The Boeing MAX 8 Accidents

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It would appear that pressing said two buttons would take the very system that makes the MAX certifiable at all, off line. That sure sounds a bit weird if one asks me. I don't see any logic in the claim that there was no incident. Actually each time those buttons had to be pushed during a commercial flight, it was an incident, since it took the plane into an uncertifiable state. How many times were those buttons actually pressed by pilots transforming the plane into a non-certifiable aircraft while in commercial flight?

Anyway, the speculation now is grounding for six to nine months notwithstanding all the brave pronouncements.
 
It is illogical that Boeing would assume the risk of nearly 5000 aircraft defective deliveries through stupidity or otherwise deliberately rushing changes. Even pure Greed is outweighed by the potential business-ending litigation!

Famous last words....

The problem with design engineers is there not the ones who are using the equipment. So this system make prefect sense to a engineer but the operator is completely bewildered by it.

Fact check the Max 8 and Max 9 have report of problems with the cruise control on takeoff. These reports are from US based airlines, and were report to the NASA website. The aircraft will pitch down with out pilot input. This was corrected when the pilot when manual. Not the same system as the one getting finger point in these crashes. Just another system that was designed to override the pilot if certain conditions occur.


Boeing best solution would be to do a complete redesign of the aircraft to fit the new heavier engines. That is reported to take 10 years to do so. In 10 years the green plan may remove the need for short haul airplanes, Elon’s BFR could destroy the long haul flights.
 
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Here is a reference to the article that references two entries in NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System about uncommanded pitch down movements after take-off with the autopilot engaged - see https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2...ecord-about-problems-with-the-737-max/584791/

BTW, now share owners in Boeing are also getting into the act apparently:

https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-e...ver-737-max-crashes-disclosures-idUKKCN1RL31D

A short quote from an opinion posted on airliners.net by xmp125a in response to a pertinent question, which sort of rang a bell for me:

What's the difference if it was controlled with FBW or by MCAS changing the trim? MCAS, in its designed role, accomplishes essentially the same thing that a FBW system would.

In FBW systems there are no mechanical fallbacks (like the infamous trim wheel in 737). Therefore, any FBW aircraft has to fulfill much more stringent criteria regarding to sensors, computers and actuators. Apparently in FBW it is standard that sensors and even computers are in triplets, so not only a failure of single sensor can be detected, it can also be made inconsequential by voting (e.g. the system compares all 3 sensors and disregards the one that is furthest away from the other two).

What Boeing did is a very bad mashup of old and new technology. They introduced MCAS, but in theory it is not the FBW aircraft so MCAS is not a necessity unless in a very specific circumstances. In theory, the cockpit could have one big red button "all computers meddling with controls off" and would be still flyable. That encouraged thinking "but pilots can disable MCAS", which indeed it is true. BUT due to certification requirements and desire for common type certification prevented exactly this - there is no "MCAS OFF" button. There are only electric trim disable switch(es), which makes situation more complex (it disables both MCAS influence AND electric trim). But even that, in the eyes of Boeing engineers, was not an issue, because there is always a trim wheel to fallback to...

Except, it turned out that a) trim wheel is almost never used b) has been made smaller with increasing computerization of the cockpit (and because it is never used) which resulted in c) the mechanical fallback was suddenly extremely difficult way to recover from the MCAS malfunction.
 
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Interesting article in NY Times

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/business/boeing-faa-mcas.html

Apparently neither FAA nor even Boeing's own test pilots were told about the final changes that created the death trap - i.e. changing the stab from 0 deg to 2.5 deg in 10 sec!

And speaking of American pilots not worrying about it, here is what American Airlines Pilot's Union spokesman had to say about that:

“That’s a huge difference,” said Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the American Airlines pilots’ union, who has flown 737s for a decade. “That’s the difference between controlled flight or not.”

Some additional pertinent quotes.... [mods: if you think too much has been quoted please feel free to edit out all the quotes below. They are afterall, all in the article, but I thought it is worth highlighting]

While it was designing its newest jet, Boeing decided to quadruple the power of an automated system that could push down the plane’s nose — a movement that made it difficult for the pilots on two doomed flights to regain control.

The company also expanded the use of the software to activate in more situations, as it did erroneously in the two deadly crashes involving the plane, the 737 Max, in recent months.

None of those changes to the anti-stall system, known as MCAS, were fully examined by the Federal Aviation Administration.

