance services. Their current muddled accounting system provides none of the basic tools widely available to regional transit systems, not to mention airlines, to analyze and accurately inform management of the incremental costs of each of segment of their services.

Wildly inaccurate information is disseminated that too often appears to be grossly biased against any passenger services not based in the Northeast, and likewise biased in favor of Northeast Corridor trains. Recent efforts are at best efforts to keep supporters of a national system at peace, are too obviously designed “to keep the troops happy.”

As critic Andrew Selden has long pointed out, accounting gimmicks were designed to minimize the costs and maximize the revenue generated in the Northeast Corridor, preordaining that one will always be perceived as a “winner” and the other a fiscal “loser.”

“Lying with numbers” is an old trick in the transit business. It’s the use of seemingly unbiased figures to justify actions that coincide with the agenda preset by staff and well-positioned board members.

While the Northeast Corridor address a crucial if limited segment America’s mobility needs, current Amtrak management tends to ignore other corridors. The mere fact that it is “understood” at Amtrak headquarters that the Northeast Corridor’s infrastructure requirements and operations will be financed by the national system, while California, Illinois, North Carolina or the Pacific Northwest need to be “partnered” with local state funding sources, is a classic example of the Upper East Coast-bias inherent the current set up.

2009 began with much hope. The Obama-Biden Administration proclaimed itself the friend of passenger rail. While their intentions were good, they failed to add one single mile of additional passenger rail service or even so much as one additional non-corridor frequency. Amtrak’s management failed to use any available opportunities to expand its role or by purchasing badly passenger cars to replace the aging long-distance equipment.

The causes of this failure are multiple and bipartisan, but its undeniable that zero progress has been made. Given political realities, even less can be expected in the coming 2012-2016, whoever is president.

SOLUTION: TWO SEPARATE RAIL PASSENGER COMPANIES:

Just continuing the status quo is not only unfair to the other forty-two states, it puts untenable pressure on Amtrak’s current staff and board. It’s also a guarantee that American passenger rail will never be a competitive travel option as it is in so much of the economically advanced world. They are now being asked to serve two masters: the Northeast Corridor, and a national system of long-distance trains and “emerging” corridors. It’s too much to ask, and in the long run unsustainable.

It’s time to dissolve Amtrak. It’s very name “Amtrak” has developed in the public such a negative, bureaucratic connotation that it should become the latest “fallen flag.” Why else does Amtrak in the East focus on the weird word “Acela” to describe their premier service.

In its place, two alternative models are suggested.

One involves transforming the present National Railroad Passenger Corporation into a new, slimmed down entity. Either remaining in the public sector which much state involvement, or as a taxpayer assisted but private enterprise run corporation, this new NORTHEAST RAIL would be allocated the sole responsibility of perfecting a southern New England -Middle Atlantic passenger service stretching from Boston south to Richmond, Virginia. If the Northeast Corridor is privatized, there is little doubt that the needed management staff will be lean.

Note that NORTHEAST RAIL will assume all of Amtrak’s rights and obligations in the current Northeast Corridor.

Simultaneously, a new rail passenger corporation needs to be established. For now, let’s call it AMERICAN RAIL. It too will assume all of Amtrak’s rights and obligations that exist outside the Northeast Corridor.

Its purpose will be to assume responsibly for all aspects of a new independent passenger railroad. That entity will operate and secure financing for all long-distance and corridor services in America west and south of the Appalachians. It should combine some aspects of public funding with the actual service operated by private operators on a line-by-line basis.

How much better for all concerned for “NORTHEAST RAIL to concentrate on what it knows best, the Northeast Corridor. At the same time, much of America, particularly at a time when the understanding of the travel and environmental importance of AMERICAN RAIL, a truly national rail network, could benefit from an organization focused on its own needs and priorities.

