Amfleet I Replacement

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Daniel

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Are there any concrete plans to replace/retrofit Amfleet I equipment at this point, perhaps with larger windows? I read that there is a RFP for 28 new High Speed Trainsets for the Northeast Corridor...would the Amfleet Is still be used if these new trainsets are delivered? I would imagine that the new trainsets would replace the Acelas/Regionals, but Amfleet Is would still run on routes like the Carolinian, Empire Service, Keystones, Adirondack, etc.
 
A coach replacement is likely a ways off. The 28 trainsets would go toward replacing the Acelas and not the Amfleet equipment such as Regionals, Keystones, etc.
 
The 28 new HSR trainsets would replace the Acela (Is) and expand the Acela class service with more daily trains. The Acela service generates enough revenue with an operating surplus that the 28 HSR trainsets, which we have been calling Acela II (completely unofficial), will pay for themselves.

Amtrak does have a long range fleet strategy plan to replace the Amfleet Is, the Amfleet II LD cars, the Superliners, and the P-42 diesels. But without at least some direct funding from Congress for equipment purchases, it is going to be quite difficult to place large orders for new equipment. There are ways to fund replacing the Amfleet I cars with the states in the east paying a capital charge for their supported corridor services and the operating surplus generated by the NE Regionals, but it won't be easy if Congress does not contribute partial funding for a large Amfleet I replacement order.
 
Are there any concrete plans to replace/retrofit Amfleet I equipment at this point, perhaps with larger windows? ...
The plan is to replace everything, if Amtrak can raise the money, and in

the specs for Next Gen equipment, the windows are larger.

If you want to know more, the slightly dated Fleet Strategy is here:

http://www.amtrak.com/ccurl/36/921/2012-Amtrak-Fleet-Strategy-v3.1-%2003-29-12.pdf

You might want to jump to the heart of it on page 13, Build Rate.

Apparently Amtrak first thought it could buy 65 new single-level coaches

and cafes a year for the Eastern routes, and 35 a year of new bi-level

equipment for the West.

But feedback from suppliers, that is, would-be bidders, was that building

a minimum 100 cars a year of one type would be needed to generate

the maximum volume discount.

Reading between the lines, my take is, without a lot of help from Congress,

Amtrak perhaps could do 100 new cars a year -- 65 + 35 -- as in the first

Fleet Strategy document. But if Amtrak can only do 100 new cars a year,

and of only one type, then the single-level equipment will be replaced first.

The Western trains will just have to, uh, uh, write their Congresscritters,

or wait their turn until 600 or more new cars have been supplied to the East.

Meanwhile as you've noticed, except for the puny order for 130 diners,

bag cars, and sleepers from CAF, (and of course, for new Acelas) there's

no movement now to buy more stuff for either Eastern or Western trains.

There is an order from All Aboard Florida for 70 new coaches, that

Siemens will build. That is a launch order for new single-level equipment.

All Aboard Florida will have to eat the start-up costs for this manufacturing line,

because they have no way to get 70 coaches without buying them new.

Then Amtrak (or a few states supporting trains) could put out bids for

batches of up to 100 a year -- or for batches of 35 or 65 cars a year,

whatever they can afford -- that could be supplied by Siemens, CAF,

or another bidder. Amtrak and the states would simply pay a higher price

that way than if the orders were big enuff and long enuff to drive down

manufacturing costs.

Trusting in the wisdom of Congress, I expect Amtrak will be forced to pay

"small batch" prices rather than save with "high volume" prices.

YMMV.
 
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The point about AAF is salient because, if I'm not mistaken, AAF has tentative plans to expand their orders beyond the initial sets of equipment. If I'm not mistaken, AAF's stuff is also going to be roughly compliant with Amtrak's high-level boarding specs, so it's entirely possible that if AAF's stuff either meets Buy American requirements or comes reasonably close (i.e. only minimal supplier tweaking and/or moving assembly locations around is needed to comply) Amtrak could piggyback on AAF's order in some fashion.
 
AAF's order probably won't have traps (for stairs for low-level boarding). That rather restricts Amtrak's use of them; Amtrak would have to have a heavily modified order.

I know more and more high-level platforms are being built. But there are still low-level platforms with replacements not funded on the NEC, Keystone, and Empire corridors, to say nothing of Virginia service or the sleeper trains.