“In creating MCAS, they violated a longstanding principle at Boeing to always have pilots ultimately in control of the aircraft,” said Chesley B. Sullenberger III, the retired pilot who landed a jet in the Hudson River. “In mitigating one risk, they created another, greater risk."

and

The missed risks, by the F.A.A. and Boeing, flowed to other decisions. A deep explanation of the system wasn’t included in the plane manual. The F.A.A. didn’t require training on it. Even Boeing test pilots weren’t fully briefed on MCAS.

“Therein lies the issue with the design change: Those pitch rates were never articulated to us,” said one test pilot, Matthew Menza.

If all this is true, frankly, this is beyond scandalous. As someone half-jokingly said, such things should not happen even in the lawn mower industry.
 
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In fact United and American executives issued statements/video stating their pilots had received proper training

Contrast that from actual words from an actual pilot (taken from the ASRS reports quoted in the above article):
This was the first flight on a Max for both pilots. Unfamiliarity with flight deck displays led to confusion about display annunciations and switch function. The Flight Manual does not address at least one annunciation, or the controls for the display—or if it does, neither pilot could find the explanation. I have spent literally days looking for an explanation, could not find one, and that is why I wrote this report. It shouldn't be this hard to figure out what I'm looking at.

Finally, in the Captain's preflight procedure in the bulletin, it says, "Selector... C". What selector is this referring to? Is this the same selector under the Fuel Flow switch, (which is shown in the MAX panels on the L position, as if that is the normal position?) This is very poorly explained. I have no idea what switch the preflight is talking about, nor do I understand even now what this switch does.

I think this entire setup needs to be thoroughly explained to pilots. How can a Captain not know what switch is meant during a preflight setup? Poor training and even poorer documentation, that is how.

"Proper training", my arse.
 
Boeing abandoned its revised financial outlook for 2019 and did not provide a new one on Wednesday (24 April, 2019) pending better understanding of the impact of the MAX incidents and its fallout.

https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-b...utlook-after-737-max-groundings-idUKKCN1S01FQ

As a Boeing shareholder, this is not good news. I still have faith in the Company, but I voted my proxy directly opposite to what the Board of Directors recommended. I hope other shareholders--including those institutions that hold far more shares than mine--do as well. Something at Boeing is amiss in Chicago. This is an excellent opportunity for shareholders to express our misgivings to the Company.
 
As a Boeing shareholder, this is not good news. I still have faith in the Company, but I voted my proxy directly opposite to what the Board of Directors recommended. I hope other shareholders--including those institutions that hold far more shares than mine--do as well. Something at Boeing is amiss in Chicago. This is an excellent opportunity for shareholders to express our misgivings to the Company.
It's called Corporate Greed!
 
Oy vey! Boeing is digging itself deeper into the doo doo. This is even further beyond unbelievable. But truth sometimes is stranger than fiction...

https://qz.com/1608362/boeing-says-it-didnt-deactivate-standalone-aoa-safety-alert/

This one makes Boeing look like the dunce that couldn't shoot straight even if he tried really hard to do so. Sigh...

Boeing's work on the software update is now looking more and more like another Brexit exercise I am afraid. :mad:
 
Oy vey! Boeing is digging itself deeper into the doo doo. This is even further beyond unbelievable. But truth sometimes is stranger than fiction...

https://qz.com/1608362/boeing-says-it-didnt-deactivate-standalone-aoa-safety-alert/

This one makes Boeing look like the dunce that couldn't shoot straight even if he tried really hard to do so. Sigh...

Boeing's work on the software update is now looking more and more like another Brexit exercise I am afraid. :mad:

As a Boeing shareholder and consumer of their products, I am sorry to say that I agree. I have asked my broker to try to obtain the results of the Shareholders votes for 2019 and 2018 for comparison purposes. 2019: 34% voted for an Independent Chairman; that's a larger percentage than I recall from previous votes on this issue.

I am not impressed by the CEO/Chairman's statement that a committee of Directors has been formed to deal with the issues now coming forth. Those Directors and their lack of proper involvement with the Company have responsibility for this mess and the loss of life that has occurred.
 
As someone with over 16,000 hours flying Boeing aircraft, including the 737, I am beyond disappointed with my onetime favorite company in the world...


This right here is Boeing biggest problem. The lost of faith in a product. This story just keeps get worse, and worse. The only plus side is there not much choice of aircraft builders. Not sure if that can save the Boeing brand.
 
This right here is Boeing biggest problem. The lost of faith in a product. This story just keeps get worse, and worse. The only plus side is there not much choice of aircraft builders. Not sure if that can save the Boeing brand.

Nothing that I have posted ought to be construed as any of my thoughts are that the Boeing brand ought to fail. Too many success stories across many different Boeing Divisions for too many years: it's a Company that will overcome this adversity with the 737 MAX. However, I hope that this issue will serve as a Board of Directors and Senior Management "kick in the rear" to be better overseers of what is taking place beyond the Board Room and Corporate Office in Chicago.