The name AMERICAN RAIL signifies a fresh start and new direction. It should have its headquarters anywhere but Washington. Chicago, the traditional hub for western and mid-American rail passenger services, would be a fine location as would St. Louis or even Denver. With its own separate board of directors, with new management and working with new private sector operators, AMERICAN RAIL would not compete with NORTHEAST RAIL but serve as its national connection.

With innovation the watchword, AMERICAN RAIL should lead to way to new routes and more frequencies all in new passenger cars and locomotives operated by a freshly recruited and trained staff equipped with a private sector-style customer-first approach. Is there risk of failure? Yes, but right now the risk of the ultimate demise of Amtrak’s long-distance service seems assured.

THE DIVISION

The new railroad’s mission will be the operation of all American intercity passenger trains outside the Northeast Corridor.

Certain services ancillary to NORTHEAST RAIL’S heartland, such as the New York to Buffalo Empire Service, the Down Easterner Route from Boston to Portland, Maine and the once-a day service extending east from Richmond to Newport News would be subject to amiable negotiations. If NORTHEAST RAIL considers those lines essential part of their bailiwick, they should continue to operate them. This plan envisions a non-hostile division resulting in two new, independent but cooperating entities.

The private sector components of both plans is an acknowledgement of the new leaner 21st Century structure of government and the ruinous divide that in the past few years has seen with passenger rail identified with the Democrats and vilified by many Republicans. A serious effort needs to be taken to depoliticize the topic of passenger rail.

Creating allies in the private sector without alienating labor is a difficult but essential component of this strategy.

This approach will result in two new entities that should create their own new corporate cultures.

While some may consider that scenario optimistic, there is zero doubt that if Amtrak’s status quo is maintained no progress will ever come to pass.

The most difficult aspect will be the division of essential federal operating and capital subsidies between the two new companies. There is no doubt that even if there is significant private sector involvement, federal dollars will remain an essential part of the puzzle, just as it has decades when it comes to air, highway and barge modes of passenger and freight mobility.

Congress is entitled to a voice even with much private sector participation. Yet, there is no valid reason that rational minds can’t prevail resulting in mediated solution acceptable to Congress and the Administration without raising regional passions.

Greater involvement by the individual states could assist in all of the above described goals. One dares to think that federal funds might even be allocated on a per-capital basis, rather than the traditional allocations which relied more on history than rationality.

MANY BENEFITS, FEW NEGATIVES:

This concept is a win-win for all except some current management employees at Amtrak’s Washington headquarters who will find themselves redundant.

Rail labor will benefit. Not only will there be no layoffs of operating personnel, there is a distinct prospect of additional employment associated with more routes and greater frequency. Certainly the manufacturing sector will benefit from equipment purchases to replace worn out passenger cars and locomotive.

Small town America will benefit. Not just from additional routes and frequencies, but from American Rail, a new rail passenger company focused on their needs. Likewise, larger states will be rewarded from attention to their emerging corridors linking major and medium sized cities.

Northeast Corridor states win from Northeast Rail, an operation undistracted by what’s proved to be an incompatible a long-distance system.

The bulk of America benefits from a new system focused on the needs of Western, Mid-western and Southern states needs and desires with new management open to innovative public-private partnerships.

MOVING FORWARD – NEXT STEP:

It’s my suggestion that the Rail Passengers Association (RailPAC) of California and Nevada members contemplate this plan aided by the preparation of professional-quality research reports. The end result would be consideration of adopting the notion of dissolving Amtrak and replacing it with the two new entities, NORTHEAST RAIL and AMERICAN RAIL as RailPAC’s official position.

We would then urge other rail advocacy groups to join with us. Sad to say, it’s doubtful that NARP, almost as East Coast centric as the current Amtrak leadership, would be supportive. NARP’s history, understandably, has been to defend and justify Amtrak management. The time for that self-defeating approach has clearly ended.