Ooh. And now I feel stupid.

I just figured out which moving part is present on the CAF diners/sleepers/bag-dorms and not on the pure baggage cars -- and is actually manufactured by CAF. I'll bet the traps are the problem which are delaying the rest of the order. There have been all kinds of problems with traps in the past, including being prone to water & snow infiltration and damage.
 
A point of confusion is that although Amfleet-1s are older the -2s have much more mileage. Other than -1 trains 66 & 67 -2s rack up much more mileage since are all overnight trains so average mileage is much higher per month. The -2s are slated to be replaced first with them maybe going into spare car status ? -1s will have to wait.
 
No matter what kind of cars are ordered, bigger windows will be required due to new safety requirements, i.e., making it easier to get people out of cars in an emergency.
 
Not all Amfleet II are on overnight trains; the Palmetto is mostly Amfleet II. Some Amfleet I (e.g. the Carolinian) run 700 miles in one day. But I get your point.
 
My guess is that notwithstanding whatever the flavor of the day long term plan says, the reality is that the decision on which cars to replace first will be driven partly by the potential revenue that the new cars will bring. Afterall that most likely is what will have to pay for a significant part of the cars, absent significant grant based cash infusion from the feds or whoever. That taken together with maintenance cost profiles will determine which will happen in what order between Amfleet Is and IIs and anything else for that matter. The decision to deal with Acela first is completely consistent with this reality. The consequences of this reality may not be exactly consistent with what some of us might want.
 
The point about AAF is salient because ... AAF has tentative plans to expand their orders beyond the initial sets of equipment. … AAF's stuff is also going to be roughly compliant with Amtrak's high-level boarding specs, so … if AAF's stuff either meets Buy American requirements ... Amtrak could piggyback on AAF's order in some fashion.
You got it.

From Railway Age, Sept 11, 2014 [with my arithmetic inserted]:

"The ‘modern single-level inter-city passenger cars’... would be assembled Sacramento using components manufactured across the USA, making them fully compliant with Buy America requirements.


"AAF plans to start operations with five trainsets, each formed of two diesel locomotives and four passenger coaches. [Total 5 x 4 = 20 coaches.] These will operate between Miami ... and West Palm Beach at the southern end of the route, where services are expected to begin in 2016. The trains would be extended to seven coaches [5 x 3 = 15 coaches] and five more train sets ordered [5 x 7 = 35 coaches, Grand Total 20 + 15 + 35 = 70 coaches] when the second phase is completed between West Palm Beach and Orlando ... Airport.

"... fully compliant with ADA accessibility requirements, and designed for level boarding without steps."

I can't believe the part about starting service in 2016, only two years after ordering the new cars. CAF has had four years since it got the order and not one car is yet in service. But anyway ...
 
I can't believe the part about starting service in 2016, only two years after ordering the new cars. CAF has had four years since it got the order and not one car is yet in service. But anyway ...
Last time I checked the Siemens built ACS-64 electric locomotives are being delivered on-time and on-budget. Unlike CAF, Siemens appears to run a tight ship, so it wouldn't surprise me if they also deliver AAF's passenger cars on-time and on-budget.
In terms of new equipment for the Western trains... if Amtrak put out a bid right now I would expect that Sumitomo/Nippon Sharyo would win the bid. The states have already spent the money preparing a manufacturing line to build intercity cars. It would be significantly less expensive to convert that to build long distance cars than to build a new manufacturing line from scratch. That would in turn save Amtrak money.

Maybe I'm just pessimistic, but I just don't see Amtrak placing any serious orders in the years to come. That likely means they'll be stuck placing small orders and paying high prices to the lowest bidder.
 
One difference may be that CAF is building a more complex car designed by someone else, whereas Siemens will just be building a version of cars that they have designed and have already in production in Europe. Just a matter of setting up a new production line with some minor mods to match US requirements. Just a guess. But that is what I understand listening to the AAF folks on this matter.Since AAF is also not depending on the RRIF loan anymore the pressure to be Buy America compliant is eased considerably.
 