My Boeing shares are held by a financial firm. I am very unhappy, shall I say very, very unhappy, that I am unable to learn the results of the election proposals at the very recent Annual Meeting through my broker. As a result of the recent 737 MAX issues, I would like to know if other shareholders--large and small--agree with me that the Directors and Officers in Chicago need to be "more on task", perhaps, with other concerns other than long range, strategic plans.
 
Nothing that I have posted ought to be construed as any of my thoughts are that the Boeing brand ought to fail. Too many success stories across many different Boeing Divisions for too many years: it's a Company that will overcome this adversity with the 737 MAX. However, I hope that this issue will serve as a Board of Directors and Senior Management "kick in the rear" to be better overseers of what is taking place beyond the Board Room and Corporate Office in Chicago.

My Boeing shares are held by a financial firm. I am very unhappy, shall I say very, very unhappy, that I am unable to learn the results of the election proposals at the very recent Annual Meeting through my broker. As a result of the recent 737 MAX issues, I would like to know if other shareholders--large and small--agree with me that the Directors and Officers in Chicago need to be "more on task", perhaps, with other concerns other than long range, strategic plans.
People need to go to Jail over this one!
 
I think it is way more important to learn from this and make changes in the institutional behavior so that this is not repeated, than figuring out who to put in jail. Sending a bunch of people to jail while not understanding and fixing the institutional issues will fix nothing.
 
How about just design a new aircraft that will be in balance with these engines. Not needed two different computers to take charge of the aircraft seem the best long term solution. Everything seem to be a work around for the bigger heavier engines.
 
How about just design a new aircraft that will be in balance with these engines. Not needed two different computers to take charge of the aircraft seem the best long term solution. Everything seem to be a work around for the bigger heavier engines.
There is such a plan but it is post 2025 introduction at the earliest.

Incidentally, here is a new article from Seattle Times on the issue of Boeing culture and the CEO's responsibility etc.

https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...wn+future_5_6_2019&utm_term=Active+subscriber
 
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Thank you very much for posting this well written and informative article.

I recall there were concerns raised at the time the Corporate Headquarters were moved from Seattle to Chicago. If my memory is correct, one of those concerns was getting senior management too far from the day to day engineering and work taking place in Renton. It now appears that those concerns may not have been too far off the mark.
 
I think it is way more important to learn from this and make changes in the institutional behavior so that this is not repeated, than figuring out who to put in jail. Sending a bunch of people to jail while not understanding and fixing the institutional issues will fix nothing.
On the other hand, one way to focus executives' minds on the need to change institutional behavior is to send badly behaving executives to jail. People in charge think they can get away with anything, and they usually do. That doesn't help change institutional behavior.
 
As the saga unfolds many take full advantage of the opportunity of damaging their credibility even further during a Congressional hearing....

https://www.eturbonews.com/252204/s...tation-committee-hearing-on-boeing-737-8-max/

I think Elwell will be one of the primary fall guys, and rightfully so. Afterall he pretty much saw it fit to sit on his two thumbs until Trump kicked him in the butt.

Now the cesspool that Boeing's program management of the 737MAX program had become, that is an entirely different matter, and who knows how that will get fixed, or if it will get addressed adequately at all? The fact that it was allowed to become so at the goading of possibly everyone all the way upto the Board is a pretty sorry state of affairs. An innate desire to try to sweep it under an appropriate set of rugs and carry one may be overwhelming.

And trust me, if you trace through all my posts on aviation at various places normally I have been in the past an unabashed Boeing fanboi, and continue to be so of their 777 and 787 programs, notwithstanding the Li battery issue, hoping against hope that the MAX malady has not infected those two programs.

I am also starting to wonder where the doomsday clock stands for Boeing's commercial aircraft division. I suspect they are too big to fail at this point, but the longer this drags on with people making fools of themselves at each step the worse its gets.
 
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On the other hand, one way to focus executives' minds on the need to change institutional behavior is to send badly behaving executives to jail. People in charge think they can get away with anything, and they usually do. That doesn't help change institutional behavior.

Why is there not a "love!" button for this post? Few things are as effective at "changing institutional behavior" as the new CEO and Board members realizing that their predecessors are now doing 7 to 20 in a Supermax prison, not to mention being sued for their personal assets down to and including their dirty underwear! I can guarantee that "fines and reprimands," the latter of which will be ignored and the former passed on to customers, will NOT result in any kind of meaningful change!
 
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