An essential early step is to secure bipartisan sponsors in both the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives to serve as our proponents. It’s naive to think that Amtrak’s current board and senior management will not oppose this move. Substantial bipartisan Congressional and Administration support is essential if this proposal is to be taken seriously. Just getting the debate off the ground is not an easy task. We can’t do it with just the old friends of passenger rail. Simultaneously, we need to expand by adding others, e.g., Republicans and the business community, who have in recent years opposed or indifferent to passenger rail, but were supportive in the past.

At the very least, debating this proposal will cause many in the rail community to think about Amtrak’s current dysfunctional structure and understand its long-term implications. A vigorous public conversation will have the salutatory side effect that Amtrak management will likely never again take the West, Midwest and the South for granted as they have done so often in the last few decades.

At best, such a bold discussion will spark others in the rail passenger community to rethink old approaches and faulty assumptions. Ideally this will all lead to a more sustainable vision of a vibrant twenty-first century truly national rail passenger system.
 
If you take the entire European continent, it's actually larger than the continental United States ("lower 48"). If you just count "western Europe," it's still about the size of the US east of the Mississippi River. There's nothing about the size of the United States that makes passeneger rail travel impractical in modern times.

It has more to do with development patterns, and, as jis noted, the complete lack of local transit connections (which goes hand-in-hand with the development patterns).
OK.... Just curious...Why do you think "development patterns/local transit" never materialized in the USA to the extent that it would put our LD train travel on the same level as Japan or Europe?
 
If you take the entire European continent, it's actually larger than the continental United States ("lower 48"). If you just count "western Europe," it's still about the size of the US east of the Mississippi River. There's nothing about the size of the United States that makes passeneger rail travel impractical in modern times.

It has more to do with development patterns, and, as jis noted, the complete lack of local transit connections (which goes hand-in-hand with the development patterns).
OK.... Just curious...Why do you think "development patterns/local transit" never materialized in the USA to the extent that it would put our LD train travel on the same level as Japan or Europe?
For one thing, our nation grew up with the industrial revolution. Steam engines and railroads were a big part of the country's expansion, whereas in Europe, the major cities had long-since been developed and settled. Lots of cities in the US really didn't grow until after the automobile was commonplace.

Europe, by necessity and by design, was built around being able to easily walk where you needed to go. This meant dense population centers and mixed-use development (though they wouldn't have used that term in the 1600s).

Older US cities were built around the same theme. However, when automobiles and roadways proliferated, cities and suburbs in the US grew like tumors. It was thought that there was no longer any need to build things close together, because people could just drive from one place to another.

The latter sort of development is incompatible with good, efficient public transit (and efficient use of other infrastructure, but that's another discussion).

Good transit connections are key to making rail travel attractive, because one of rail travel's supposed advantages over flying (for example) is to be able to drop you off right in the downtown of a city. If a person can't walk from the train station to their destination, then they will either need a good transit connection, a taxi (expensive), or a rental car (expensive and inconvenient). If they have to rent a car, that puts even more pressure on the railroad to be time-competitive enough to beat driving. (As an example: How popular would the Hiawatha service be if you had to rent a car in Chicago to get anywhere? You'd be better off driving the whole way down from Milwaukee in that case.)

Another key difference between the US and Europe is that the US didn't have two world wars fought on its soil. Much of Europe's infrastructure was destroyed during World War II, and had to be rebuilt anyway. The US railroad infrastructure was still in relatively good shape. On top of that, since US railroads were privately owned (vs. public ownership for European railroads), there was no interest in government investment in railroad infrastructure in the US.

When the US built the interstate highway system, that accelerated a number of the factors noted above. For one, it destroyed a lot of cities/urban neighborhoods by going right through the heart of their downtowns, taking up tons of land and driving a wedge in between the areas that were left; it made it easier for people to travel long-distances to/from work, which encouraged them to live further out, in less densely populated areas, and it also provided another alternative to the railroads for both passenger and freight transportation.

In some cases, ironically, transit providers themselves planted the seeds of their own demise. An example a former colleague noted to me was in Chicago, where streetcar companies expanded beyond the old traditional city limits (which have long since been significantly expanded) and encouraged people to buy land and build houses out there and ride the streetcars into town. However, in doing so, it ultimately wound up contributing to the sprawling development that eventually cost transit its market share vs. the automobile (of course, you could probably argue that it would have happened anyway).