My guess is that notwithstanding whatever the flavor of the day long term plan says, the reality is that the decision on which cars to replace first will be driven partly by the potential revenue that the new cars will bring. … The decision to deal with Acela first is completely consistent with this reality. The consequences of this reality may not be exactly consistent with what some of us might want.
The Eastern single-level trains may already have a positive operating result, namely the Palmetto (the Auto Train, of course, does not use single-level equipment); or they're getting close to break even, the Carolinian, Meteor, Star, Lake Shore Ltd, and probably the Ethan Allen, Vermonter, Adirondack, Maple Leaf, and Pennsylvanian; or they have modest but tolerable losses of $10 or $20 million or so, the Cardinal and the Crescent. The results on most of these trains will soon improve when high-maintenance diners are replaced, and sleeper capacity increases by 60%.

Most of the Western trains, alas, count losses by the tens of millions.

I'm not playing favorites. I want a strong national system.

But my bet is they'll invest first in the Eastern trains: new coaches and cafes to expand capacity by one or two cars per train (so, 20 to 40 for that), take the Cardinal daily (5 or 10 more tops), to reduce maintenance and operating costs, and to give riders fresh modern trains. Perhaps if the tide is with us, add a Chicago-NYC train with daylight stops in Cleveland and Pittsburgh and that day train to Atlanta.

After somehow paying for 600 or more cars for the East, I'd expect a turn to the West.

But yes, YMMV.
 
It's also a good question as to how much trouble it would be to add the traps for the steps, too.

With that being said, at least as far as trains only going between WAS and NYP, I want to say that most or all of the stations have platforms that are all-high-level, and I think the same applies to the Keystone and Empire routes as far as Albany and Harrisburg, so Amtrak could in theory partially replace the NEC fleet. Fixing non-NEC stations to comply will be problematic; though it would at least be doable in theory, enough stations have platform setups that are not exactly friendly to all-high-level trains...though even at RVR, you could probably raise everything but a small area around the pedestrian crossing between platforms and the crossing plus "ramped" platform areas would be only about one car long (and besides, the main platform is something like 18 cars long, while the other platforms don't allow trains to be parked across the crossing for very long since that would block access to the main platform).
 
The Eastern single-level trains may already have a positive operating result, namely the Palmetto (the Auto Train, of course, does not use single-level equipment); or they're getting close to break even, the Carolinian, Meteor, Star, Lake Shore Ltd, and probably the Ethan Allen, Vermonter, Adirondack, Maple Leaf, and Pennsylvanian; or they have modest but tolerable losses of $10 or $20 million or so, the Cardinal and the Crescent. The results on most of these trains will soon improve when high-maintenance diners are replaced, and sleeper capacity increases by 60%.
You are mixing state supported trains with LD trains. With the eastern states now supporting all the off-NEC corridor services and the NEC commission working on a new funding arrangement for the NEC, really have to put a wall between the LD and corridor trains for funding, future equipment acquisition and planning.
The acquisition of Amfleet I replacements could and possibly likely will end up being completely separated from the acquisition of Amfleet II replacements which may result in orders from different vendors. If the states are providing some or much of the funding for Amfleet I replacements, they will ultimately decide what to order, not Amtrak. The Amfleet I could be replaced by Siemens built coach cars of Siemens own design. Amtrak could decide to order Amfleet II replacements based on the Viewliner II, so they would have a consistent type for the eastern LD fleet. Don't know how replacement orders for the Amfleet I and IIs (and P-42 diesels) are going to play out, but we need to recognize that the states DOTs will have a major role in the process. It is not just up to Amtrak management to decide, the FRA to oversee and Congress to provide the funds.

The Palmetto, Meteor, Star, etc are not operating at a surplus or getting close to "breaking even". Some of the eastern LD trains may be covering their direct costs, which is a useful metric when to comes to looking at possible service expansions. But until they cover their fully allocated costs which includes all the overhead, they are losing money. Period. For the first 11 months of FY14, the Palmetto has a fully allocated operating loss of $9.3 million, the Silver Meteor $27 million.
 
The Eastern single-level trains may already have a positive operating result, namely the Palmetto (the Auto Train, of course, does not use single-level equipment); or they're getting close to break even, the Carolinian, Meteor, Star, Lake Shore Ltd, and probably the Ethan Allen, Vermonter, Adirondack, Maple Leaf, and Pennsylvanian; or they have modest but tolerable losses of $10 or $20 million or so, the Cardinal and the Crescent. The results on most of these trains will soon improve when high-maintenance diners are replaced, and sleeper capacity increases by 60%.
You are mixing state supported trains with LD trains. With the eastern states now supporting all the off-NEC corridor services and the NEC commission working on a new funding arrangement for the NEC, really have to put a wall between the LD and corridor trains for funding, future equipment acquisition and planning.
Seems like Amtrak has been cooperating with the states for many years,

conspicuously so in developing the specs for Next Gen locomotive and

rolling stock. In the Midwest, now Illinois, Michigan, and Missouri are buying

new bi-level cars from Nippon-Sharyo for their state-supported services

that will probably be operated by Amtrak. They will enjoy various economies

from sharing common equipment. Why should Amtrak and the states not

cooperate to their mutual benefit in the future?

In addition, the bi-levels designed for corridor service apparently could be

easily tweaked for long distance cars. Nippon Sharyo hasn't won the bidding

for long distance bi-level cars for the Western trains, but it will have a big

head start. So yes, I'll mix the Lincoln service with the Texas Eagle. I'm

betting that in 15 years they could both have consists of bi-level coaches

from Nippon Sharyo.

In much the same way, I expect that in 20 years the cars on the Vermonter

and the Regionals, on the Ethan Allen and the Lake Shore Ltd, on the

Adirondack and the Cardinal, on the Pennsylvanian and the Silvers will be

basically the same, certainly built to the same Next Gen specs, possibly

from the same manufacturer, and serviced in the same Amtrak yards.

And no, I'm not seeing any wall between the LD and corridor trains that
wasn't there already. Each of the equipment orders since the Stimulus money
came has been an individual collage of planning and funding, and I don't
expect that process somehow to change to smooth cookie cutter patterns.
If North Carolina doesn't want to pay to use Amtrak's new equipment and
chooses to buy their own from Amtrak's supplier, so what? But I'm sure
that Amtrak won't let state-supported trains with consists of old cars
that can't keep up even get on the NEC.

Perhaps I missed the proper terms to describe the results of the Eastern
trains and the Western trains. However, unless you are really intent on
deliberately missing my point, it doesn't much matter. The point is, the losses
on each and every one of the Eastern trains is much lower than the losses
of any of the Western trains. Closing the gap between current losses and
break-even or positive results, however defined, labeled, or measured will
be much easier on the Eastern trains. I expect that Amtrak will try to close
the easier gap, then turn to the problems of the Western trains down the line.
 
States on the extended NEC are a special case since Amtrak controls most of the tracks from WAS to ALB, SPG, and BOS as well as HAR-PHL. NC could tell Amtrak to get lost and use whatever they want equipment-wise as far as the Piedmont goes, but not the Carolinian (unless they're willing to truncate service to WAS).

With that being said, my best guess is that if Amtrak tries to get rid of the Amfleet Is (rather than retaining them as surge capacity, for example), they'll face a lot of pressure from states, other operators, and (I sincerely hope) Congress to sell them rather than scrap them...and it'll be pretty hard for Amtrak to deny access on the NEC to trains using equipment Amtrak is (presumably) still using in any quantity.
 
I want to say that most or all of the stations have platforms that are all-high-level, and I think the same applies to the Keystone and Empire routes as far as Albany and Harrisburg, so Amtrak could in theory partially replace the NEC fleet.
That's not exactly true as far as Keystone is concerned. Ardmore, Paoli, Downingtown, Coatesville, Parkesburg, Mt Joy and Middletown are all low-level platforms that require steps.
 
Ok, that's my bad on the Keystone. I know that Albany is high-level. Ditto Yonkers, and I think the others on the Hudson line are.
 
So, just for fun, I worked out which stations have high platforms and which have low platforms.

On the Empire Corridor, it's high in Metro-North territory (NY Penn through Poughkeepsie), but north of that, the only high platforms are Albany, Schenectady (coming soon), Syracuse, and Rochester (coming soon). In particular, Rhinecliff and Hudson still have low platforms.

On the Adirondack, Montreal has high platforms but everything in between there and Schenectady does not.

On the Keystone, there are *plans* for high platforms everywhere from Harrisburg to Philadelphia, but they aren't *funded*. (Barclur listed the unfunded stations.)

On the NEC itself, the low-level stations are:

Westerly, RI

Mystic, CT

Cornwells Heights, PA

Newark, DE (there are plans for this but they keep changing and being delayed)

Aberdeen, MD (I found a 2012 study for "Aberdeen Station Square")

and of course *some* of the tracks at DC Union.