Really, one could write a book (or several) on all of the different reasons why the US developed in such a way that made rail travel a difficult proposition.
 
If you take the entire European continent, it's actually larger than the continental United States ("lower 48"). If you just count "western Europe," it's still about the size of the US east of the Mississippi River. There's nothing about the size of the United States that makes passeneger rail travel impractical in modern times.

It has more to do with development patterns, and, as jis noted, the complete lack of local transit connections (which goes hand-in-hand with the development patterns).
OK.... Just curious...Why do you think "development patterns/local transit" never materialized in the USA to the extent that it would put our LD train travel on the same level as Japan or Europe?
For one thing, our nation grew up with the industrial revolution. Steam engines and railroads were a big part of the country's expansion, whereas in Europe, the major cities had long-since been developed and settled. Lots of cities in the US really didn't grow until after the automobile was commonplace.

Europe, by necessity and by design, was built around being able to easily walk where you needed to go. This meant dense population centers and mixed-use development (though they wouldn't have used that term in the 1600s).

Older US cities were built around the same theme. However, when automobiles and roadways proliferated, cities and suburbs in the US grew like tumors. It was thought that there was no longer any need to build things close together, because people could just drive from one place to another.

The latter sort of development is incompatible with good, efficient public transit (and efficient use of other infrastructure, but that's another discussion).

Good transit connections are key to making rail travel attractive, because one of rail travel's supposed advantages over flying (for example) is to be able to drop you off right in the downtown of a city. If a person can't walk from the train station to their destination, then they will either need a good transit connection, a taxi (expensive), or a rental car (expensive and inconvenient). If they have to rent a car, that puts even more pressure on the railroad to be time-competitive enough to beat driving. (As an example: How popular would the Hiawatha service be if you had to rent a car in Chicago to get anywhere? You'd be better off driving the whole way down from Milwaukee in that case.)

Another key difference between the US and Europe is that the US didn't have two world wars fought on its soil. Much of Europe's infrastructure was destroyed during World War II, and had to be rebuilt anyway. The US railroad infrastructure was still in relatively good shape. On top of that, since US railroads were privately owned (vs. public ownership for European railroads), there was no interest in government investment in railroad infrastructure in the US.

When the US built the interstate highway system, that accelerated a number of the factors noted above. For one, it destroyed a lot of cities/urban neighborhoods by going right through the heart of their downtowns, taking up tons of land and driving a wedge in between the areas that were left; it made it easier for people to travel long-distances to/from work, which encouraged them to live further out, in less densely populated areas, and it also provided another alternative to the railroads for both passenger and freight transportation.

In some cases, ironically, transit providers themselves planted the seeds of their own demise. An example a former colleague noted to me was in Chicago, where streetcar companies expanded beyond the old traditional city limits (which have long since been significantly expanded) and encouraged people to buy land and build houses out there and ride the streetcars into town. However, in doing so, it ultimately wound up contributing to the sprawling development that eventually cost transit its market share vs. the automobile (of course, you could probably argue that it would have happened anyway).

Really, one could write a book (or several) on all of the different reasons why the US developed in such a way that made rail travel a difficult proposition.
Thanks very much! :hi: I appreciate the effort you put into this.

I get the role of the automobile and the Interstate Highway system (and its effects on urban sprawl, etc.). I just thought that, intuitively, air travel would've had more of an impact than it seems, at least for real, LD travel (i.e coast<-->coast or North<-->South). That is, the need to "get there, faster, sooner." I would have thought that the development/expansion of air travel, jets, and the resultant decreased travel times would have done similar things to LD rail travel that the automobile did.
 