There seem to be no plans for high-level platforms at Westerly, Mystic, or Cornwells Heights.

The Springfield corridor is all low-level. The commuter rail funding is only going to build high-levels as far north as Berlin. Springfield itself should also get high-levels as part of the endlessly delayed station reconstruction project. (It is hoped that the unfunded highway relocation project in Hartford will involve high-levels there. This still leaves Windsor and Windsor Locks unfunded, though!)

In short, there is a lot of platform work necessary before Amtrak can run all-stops service on trains without traps, on any corridor.

The Palmetto, Meteor, Star, etc are not operating at a surplus or getting close to "breaking even". Some of the eastern LD trains may be covering their direct costs, which is a useful metric when to comes to looking at possible service expansions. But until they cover their fully allocated costs which includes all the overhead, they are losing money.
How can I put this politely?

****.

I apparently understand more about the economics of business lines than you do.

When you talk about an operation "losing money", what do you mean? I believe the actual question is:

"If we discontinued this operation, would the bottom line

(a) improve (i.e. the operation is "losing money" for us)

(b) get worse (i.e. the operation is "making money" for us)

?"

For a train which is covering its avoidable costs, the answer is that discontinuing it would make the bottom line worse -- the train is "making money".

Direct costs are nowhere near a perfect proxy for avoidable costs, but they're the best I've seen. They're certainly a better proxy than "fully allocated costs", which are nonsense.

Larding services up with overhead is bad accounting when you're making business decisions. There are clear case studies of several railroads which made *bad business decisions* based on looking at *profitable* lines which appeared unprofitable after they'd been larded up with overhead. They kept cutting the supposedly "unprofitable" lines, each time they did this, their bottom line got worse.

It is a terrible, terrible business mistake to look at the operations that way. That's why I speak so strongly about it.

Now, do the Star, Meteor, and Palmetto as a *group* "make money"? I'm not actually sure -- since nobody's released direct-costs numbers for fiscal years after 2012 -- but likely not. You could close a lot of stations and thus eliminate some overhead costs if you discontinued *all three* of them. (Though you'd have to relocate Hialeah; so many overhead costs would not go away.) *Individually*, however, the Palmetto and Meteor make money. You can't reasonably count the shared costs towards either one of them individually if you're considering whether to discontinue that one or not.

Here's another way to see why your thinking is simply wrong. Suppose you have three services which which you are claiming "lose money". Suppose you add a fourth service, with the *same* variable costs and the *same* revenues as each of the other three, and now all four of the services "make money". Does this make any sense? No.

What's really going on is that all the services were "making money" all along -- they just weren't making enough money to cover overhead. Expansion of services allowed overhead to be covered. That's the correct way to look at it if you're looking at it as a business matter.

Another way to put it: if you cancelled the entire eastern long-distance network, the cost of the reservations system (which is partly "allocated" to them) would... remain exactly the same and be reallocated to other trains. Whoops.

The only legitimate purpose of overhead allocation is when figuring out how much of a markup you need to charge when doing *contract services*. If you do nothing but contract services, then your markup over avoidable costs on each contract has to include an amount to cover overhead, and to be fair to your customers, you want to spread it evenly over all of them. If you underestimate the number of contracts you're going to get this year, you'll underallocate the overhead and lose money; if you overestimate the number of contracts you're going to get this year, you'll overallocate the overhead and gain money. But it's still a useful tool for this purpose. As such, I'm not going to complain about Amtrak's allocation of overhead to the state-contracted trains; it's an attempt to get the states to cover part of the overhead costs, and it's a negotiated result.

By contrast, if you're running operations on your own account, allocating overhead is silliness and leads to bad business decisions. Please note that Amtrak is running the long-distance trains and the NEC on its own account.

This overhead allocation is the same idiotic thinking which causes people to claim that "Amtrak loses $XXX on every passenger, so if they get more passengers they'll lose more money". It really, really doesn't work that way, and it's misleading to think about it that way.

From a business point of view, what is going on with the best-performing eastern "long distance" trains is that they are profitable to operate, but have very low gross margins. So they do not contribute much to the extremely large overhead of running a railroad. (This seems to be the current problem on the Palmetto, Meteor, and LSL.)

By contrast, a bunch of the western trains seem to be nowhere close to covering their variable costs.

I don't know what the situation was back when David Gunn foolishly cancelled the Three Rivers. It's possible that it was actually losing money, since it seems like all the trains had lower ridership back in 2004. Or maybe it wasn't. It would certainly be making money now. Would the "fully allocated" numbers show that? Depends on what arbitrary allocation procedure was used.

You can make any train look unprofitable by screwing around with overhead allocation. It's not real, it's just confusing. What is real is that some trains have much better gross margins than others. But Amtrak is no longer publishing numbers which allow us to work out the gross margins.
 
Hmm. I'll try to put this less confrontationally:

Good business sense says that the NY-Chicago services should be expanded, with capital improvements. The demand is clearly there, even at high ticket prices and even with delays. The LSL probably has positive gross margins at this point (it's hard to tell); adding additional service with positive gross margins improves the bottom line. The network effect will also improve ridership & revenue on all connecting lines.

Good business sense says that the NY-Florida services should be expanded, with capital improvements. The demand is clearly there, even at high ticket prices and even with delays. The existing service as a whole probably has positive gross margins at this point (it's hard to tell); adding additional service with positive gross margins improves the bottom line. The network effect will also improve ridership & revenue on all connecting lines.

Good business sense says that West Coast - Chicago services should NOT be expanded, and that money put into capital improvements would NOT help. The demand does not seem to be there, even when the trains are running on time, and even with arguably low prices. The existing services have substantial negative gross margins. Adding additional service with negative gross margins makes the bottom line worse. The network effect would still improve ridership & revenue on connecting lines, but given how negative the gross margins are, this probably isn't enough to compensate.

Furthermore, expansion is currently very difficult and expensive on the other service Amtrak operates on its own account -- the NEC. The returns on expanding Acela are expected to be positive. But NE Regional service probably can't be expanded much even with more cars; expensive trackwork is needed.

So: there is a straightforward dollars-and-cents business case for buying new Viewliners. They will pay for themselves quickly. Amtrak's choice to spend its free cash on this was pure dollars and cents. With positive gross margins, if a shortage of Viewliners causes a train to be cancelled (or worse, causes it to run with too few cars on a high demand day), this is lost money for Amtrak.

But there is a much worse business case for buying new Superliners (except perhaps on the Auto Train). If a shortage of Superliners causes a train to be cancelled, Amtrak probably actually comes out ahead at the end of the year.
 
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I generally agree with the points you make. Couple of minor observations:

1. The NE Regionals can be uniformly expanded to 10 or 11 cars if more cars become available, involving no additional track work. That would be increasing capacity by a third. And most of the additional revenue will be additional cash since there will be minimal additional staffing involved - one additional assistant conductor per train AFAICT.

2. Agree fully about eastern LDs. Among the LDs they are a potential gold mine that Amtrak is sitting on, and rightfully the first replacement and expansion rolling stock that they ordered is to beef them up some.
 
The Silvers run with 10-12 car consists compared to 15-18 in the Heritage Fleet era. It's typical for the trains to be sold out at some point along their routes. The Crescent also had a significantly longer consist prior to Amfleet II. Whether the financial performance of these trains would improve with longer consists is unclear; it depends on what happens to the average selling price of a ticket for longer consists and the capital and maintenance charges for the incremental cars. But my guess is, the trains' financial performance would improve with longer consists -- at least during the high and shoulder seasons for these trains.
 
Came across this RFP on the Amtrak Procurement Portal website in the non-construction category: Engineering Assessment - Amfleet Passenger Cars which was posted on July 15 and will be open until July 24. No information beyond this:

REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL * Engineering Assessments (Amfleet Passenger Cars) * Description: Engineering Assessment to determine the life expectancy of Amtrak's Amfleet Passenger Cars. A Non-Disclosure Agreement must be executed to ensure you receive all relevant documents. * Amtrak will accept proposals for the following procurement until 2:00 PM Eastern Time on the closing date stated below: * RFP Number: Doc672157 * Proposal Closing Date: 8/14/15
So Amtrak is looking for a company to provide an independent engineering assessment of the remaining life expectancy of the Amfleet cars. May be doing this as input for the next release or update of the Fleet Strategy Plan.
 
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