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AutoTrDvr,

I'm often following news stories around the country as they relate to rail, but it subway, light rail, commuter, or Amtrak. And one of the most common thing that I see from those opposed often goes like this "I can get in my car and drive there for $35 vs. paying $100 for Amtrak." Far too many people equate the cost of driving only to the cost of the gas in their tank. Many even forget to include the cost of filling up once again when they get home to their trip. I'll point out the fact that one must include a pro-rated cost for insurance, interest, price of the car, repairs & maintenance, and wear & tear. That makes their trip more expensive that just the price of the gas they put in the car.

Then we come to the fact that the fuel taxes do NOT fully cover the costs of our roads & highways, meaning that we drivers actually get a subsidy to drive our cars.

When one starts including all of that, driving often isn't cheaper than Amtrak. But again, far too many people don't realize that, so they jump in their car and drive instead of taking the train.
 
I get the role of the automobile and the Interstate Highway system (and its effects on urban sprawl, etc.). I just thought that, intuitively, air travel would've had more of an impact than it seems, at least for real, LD travel (i.e coast<-->coast or North<-->South). That is, the need to "get there, faster, sooner." I would have thought that the development/expansion of air travel, jets, and the resultant decreased travel times would have done similar things to LD rail travel that the automobile did.
Oh, to be sure, air travel had a significant detrimental impact on the viability of long-distance rail travel.

My explanation was geared more towards the question of why development patterns in cities occurred the way they did.

As I mentioned in an earlier post, the European continent is slightly larger than the continental United States. Western Europe is roughly the size of the eastern half of the US.

Air travel in Europe replaced a lot of long-distance rail travel, but HSR development has enabled rail to fight back and regain market share. While there are a few overnight/sleeper trains in Europe, there's nothing that really compares to the Amtrak long-distance trains. Most of Europe is covered with rail corridors (both high-speed and conventional), whereas passenger rail in the US is very sporadic. If the US had developed in a similar fashion as Europe, you'd have high-speed rail on a continuous line from St. Louis to Chicago to Cleveland to New York, Minneapolis to Chicago to Indianapolis to Atlanta to Florida, New Orleans-Atlanta-Washington, DC, and several other routes, plus dozens of conventional train routes connecting surrounding areas to the major cities to connect with high-speed rail. It would likely have been possible to get from St. Louis to New York in less than 12 hours (maybe less than 10, depending on speed and exact routing) by rail.

This would make discussion of "long-distance trains" more academic, at least in the eastern United States, because you'd probably have enough coverage with connecting trains (and maybe a couple of through trains per day) to eliminate the need to spend the night and 18 hours on the train to get from Chicago to New York.

Going west, it's a different story. For one, you've got much more mountainous terrain which makes faster trains more expensive. Second, the wide-open spaces with very few populated areas makes it more difficult to justify the investment in high-speed rail, since the demand wouldn't be there to support the frequency needed to make it worthwhile. So, perhaps you still would have long-distance trains in the west (and if you had a successful network of high-speed trains in the east, it would make it more likely for there to be widespread support for trains out west, even if they're not as fast). Those long-distance trains could then feed into the high-speed networks that could have potentially developed in Texas, California and the Pacific Northwest. It would still take a while to go coast-to-coast by rail, and the market for that specific type of travel would certainly be limited, just as the market from Lisbon to Warsaw, Poland is probably limited (though likely more doable, with more options; I haven't looked up all the routes online).

Long story short, in order for rail travel to be more relevant, not only must it be time competitive (not necessarily faster, just competitive), but it also needs the feed at the end of the line. That's what we don't have.

That's one reason why it's probably a good thing that the ridiculous Tampa-Orlando HSR was stopped. For a starter segment, with no onward connections, it wouldn't have been useful to anyone as neither Tampa nor Orlando have a particularly good transit system to get people anywhere once they're there (and once it failed to generate any ridership, for that reason, the support most likely would not have been there to finish the rest of the planned system).
 
I'd be willing to pay a bit more tax to expand passenger train service, as long as it is not too high for me to sustain, which I don't thnk it will be as long as it's used for trains.
 
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